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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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'Open Skies' Talks in Budapest Begin 23 Apr

LD2304140190 Moscow TASS in English 1337 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Budapest April 23 TASS—The second stage of the international "Open Skies" conference opened in Budapest today. It is being attended by 23 Warsaw Treaty and NATO member states.

The key aim of the international forum is to achieve an agreement between the two military and political alliances on making control flights over these states' territories by planes without arms.

Bogachev on Aims, Tasks

LD2304230290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] The second stage of the Open Skies conference of the 23 member countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO [has opened]. We asked TASS military commentator Vladimir Bogachev to talk about the aims and tasks of the conference, and about the results of its first stage, which took place in Ottawa.

[Begin recording] [Bogachev] Holding the Open Skies conference is a sign of the times per se. It was made possible only as a result of the spread of the new political thinking in the world, and of states' new approaches to problems of war and peace. The participants in the conference are setting themselves the task of agreeing to set up a system to enable observers from one side to carry out unhindered flights over the other side's territory in unarmed aircraft, and to observe military activity in this or that region. What is involved is spy planes, within the law. That was the image one journalist used to describe the essence of the problem under discussion at the conference. That was a joke, of course. One of the conference's tasks in fact consists in ruling out espionage in the broad sense of the word from these flights. At the same time, the flights must assist in preventing, say, a sudden attack by one side on the other, by discovering concentrations of armed forces preparing for attack. In our age of missiles and nuclear technology, that is a very important task.

Flights made under the Open skies plan must be conducted according to defined rules, with the side over whose territory the observation is to be made being informed in advance, with particular equipment being used, and with the flight path and other agreed upon requirements being defined. The delegates in Ottawa discussed these rules.

It would seem that the main result of the first stage of the conference in Ottawa lies in the fact that all parties came to the conclusion that the proposed Open Skies system is not only expedient but also feasible. Differences between the participants also came to light. Some of them are of a fundamental nature. Thus, the U.S. side insisted that every state should gather information independently and with its own aircraft, and that it should not share the information it gains with other countries. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, believes a single common data bank should be created which all parties to the treaty could use. After all, not all of the 23 countries can afford to conduct frequent observation flights, for both economic and technical reasons.

Washington is insisting that inspection flights over its military bases sited in countries which are not NATO members, for example Japan. [as heard] According to the U.S. proposal, they can now conduct inspection flights over Soviet territory in the Far East from the Uelen Cape to Vladivostock, while the USSR will not acquire the right to inspect U.S. military activity at the large bases in Japan in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet border. That is unfair, of course.

In short, solutions to many issues of fundamental importance will have to be sought at the second stage of the Open Skies conference, which has opened in Budapest. It seems to me, however, that there are no insoluble problems in his sphere. [end recording]

Grinevskiy Cited on Conventional Arms Talks

PM2404090790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent Igor Melnikov: ""Dancing School""]

[Text] Vienna, 22 Apr—The 23 states taking part in the Vienna talks have come very close to elaborating procedures for destroying or converting conventional arms coming under the terms of the future treaty.

To judge by observers' first reactions, the sides share the view that the main mass of these arms should be destroyed. But before complete elimination some of them could be rendered unfit for combat and placed at temporary depots under international control. What should serve as the basic criterion here? The answer of competent experts is unambiguous: putting the arms and equipment which are being reduced into a condition which completely rules out the possibility of their restoration as weapons. In that case any circumvention of the treaty would become impossible.

"These seemingly strictly working issues have considerable importance in our view," O. Grinevskiy, the head of the USSR delegation, said in a talk with your PRAVDA correspondent. "At a recent session we imparted our ideas on specific methods of rendering the arsenals which are being reduced unfit for combat. Our position will be submitted in a more detailed form to our partners in the very near future. The constructive discussion of the problem will make it possible to ensure tangible progress at the talks."

In the corridors of the Hofburg palace, where the talks are underway, there is a lot of talk now about an unusual channel which, military experts believe, will accelerate the untying of the "Vienna knots." The idea is simple:

Let the NATO and Warsaw Pact states organize on a mutual basis the display of the main models of conventional arms to be destroyed both in their combat-capable form and rendered unfit for combat. Then both sides would see for themselves the practical feasibility of the measures which turn terrible weapons into virtual toys.

Incidentally, some experience has already been accumulated here. Diplomats recall with satisfaction the display, organized last fall by the Czechoslovak side, of models of arms and equipment subject to the treaty in the region of Brno City. The recent proposal from Britain for a 17-18 May familiarization tour of the activity of a Royal Air Force base in the FRG has also been well received at the talks. And it has now become known that the Soviet side is prepared to show in May or June the basic models of U.S. Arms in a combat-capable form or rendered unfit for combat. The Soviet side proceeds from the premise that these "viewings" must be held on a mutual basis.

It must be supposed that the Western partners in the talks share this approach: As is well known, it takes two to tango. And that applies to an even greater extent to the Vienna waltz.

Further on Perfilyev's 19 Apr Briefing

PM2304133790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[G. Charodeyev report from USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center: "Pressure Campaign Continues"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The briefing's moderator V. Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, told journalists that a group of U.S. observers recently visited the Soviet air base at Uzin (Ukraine) in order to inspect heavy bombers. This visit was conducted in accordance with the Soviet-U.S. agreement signed 8 December 1989 on reciprocal demonstrations of heavy bombers and is the first of a whole series of experimental verification measures in respect of strategic arms. At the beginning of May a Soviet group will visit a U.S. air base to conduct a similar inspection of U.S. heavy bombers. In addition there will be experimental inspections to monitor the number of warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

During this inspection the Soviet side demonstrated two heavy bombers—one equipped for air-launched long-range nuclear cruise missiles and one not so equipped. U.S. observers were able, in particular, to inspect and measure these aircrafts' weapons bays and the arms themselves and also inspect the cockpits. The entire air base as a whole was also inspected. On its completion both sides expressed the opinion that the trial inspection had been successful.

The U.S. representatives' visit to a strategic offensive arms facility prior to the conclusion of a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms attests to the increased trust between the two countries and their firm intention to work to conclude a treaty.

V. Perfilyev then said: "A number of foreign news organs, including VOA, citing Western diplomats in Islamabad, Radio Tehran, and French news agencies, have reported that D. Panjsheri and S.M. Ziray, members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Central Committee who were arrested after former Defense Minister S. Tanai's abortive coup, have been executed in Kabul. We contacted Kabul and were told that this information does not correspond with the real situation. The same radio stations reported that S. La'eq, Afghan minister of border affairs, and Foreign Minister A. Wakil had been removed from their posts. We were told by Kabul that S. La'eq still holds his former post. Foreign Minister A. Wakil is now in Moscow, from where he will fly on to New York to take part in a special UN General Assembly session on international economic questions....

FRG, GDR Ministers Talk About Unification

PM2304104590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent M. Podklyuchnikov under the rubric "Topic of the Day": "What Did Ministers Agree On?"]

[Text] Berlin—The new GDR Government is taking its first steps aimed at specifically bringing matters to the unification of the two German states. In particular this is the aim of the series of meetings at minister level. Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Peter-Michael Diestel was the first member of the GDR Government to make an official trip to Bonn. His partner at the talks has been FRG Interior Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble.

First of all the two ministers found a common language with regard to the all-around easing of the two German states' border regime. Measures have been outlined to ensure that at the same time as the forthcoming conclusion of a currency, economic, and social alliance, control is lifted on the crossing of the border by individual citizens. But inasmuch as this would mean that citizens of other states could also move freely in both directions the ministers provided for the establishment of control at the "foreign borders" of the GDR and the FRG on the basis of a jointly elaborated visa policy.

In this connection political observers are naturally asking: Does this decision not mean that the GDR Government intends to renounce agreements on reciprocal visaless through travel which the republic has with a number of states? And in the future will it be not Berlin but Bonn which determines who will enter the GDR and who will not?

In taking individual GDR departments under its tutelage, Bonn is passing its advisers onto them. The first has been Elmar Pieroth, a consultant whom the West German Christian Democratic Union sent to "assist" GDR Economy Minister Gerhard Pohl. After the present meeting on the Rhine the GDR Ministry of Internal Affairs will also receive its own Bonn adviser. He will be Heinrich Boge, who until recently headed the criminal affairs department in the FRG.

At the same time GDR Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Regine Hildebrandt and FRG Minister of Labor and Social Affairs FRG Norbert Bluem had a meeting. On the agenda was an important question affecting the fundamental interests of GDR citizens—the prospects of mass unemployment after the GDR economy, as a result of the conclusion of the currency, economic, and social alliance with the FRG, is "in harness" with the West German economy and consequently encounters merciless competition. In contrast to the interior ministers, here no definitive specific measures have yet been heard of.

GDR, FRG Ministers on Economic Cooperation

LD2404081890 Moscow TASS in English 0730 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] United Nations April 24 TASS—By TASS correspondent Mikhail Kochetkov:

The East and West German ministers for economic cooperation Hans-Wilhelm Ebeling and Yuergen Warnke are trying to persuade developing countries at the United Nations that the unification of the two Germanys will not diminish the amount of aid for development purposes.

UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar on Monday received both ministers to discuss economic cooperation.

On the same day, the ministers gave a news conference at West Germany's UN mission, during which Ebeling, who has been in the post of the minister for economic cooperation of the German Democratic Republic for only several days, said that his country was revising projects to provide aid to other countries. He said that the GDR did not intend to give politically-motivated aid in future and would confine itself only to the humanitarian area of assistance to developing countries.

Warnke, in turn, promised to increase aid to developing states as a result of slashing military spending. "Approximately half a billion marks will be saved in the West German budget for 1990," he said. "This figure can top a billion marks in 1991 thanks to reductions in military expenditures."

In the next few days the ministers will travel to Nicaragua to attend the inauguration of that country's new president. Ebeling said that in Managua he intended to visit the Karl Marx Hospital built with the GDR's assistance.

Warnke was asked if he, too, planned to visit this hospital. He answered that he did not have any objections to this project, which only proves the high standard of medicine in the GDR. He added that the name of the hospital did not embarrass him. "My ministry in Bonn stands on Karl Marx Street and I go there every day," he added.

Speaking during the debates at the UN General Assembly special session, devoted to international economic cooperation, Ebeling noted that the GDR would continue to implement economic, medical, agricultural and social aid projects to developing countries, although "we made a decision to free economic cooperation of ideology." He emphasised that the GDR's assistance would from now on never serve the creation of security services in other countries.

Warnke said at the special session that West Germany allocated extra funds this year for aid to East European countries. "Expenditures on developing cooperation with developing countries have also increased," he said.

Some Progress Toward Chemical Weapons Ban Noted

PM2304104790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[A. Golts commentary under the rubric "History: Dates and Deliberations": "1976 and the Latest?"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Our country has always been in favor of a total ban on chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has not supplied these weapons to other states and has never used them itself. However, we will be honest. Our stand has not always been consistent. I can remember how, comparatively recently, vague arguments were given at a news conference in response to the direct question of whether the Soviet Union possesses chemical weapons or not. The essence of these arguments was that our Armed Forces "have everything necessary at their disposal" to properly respond to a chemical attack by a potential adversary.

The mutual suspicion which reached its peak in the period of confrontation essentially blocked talks on drafting a convention to ban chemical weapons. A real turnabout came with the new political thinking. Not confining itself to proclaiming the destruction of toxins as a priority foreign policy task, our country embarked on a path of glasnost. It gave out data on its chemical weapon stockpiles, invited foreign representatives to secret military installations, and developed a system of comprehensive verification of a future agreement. The Soviet Union announced that it was terminating its chemical weapons production.

It must be admitted that a number of states, the United States included, have taken steps to meet us halfway. As a result, work on a comprehensive international document which is to outlaw chemical weapons forever is nearing completion.

Washington and Moscow intend to make joint efforts in this sphere even before a convention is signed. One of the main documents that will be discussed at the future summit meeting is a bilateral agreement on mutual commitments. It envisages the destruction of a substantial proportion of U.S. and Soviet chemical weapon stockpiles and their reduction to equal, low levels. It also discusses cooperation in the field of techniques and procedures for the safe, quick destruction of chemical weapons that will meet economic and environmental requirements.

As we can see, progress is being made. However, it would be premature to say with confidence that the "silent killers" no longer pose a threat to people.

Chemical weapons are proliferating rapidly across the planet. To all appearances, several developing countries possess these weapons, regarding them as "the nuclear weapon of the poor." Moreover, these barbarous weapons are being used in regional conflicts. It is evidently going to take considerable effort to persuade all states to reject chemical weapons.

There is also inconsistency in the U.S. stance. Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States still manufactures chemical weapons. And it not only manufactures them. I happened to visit the U.S. Army chemical center at Fort McClellan quite recently. It is there that officers and sergeants are trained as toxin specialists. For obvious reasons, the people in charge strictly limited our time at this secret center and contrived only to show us how specialists are trained in chemical defense procedures.

However, it is highly significant that training exercises at the fort use real nerve gases, sarin in particular. We were also shown a special laboratory where this lethal gas is synthesized in fairly large quantities. The exercises themselves are conducted in special isolation units. First the instructor, wearing protective clothing, applies toxins to weapons and military hardware, and then the trainees have to decontaminate them. Possibly the main impression from what I saw was that the Americans are still very serious about training for combat operations involving the use of chemical weapons.

But perhaps I am taking an overly gloomy view of things. Those same skills which U.S. servicemen acquire at Fort McClellan will certainly also be required in order to dispose of the "silent death." After all, millions of units of chemical munitions and hundreds of thousands of tonnes of toxins have been accumulated, and rendering them harmless will be no easy matter. The Americans have already come up against this problem when planning the forthcoming removal of 400 tonnes of toxins from their depots in the FRG.

Let us hope, nevertheless, that it will not be too long before chemical weapons disappear from the face of the earth forever. So that people will never be threatened with a repetition of the nightmare at Ypres.

United States & Canada

Bush, Baker Cited on Release of Hostage Polhill

PM2304204390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA press service report: "Hostage Gets Freedom"]

[Excerpts] The American Robert Polhill, who was seized in Beirut by the "Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine" organization in January 1987, spent more than 1,000 days in captivity, between life and death. On Sunday evening he was finally released and handed over to Syrian intelligence officers in a southern suburb of Beirut and then taken to the U.S. Embassy in Damascus. [passage omitted]

Western news agencies report that Polhill's release was made possible thanks to Syrian and Iranian mediation. But U.S. President G. Bush, talking on Sunday with journalists, made it plain that a general improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations will be possible only if all U.S. hostages in Lebanon are released. According to UPI calculations, 16 Western hostages, including seven Americans, are being held in the country at the present time by various groupings.

"This is a joyful day. But the fate of the rest of the hostages will remain my burden until they are all released," the U.S. President said. Secretary of State J. Baker thanked Syrian and Iranian officials but refused to discuss the role of the latter in the hostage drama.

R. Polhill is the second U.S. hostage to be released in Lebanon. The first was D. Jacobsen who was released unharmed in November 1986. An American R. Higgins, a UN forces officer, was executed by his captors.

Washington Summit Preparations in 'Full Swing'

PM2404140990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by A. Stepovoy: "En Route for the Market. USSR President's Press Service Briefing"]

[Excerpts] The USSR president's press service arranged a routine briefing for representatives of the Soviet and foreign press on 23 April. [passage omitted]

[A. Maslennikov, USSR president's press secretary] The president's preparations for the visit to the United States are in full swing. Preparations are being made at all manner of levels. The talks in Geneva on problems of nuclear and space armaments are proceeding at full speed. Intensive bilateral contacts are taking place. We are looking forward to Secretary of State Mr Baker's arrival in Moscow. During the conversations with him the details of the upcoming summit will be worked out. In short, preparations for the U.S. visit are proceeding normally.

As for a meeting with journalists, I do not know what specific plans the president has for this. Possibly it would be a good idea to have this meeting after the U.S. visit. But if the president considered it necessary to make some statement or other on the eve of the visit I would join you in welcoming such a meeting.

U.S. Anger Over Lithuania Seen as 'Farce'

LD2404101690 Moscow TASS in English 0922 GMT 24 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Sidorin]

[Text] San Francisco, April 24 TASS—The indignation of some U.S. politicians over the Lithuanian stand-off are an open farce, according to Douglas Mattern, director of the World Civil Diplomacy Organisation.

This is especially apparent when the criticism or denouncement of the Soviet leadership's Lithuanian policy comes from representatives of the U.S. Congress or Administration, who spend more than a million dollars a day to support the corrupt Salvadorean regime and its death squads, he writes in an open letter to the SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE newspaper.

These are the same Washington leaders who spent millions of dollars on the Contra war against the Nicaraguan Government, which killed thousands, as well as the recent invasion of Panama, Mattern wrote.

The United States should stop building up tensions around the Lithuanian problem. It is bad enough that Lithuanians are hurting the first Soviet leader who will allow them to secede if they show common sense and restraint in abiding by Soviet laws, he stressed.

Gorbachev bears responsibility for his country and cannot allow reckless actions capable of provoking a civil war in the republics, he pointed out.

More seasoned American political analysts support a more measured approach to Washington's official stance on Lithuania.

The Soviet leader has shown that he is ready to abide by the constitutional provision of the republics' right to secession, Jeane Kirkpatrick, the former U.S. United Nations representative, wrote in THE LOS ANGELES TIMES. The Soviet Government's proposed secession mechanism is basically prudent and provides a way out of the situation, she said.

Commentary Urges U.S. Warning to Lithuania

LD2404100990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0400 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Commentary by Aleksandr Malikov]

[Text] There is a need to touch on the situation in Lithuania in this program, since rumors about possible economic sanctions by the United States against the

Soviet Union continue to circulate in American corridors of power. Agencies report that this theme will be touched on by U.S. President George Bush at his meeting with the leaders of the U.S. Congress. Earlier, the United States excluded the possibility of an embargo on grain supplies to our country, as well as any cancellation of the scheduled U.S.-USSR summit. For a more complete picture of U.S. reaction to events in Lithuania, it is also worth noting that the U.S. Department of State has refused [Lithuanian Prime Minister] Prunskiene an entry visa to the United States next month. All of these reports have reminded me of the following advice from THE NEW YORK TIMES to the White House, which was published on the pages of that newspaper: The fact that President Bush warned Gorbachev against using force in Lithuania, the newspaper says, is fine, but it would be more appropriate if at this time he warned Lithuanians to stop pushing President Gorbachev toward coercion.

U.S. Links Trade Status With Lithuania

LD2404120790 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] A new round of Soviet-American talks on drafting a trade agreement has started in Paris. Commentary is by Vladislav Kozyakov. Here is what he writes.

The sides believe an agreement is ready in many ways and the unsettled issues can be resolved soon. So, in fact, there is a chance to fulfill the agreement reached by Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush last December. The presidents then agreed that a trade accord be signed during the summit in Washington. Such a conclusion is also borne out by the fact that the major aspects of a future agreement, the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik discriminatory legislation and the granting of most favored nation treatment status to the USSR, could no longer be objected to by the American side. the emigration regulations that used to be in effect in the USSR were the main obstacle. Since then legislation in this sphere has been brought in this country in line with universally accepted norms and, what is no less important, every Soviet citizen can now exercise this right to travel outside the country and return.

Incidentally, this part of a trade accord on granting most favored nation status to the USSR is high on the agenda of the negotiations in Paris. If the issue is settled there can be a real breakthrough in Soviet-American economic ties. However, the talks, as some reports indicate, have been in a complex situation. The American delegation is to make a choice and in fact show which priorities the United States has set in relations with the USSR. The point is that some cabinet members and congressmen have been attempting to link the prospect of signing a trade accord to the situation in Lithuania. Their logic is that if the Soviet president adopts measures unsuitable to Washington against Lithuania the American side could slow down drafting a trade treaty. Thus on the pretext of events in Lithuania some american officials are ready to put major agreements reached in Malta at risk.

We could recall in this connection that at the Malta summit both sides attached much significance to a normal bilateral trade. Basically coordinated economic cooperation was described as a fundamental achievement in Malta. If those in Washington who would like to use trade as pressure against the USSR in solving its internal problems prevailed, we'd be doubtful concerning the predictability of American policy. We would also question the sincerity of the United States' wish of success for perestroyka and its intention to promote cooperation with the USSR.

Lithuania Issue Impacting on Superpower Ties

PM2304160590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent V. Nadein under rubric "Situation in Lithuania. In the Mirror of the World Press": "United States"]

[Text] Washington—Opinions of perestroyka, which have never been unanimous in the United States, have now run up against a stumbling block. This stumbling block is Lithuania...

The pre-perestroyka world was both more malevolent and more simple. The United States never recognized the legality of Lithuania's incorporation in the USSR, as demonstrated by the "Enslaved Nations Weeks" that were proclaimed annually in Washington. If something similar to the present had happened some 10-15 years ago, the U.S. reaction would have been sharp, decisive, and knee-jerk. Because manners in the "cold war" were as in a real war.

But the point is that nothing "similar" could have happened either in Lithuania or in another place 10-15 years ago. Under Brezhnev and earlier, professors of music did not dare to indulge even in music to their heart's content—what about politics, then?

"Enslaved Nations Week" did not take place last summer. This gave grounds for criticism of President G. Bush. The criticism intensified with the development of events in the Baltic region. It is a rare commentator who is so bold as to concur even in some way with M.S. Gorbachev's position on Lithuania. All are solidly and unconditionally behind Lithuania: the Senate, Congress, the mass media, the influential Lithuanian community in the United States...

The impression was created that only President Bush and Secretary of State Baker were opposed to this unified trend. However, in public statements and at official talks, including the recent meetings with E.A. Shevardnadze, the U.S. Administration has left no doubts about its policy, constantly emphasizing that the development of events in the Baltic region will "have an influence" on the entire package of Soviet-U.S. relations. At the same time Bush accompanied his warnings with vigorous "buts" and "howevers." For it is a question not simply of a partner in important talks. Nor even simply of one of the two superpowers, threats against which could dangerously rock the not particularly stable boat of their fragile concord.

Meanwhile, new tones have gradually begun to be heard in newspapers and on television. New for Americans, of course. This is evidenced by a recent article in THE WASHINGTON POST.

"When I arrived at Vilnius Airport 10 March," Bramberg writes in the article "Lithuania—Cause for Compromise," "I was met by a representative of 'Sajudis,' who told me with a mixture of triumph and anxiety that independence would be proclaimed the next day. Although 'Sajudis' candidates had won a decisive majority in the Lithuanian parliamentary elections, the actual decision to declare independence, he told me, was known only to a narrow little group of political leaders."

Why, then, such haste and mystery?

Bramberg continues: "He told me (and others repeated later) that this was necessary in order to face Mikhail Gorbachev with a fait accompli before he secured presidential power and because only a fait accompli would compel the West to recognize the new Lithuanian Government."

The U.S. journalist names people who were "horrified" at just the way this independence was proclaimed and at "the lack of practicality and the propensity for bombast and excessive reliance on external forces" inherent in Lithuania's new leaders.

In the opinion of many residents of Vilnius, Bramberg goes on to write, the leaders of "Sajudis" violated an agreement reached earlier that "independence can be proclaimed no sooner than an economic agreement is concluded with the USSR." The hopes pinned on the magic effect of a "fait accompli" is not yet being realized. Not one of the 28 countries which did not officially recognize the fact of Lithuania's joining the USSR has not yet voiced the intention of establishing diplomatic relations with that republic.

It would be naive, to put it mildly, to draw the conclusion on the basis of this information, which is only now becoming known to the U.S. public, that Lithuania is ceasing to be a serious factor in Soviet-U.S. relations. Rather the reverse: As events develop, the tone of the U.S. press and of critics of President Bush is becoming tougher.

Aid funds for Lithuania are being set up in the United States, as in a number of other countries. They are collecting money and examining questions of delivering goods via Klaypeda, bypassing Finnish and Swedish ports. The economic significance of such aid is infinitesimal. However, the emotional charge is such that even farsighted and responsible governments will be forced to heed it. This means that under certain conditions arms reduction and reducing the risk of war, trade agreements and the Soviet Union's participation in international financial establishments, the summit meeting and even the very process of democratization in the USSR—all these processes could become hostages of the fait accompli in Vilnius.

"What a surprising turn of events, when Lithuania's independence could mark the end of democratic hopes for the USSR. The irony is that President George Bush must side firmly with Gorbachev in order that neither Lithuania nor Soviet extremists try to reverse the rising tide of peace and freedom."

This letter from Albert Fisher, a resident of the city of Medford, Massachusetts, is published in the latest issue of TIME magazine.

Bush, Mitterrand Discuss EC Security Structure

*PM2304090390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1*

[Own correspondent A. Blinov dispatch: "Presidents Meet"]

[Text] Washington—A meeting was held last Thursday in the Florida resort of Key Largo between U.S. President G. Bush and French President F. Mitterrand. The meeting was an integral part of the intensive consultations between leading Western countries on the question of the fundamental changes in the situation on the European continent. Prior to this Bush had held talks in Bermuda last week with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

F. Mitterrand briefed the U.S. President on the details of the plan to set up a "new security structure" within the EEC framework. As is well known, this plan—which has been put forward by F. Mitterrand together with FRG Chancellor H. Kohl—envisages intensifying the political aspects of the EC's activity and giving the community a qualitatively new role as an organ of collaboration in the security sphere. According to the U.S. press, the Franco-West German initiative will accelerate the process of European integration and lead to the creation of a powerful "European pole" in NATO—to a considerable extent balancing U.S. influence.

President Bush had had prior notification of the general contents of the plan. At a press conference following the meeting with Mitterrand he stated that he sees no threat to U.S. interests. It is expected that discussion of the Franco-West German plan will be continued at a meeting of NATO leaders—Mitterrand's initiative to convene this meeting was supported by President Bush. The timetable for the meeting remains to be agreed by the allies.

At the Key Largo press conference Bush declined to discuss issues connected with the U.S. course of action with regard to the Lithuania situation, restricting himself to a general statement of his "concern" about the matter. Bush explained his reluctance to expand on the subject by his desire to "maintain the channels of dialogue and discussion concerning the interests of many, many people." "I'm talking about arms control. I'm talking about strengthening East European democracies. I'm talking about many things where relations between the United States and the Soviet Union concern the interests of many countries..." Bush stated.

Cheney Vows To Cut Forces With 'Caution'

PM2004155590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Blinov report: "Pentagon: Reliance on Quality"]

[Text] Washington—The U.S. Defense Department is going to substantially reduce the size of America's ground forces and "squeeze" other categories of forces—the Air Force and Navy. This statement was made by Richard Cheney, head of the U.S. defense department, in a speech on the outskirts of Washington. He was the main speaker at a conference of a number of military departments connected with communications and the electronics industry.

The "fundamental changes in the dynamics of the international situation" demonstrate, Cheney said, that "the threat of all-out war between the United States and the Soviet Union is now at its lowest level since the beginning of World War II." "The American people have responded to them with demands to reduce the military budget." As the defense secretary noted, the situation in the world offers the United States a favorable opportunity to reduce its Armed Forces without abandoning its global commitments. "In the long term we will be able to save resources on military spending, but we will act with caution," the secretary stated.

Cheney sees grounds for caution, among other things, in the fact that "U.S. security interests are still subjected to considerable threats." They include the spread of advanced military technology among countries which may be hostile toward the United States. In the U.S. military department's view, around 30 countries will possess chemical weapons during the next decade, 10 will acquire the ability to create biological weapons, and half a dozen are working on creating a nuclear potential. By the year 2000 at least 15 developing countries will either have ballistic missiles or will even produce them independently and six countries will have intermediate-range missiles in their arsenals.

According to the defense secretary, the Pentagon budget for the coming fiscal year will be reduced in real terms by 2 percent, taking inflation into account. Commanders of categories of forces have been instructed to produce estimates of the long-term reduction in the number of servicemen. It is planned to reduce the number of infantry divisions on active service from 18 to 16 as early as next year and to reduce the total number of servicemen to the level existing before the massive military program adopted by the Reagan administration. It is planned to scrap 20 major arms creation programs. However, the United States does not intend to abandon the creation of "the best arms systems in the world" or its technological superiority. In the light of this, the Pentagon will continue participating in the financing of basic studies and research programs in areas of critical importance for defense and will even work to "restore the competitiveness" of the United States in those areas where U.S. business has lost the lead to other countries.

Postponement of Lance Missile Modernization Noted

PM2304081190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Single Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading: "Teletype"]

[Text] Washington—An official Pentagon spokesman confirmed Thursday the U.S. press report which had claimed that the U.S. Army command has postponed implementation of the program to modernize Lance tactical nuclear missiles. At the same time, he refused to confirm or deny reports that the G. Bush administration is examining the possibility of abandoning plans to site these state-of-the-art tactical missiles in West European countries.

Deputy Foreign Minister Receives U.S. Ambassador

LD2004141790 Moscow TASS in English 1049 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh received U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Jack Matlock on Thursday.

During the meeting, the sides discussed the military-political talks between the Soviet Union and the United States.

China

Li Peng Continues Official Visit to Moscow

Outlines Purpose of Visit

LD2304114890 Moscow TASS in English 1143 GMT 23 Apr 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 23 TASS—The peoples of China and the Soviet Union are brought together by friendship. There are good prospects for the development of relations between the two neighboring socialist states—the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, Chinese premier Li Peng said on his arrival in Moscow today.

He recalled Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to China in May last year, pointing out that Sino-Soviet relations were normalized at that time.

Li Peng described it as the purpose of his present visit to the Soviet Union to promote the process, as a result of which the Chinese and Soviet sides, acting in the spirit of the Sino-Soviet communique, achieved the further development of mutual relations in politics, economics, trade, science, technology, culture, education and other fields. The Chinese premier said that, during his visit, he will exchange views with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov and other Soviet leaders on "matters concerning bilateral relations and major international problems of mutual concern."

"We are confident," Li Peng said, "that improvement of Sino-Soviet relations not only meets the basic interests of the peoples of the two countries but also promotes the cause of peace and development in Asia and throughout the world."

Begins Talks in Kremlin

LD2304160690 Moscow TASS in English 1547 GMT 23 Apr 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 23 TASS—Talks began today in the St. Katherine Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace between Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov and Premier of the Chinese State Council Li Peng.

The head of the Chinese Government is in Moscow on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

The St. Katherine Hall was built as the Throne Hall of Russian empresses and named after the Russian lady's Order of St. Katherine, first conferred by Peter the Great on his royal spouse in 1714. After the 1917 revolution, congresses of the communist international were held in the hall. The founder of the Soviet State Vladimir Lenin took an active part in the congresses.

The historical interior of the St. Katherine Hall has been fully preserved. The hall is now one of the busiest venues of political events in the Grand Kremlin Palace. Soviet leaders meet the visiting heads of states and governments here. Receptions in honour of foreign parliamentary delegations and the presentation of the top national awards are held here.

The two-day Soviet-Chinese talks have begun. Hope is being expressed in Moscow that they will be held in a business-like and constructive atmosphere and yield maximum results to deepen the relations of friendship and good-neighbourliness between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic, strengthen mutual trust and understanding and develop cooperation in the international arena. Soviet-Chinese documents will be signed after the talks conclude.

Calls Talks 'Landmark'

PM2304205790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Soviet-Chinese Talks"]

[Text] Talks between N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, began in the Kremlin 23 April.

Welcoming the head of the Chinese Government, N.I. Ryzhkov stressed that Li Peng's present visit to the USSR is an important new milestone on the path of developing relations between the two countries after the historic meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and China's leaders in Beijing in May 1989, which marked the normalization of USSR-PRC relations.

Li Peng stated that the Soviet-Chinese summit is regarded in China as landmark. He noted that since that meeting bilateral relations in the political, economic, scientific, cultural, and other spheres have received further dynamic development.

There was a thorough exchange of opinions on the entire range of USSR-PRC relations.

The sides noted considerable progress in the sphere of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation and stressed that it promotes the consolidation of the traditional friendship between the peoples of the two countries and the fulfillment of their national economic plans. During the discussion of questions of trade, economic, scientific, and technical relations special attention was paid to prospects for their further development as set out in the long-term program for the development of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation between the USSR and PRC which is due to be signed during the Chinese Government head's present official visit to the USSR.

The program includes the fuel and power industries, metallurgy, transport and communications, consumer goods production, agriculture and the processing of agrarian output, machine building, the timber and wood processing industries, construction, and others among the most important spheres for cooperation. A special role is assigned to expanding the two countries' collaboration in the sphere of science and technology, first and foremost in the priority areas of scientific and technical progress which ensure the accelerated development of production forces, including the study and use of space for peaceful purposes.

The government heads exchanged opinions on ways to increase the efficiency of Soviet-Chinese economic cooperation and on the urgency of the search for new forms and mechanisms for their development which meet present-day requirements. The sides proceed from the premise that a new level of economic relations can be attained not only by increasing the traditional commodity exchange but also by diversifying economic ties and stepping up direct ties, including cross-border ties. It was deemed important to more closely link the two countries' economic reform achievements with improvement of bilateral cooperation. Mutual understanding was achieved on the expediency of expanding opportunities for foreign trade shipments between the USSR and the PRC and for the transit of freight across Soviet territory.

N.I. Ryzhkov and Li Peng believe that considerable reserves exist for developing Soviet-Chinese cultural and humanitarian ties. They expressed an interest in increasing the number of specialists, trainees, and students sent for varying periods of time from the PRC to the Soviet Union and vice versa.

The leaders of the two countries' governments expressed satisfaction at the course of the bilateral talks which began last year on the reciprocal reduction of armed forces and the strengthening of trust in the military sphere in the Soviet-Chinese border region. In their opinion, the consolidation of the accords achieved here, and subsequent practical steps to implement them, will have a beneficial effect on the strengthening of good-neighborly relations between them and will contribute to the consolidation of peace in the Asia and Pacific region and throughout the world.

Note was made of the great work done by government delegations from the two countries in the matter of a border settlement. The sides agreed to continue discussing this problem.

A number of other questions of Soviet-Chinese relations were also discussed.

The talks were held in a constructive and friendly atmosphere.

Present at the talks on the Soviet side were: E.A. Shevardnadze, USSR foreign minister; S.A. Sitaryan, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; K.F. Katushev, USSR minister of foreign economic relations; O.N. Shishkin, USSR minister of general machine building; K.V. Malakhov, deputy chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee; I.A. Rogachev, USSR deputy foreign minister; A.N. Kleymenov, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; O.A. Troyanovskiy, USSR ambassador to the PRC; and other officials.

And for the Chinese side: Qian Qichen, PRC foreign minister; Tomur Dawamat, chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region People's Government; Gan Ziyu, deputy chairman of the PRC State Planning Commission; Yuan Mu, chief of the PRC State Council Political Research Department; Tian Zengnei, PRC deputy foreign minister; Xu Xin, deputy chief of the Chinese People's Liberation Army General Staff; Yu Hongliang, PRC ambassador to the USSR; and other officials.

The talks will be continued.

Honored at Kremlin Dinner

LD2304220190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1716 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 23 Apr (TASS)—A dinner was given today in the Great Kremlin Palace on behalf of the USSR Government and in honor of Li Peng, member of the CPC Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee and premier of the PRC State Council, and his wife.

The Chinese officials who are accompanying the guest on his trip were present with him.

On the Soviet side were Nikolay Ryzhkov and his wife, Eduard Shevardnadze, Yevgeniy Primakov, deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers, USSR people's deputies, and other officials.

Nikolay Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, made a speech. He said:

On behalf of the Soviet leadership I offer cordial greetings to Comrade Li Peng and in his person to the great neighboring socialist country and the friendly Chinese people, for whom the Soviet people have feelings of deep respect.

People in the Soviet Union are watching with affection as the working people of China tackle today's complex problems of renewing their country and modernizing the economy through a fuller opening up of socialism's potential. We are delighted by the success the Chinese people have managed to achieve thanks to persistent labor and by pursuing the line of the reforms outlined by the third plenum of the CPC Central Committee in 1978. We know from our own experience just how complicated the search for fundamentally new solutions which correspond to the interests of all the people is. We are, however, convinced that the Chinese people will be able to surmount the difficulties in their path and we wish them success.

Almost one year ago in Beijing M.S. Gorbachev and the leaders of the PRC mapped out the general outlines of Soviet-Chinese relations for the future and opened a fundamentally new phase in their development. Typical of that phase is a profound interpretation of the past, a new outlook on realities of the modern world, and a desire to develop bilateral relations in conditions of good- neighborliness, openness [otkrytost], and extensive international contact. Our relations are built on a reciprocal respect for interests, concern for specific character, complete equality of rights, and noninterference in one another's internal affairs, the acknowledgement of the right to sovereignty and independence, and a desire to advance, consistently and gradually, in developing bilateral relations with no deviation from the line embarked upon even when our viewpoints fail to coincide in some way. Such a development of relations of cooperation between two great peoples is not directed in any way against third countries.

The past year has been more richly packed with events in our relations than decades in the recent past. A new atmosphere of amicability and trust is being ever more strongly affirmed between our countries and peoples. [Moscow International Service in Mandarin at 0200 GMT on 24 April reports the speech by Nikolay Ryzhkov and omits the previous two sentences] The sphere of mutual ties is broadening, and there are more and more new and bright notes appearing in it.

Political dialogue is becoming more profound and a regular thing. Contacts between the CPSU and the CPC, to which we attach great significance, have taken off again and are being expanded.

The exchanges between Soviet republic, krays, and oblasts, and provinces and autonomous regions of the PRC, and between Soviet and Chinese towns, are becoming increasingly active.

The development of contacts along social and cultural lines is leading to a rapprochement between the two countries' peoples and to the appearance of a lively interest in each other's efforts to improve life and to embark on a broad path of progress.

Our talks today confirm that we are moving toward good results both in the sphere of politics and in that of economic ties.

Comrade Li Peng, your recent statement about the aims which the PRC leadership is linking to the official visit to Moscow by the head of the Chinese Government was received with great interest here. We agree with you that a time has come when relations between our countries can progress more rapidly. The long-term program of economic and scientific-technical cooperation which we are to sign in the coming days will undoubtedly also contribute to this.

This document will determine our interaction for the period until the year 2000 and will be a basis for intensive, mutually beneficial relations in various branches of the economy. We believe it especially important that it will point us toward the development of cooperation in progressive, high-tech areas, in particular, in the development of nuclear power engineering and joint work in the sphere of the aviation and space industry while, at the same time, not ignoring those spheres and industries which are traditional for our countries say, for example, timber processing and agriculture, in which cooperation will give both our countries the opportunity to make use of their natural advantages and resources.

The broad range of opportunities opening up before us also presupposes the use of new forms and methods of cooperation in keeping with the transformations taking place in the lives of our countries. We see an important additional and mutually advantageous source which can nourish the creative efforts of the Soviet and Chinese peoples in the further enhancement of Soviet-Chinese relations.

The potential of our good-neighborliness is immense. The reciprocal interest of our peoples in one another is reinforced by the objective similarity of the large-scale internal processes underway in the USSR and China.

There is also no small similarity in the fact that, as our Chinese comrades, when setting about renewing all spheres of our life, we proceeded from the need to accelerate the country's socioeconomic development and the implementation of the economic reforms, which required a considerable transformation of our whole political system as well. Thus was born revolutionary perestroyka, and thus we came to the path of radically enhancing the role of local soviets as the people's bodies of power. We are on the threshold of the reconstruction of the Soviet federation. Finally, the radicalization of the economic reform is increasingly being pushed toward the top of the agenda.

In the course of the fundamental transformations which have gripped Soviet society, the CPSU has remained loyal to the choice made in October 1917. It derives spiritual strength from the far from fully discovered, mighty potential of the socialist idea. We regard as a permanent value Vladimir Ilich Lenin's understanding of socialism as the living creation of the masses, a society of social justice and protection, of people's welfare. In the process of revolutionary perestroyka, Leninism remains for us a living, creative force.

By now setting as one of our most important tasks the consolidation of forces to enhance the economy and improve the lives of Soviet people we are providing scope for individual and collective interest in highly efficient and productive labor, and we are striving to bring into full effect new and flexible forms of managing and organizing production. The Chinese comrades began this kind of work earlier than we did, and their experience is instructive and important for us. The common interests of socialist renewal in our states predetermine our mutual need for an active exchange of experience and information.

Each of our countries is conducting an independent policy worked out on the basis of its own evaluations and judgments. The aspiration of each of them to contribute to the positive trend of the changes taking place in the world, to strive for a transition from tension to detente, from confrontation to dialogue, from rivalry to cooperation, and to lead matters toward a state of affairs in which ill-will and suspicion among countries and peoples would for ever become part of the past and in which wars and conflicts would cease, is all the more remarkable.

We can note with satisfaction the elements in the positions of our countries that coincide. The USSR and China stand together on the question of not being the first to use nuclear weapons. They are in favor of the complete destruction of nuclear weapons; the non-use of force in international affairs; the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, and the elimination of bases outside national borders; and for the unblocking of regional situations of conflict by political means. Also among the assets of our two countries are unilateral measures for the reduction of their troops and armaments.

The accords between the Soviet Union and China regarding the reduction of armed forces and strengthening confidence in the military sphere in the vicinity of the Soviet-Chinese border are a specific example of mutual interests in the creation of an atmosphere of trust and in the gradual formation of a system of interrelations which would render pointless the use of force against each other. We and you are pioneers in this matter in the region of Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

In the present-day world the responsibility of all states for the preservation of international peace is growing; however, the major world powers, to which the USSR and China also belong, objectively speaking bear a special burden of this responsibility.

Permit me to express the confidence that the visit to the Soviet Union by the premier of the PRC State Council republic will make a great contribution to the cause of strengthening good-neighborliness and cooperation between the Soviet Union and China, in the interests of the peoples of both countries, and of peace and of progress in Asia and throughout the world.

In conclusion Nikolay Ryzhkov proposed a toast to the health of Comrade Li Peng and his wife, Comrade Zhu Lin, and to the prosperity and successes of the Soviet and Chinese peoples.

Gives Dinner Address

LD2304230990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1733 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 23 Apr (TASS)—A dinner was given in the Great Kremlin Palace today in honor of Li Peng, member of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau Standing Committee and premier of the PRC State Council, and his wife, on behalf of the USSR Government.

Nikolay Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, delivered a speech at the dinner.

Li Peng then delivered a speech. He said:

First of all I would like to cordially thank the Soviet Government and you personally for inviting me and my wife and my colleagues to visit your country, and for the cheerful reception we have been accorded. Although we arrived in the Soviet Union quite recently, we have already deeply felt the friendly feelings of the Soviet people toward the Chinese people. Permit me to take this opportunity to express my profound respect for the Soviet people. In May last year Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev visited our country, and a summit meeting took place between the leaders of our two countries. This historic meeting made it possible for us to "close the past and open the future," and normalize Sino-Soviet relations. Since then relations between the two countries have entered a new stage of development. We are glad to note that over the past year obvious progress has been achieved in relations between our countries, in the sphere of politics, economics, trade, science and technology, culture and education, and so on. Along with this the spheres of our cooperation are also steadily expanding.

With each day, the friendship between the peoples of the two countries is growing stronger. Ties between the CPC and the CPSU have also resumed. All this represents the positive results of the Sino-Soviet summit meeting. The aim of our visit is precisely to provide a new impetus to this process and to advance relations between our two countries even further.

China and the Soviet Union are countries linked by common rivers and mountains and with a common border stretching for over 7,000 kilometers. They are both socialist countries and each is carrying out reforms and perestroyka in accordance with the realities of its country. Our countries possess enormous potential opportunities for developing mutual cooperation in many spheres. We are willing to reveal these opportunities with all the means at our disposal and to take even more major steps in developing friendly cooperation between the two countries. Sino-Soviet relations have followed a zig-zag path of development and normalizing them has not been easy for us. We greatly value the results achieved.

Although realities in China and the Soviet Union vary and both sides have different views on a number of issues, as pointed out in the "joint Chinese-Soviet communique," "differences on particular issues should not obstruct the development of relations between the two states." Historical experience convinces us that only the establishment and development of good-neighborly and friendly Chinese-Soviet relations on the basis of the five principles, that is the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, comply with the fundamental interests of our peoples and are to the advantage of strengthening peace and stability in Asia and throughout the world. We are sure that if only we are firm and are constantly guided by the five principles of peaceful coexistence and the spirit of the "joint Chinese-Soviet communique," Chinese-Soviet relations will without fail develop in a healthier and more stable way.

In past years the peoples of China and the Soviet Union, linked by traditional friendship, have sympathized with each other and supported each other. Even during those difficult years in the history of relations between our countries, the Chinese people continued to constantly preserve sentiments of friendship in their hearts toward the Soviet people and never forgot the support and assistance rendered to them by the Soviet people.

The Chinese people are attentively following everything that is happening in the Soviet Union. The Soviet people have the glorious tradition of the October Revolution. Throughout a more than 70 years period, the Soviet people have moved forward steadfastly along the path of socialist revolution and socialist construction, overcoming difficulties and obstacles, one after the other. Therefore, we are confident that the Soviet people will certainly be able to overcome the difficulties facing them now, to resolve the problems arising on the path of socialist restructuring and achieve new successes. China appeared before the world with a new look thanks to the policy of reform and openness which has been carried out for more than 10 years. Over 10 years, our country's gross national product and national income have doubled, the country's economic might has strengthened and our people's standard of living has risen. The aim of the first stage under the strategic plan of our country's development has already been achieved. [Moscow International Service in Mandarin at 0200 GMT on 24 April reports the speech by Li Peng and omits the previous three sentences] In the forthcoming decade, before the end of this century, we are striving to achieve the aim of the second stage under the strategic plan of the country's development—to once again double the gross national product.

It goes without saying that our path of advancement is not smooth and various difficulties and problems exist. At present, we are continuing to regulate the economic environment, bring order to the economy, intensify reforms, and further expand ties with the outside world. At the same time, we are actively carrying out work to strengthen the building of a socialist spiritual culture and to reinforce the party's ties with the masses, in order to ensure and promote the healthy development of our country along the path of its modernization. The recently concluded 6th CPC Central Committee Plenum of the 13th convocation and the 3d National People's Congress Session of the 7th convocation provide new impetus for building and reforming our country. Forty years of practice of revolution and construction have profoundly convinced our people that China can ensure the prolonged, stable, and harmonious development of its economy, and can create a prosperous and powerful future only if it devotedly proceeds along the socialist path and defends the leading role of the CPC, placing economic construction at the center of attention, and constantly intensifying reforms and expanding ties with the outside world, while strengthening and developing a political situation of stability and unity.

The international situation is currently going through enormous changes. In certain regions and countries powerful tremors can be observed in their internal situation. A number of deep-rooted contadictions remain unresolved, and new problems are already arising. Regional conflicts are continuing as before, and the gulf between the poor countries in the south and the rich countries in the north is growing ever wide. All of this aggravates destabilizing factors in the international situation. It should be noted that there are not infrequent cases in the practice of international relations when a policy of force is pursued, and there is crude interference in the internal affairs of other countries and atempts to foist one's will on others. All this cannot fail to give rise to serious concern among people. But peace and development remain, as before, an irrepressible historical current in the contemporary world. It seems to us that with the joint efforts of the peoples of all countries of the world it has become possible to achieve peace throughout the world for quite a prolonged period. China undeviatingly aspires to preserve peace throughout the world, unchangingly and consistently pursues an independent and autonomous peaceful foreign policy, showing initiative and vigor, and advocates that the five principles of peaceful coexistence should become universal norms in international relations, and that a new international political and economic order should be established on the basis of these principles.

All countries, whether large or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, regardless of their social system, should be equal and should respect each other, and maintian friendly cooperation and live in peace and harmony. China is prepared to establish and develop relations of friendship and cooperation with all countries of the world on this basis.

In the forthcoming days of my visit to your country we will be exchanging opinions with President Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman Nikolay Ryzhkov, and other Soviet leaders on the development of bilateral relations and on a range of major international problems. We will also have the opportunity to mix directly with the Soviet people, our friends, and to acquaint ourselves with their great achievements in the fields of economy and culture. As they say in your country, solidarity and friendship of peoples are dearer than any riches. It is with just such a conviction that my colleageus and I will be making every effort to successfully implement an important mission on our visit, to deepen mutual undertanding even further, and to strengthen friendship and mutual cooperation between our countries and our peoples.

In conclusion, Li Peng proposed a toast to the traditional friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples, to the further development of Chinese-Soviet relations, to the successes of the Soviet people in perestroyka and construction, to the health of comrade Nikolay Ryzhkov and his wife, and to the health of all the comrades and friends present. [Moscow International Service in Mandarin at 0200 GMT on 24 April reports the speech by Li Peng and omits the previous paragraph]

Begins Second Day of Activities

LD2404094290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 24 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Li Peng began his second day in Moscow by laying a wreath at the mausoleum of Vladimir Ilich Lenin. The visitor from China also laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin Wall. [video shows Li Peng adjusting the wreath at the Lenin mausoleum and bowing before the wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier]

Meets With Gorbachev 24 Apr

LD2404082690 Moscow TASS in English 0808 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev met Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng here today.

Li is paying an official visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

Commentator Reviews Li Peng's First Day

LD2404130490 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Chinese Premier Li Peng is in the Soviet Union on an official visit. He has held talks with the Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov. The entire spectrum of Sino-Soviet relations was deeply analyzed during the talks, which will continue. The program of the visit also includes consultations between the two countries' foreign ministers and representatives of other departments. Premier Li Peng has had a meeting with the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Our diplomatic correspondent, Oleg Shchedrov, comments on the first day of the visit:

It's a year since the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and the architect of reforms in China, Deng Xiaoping, turned a new leaf in the relations between the two countries at their meeting in Beijing. They closed the past and opened the future, as the Chinese put it, and both sides have been actively filling in this new page.

Prime Minister Ryzhkov said at the dinner given for the Chinese guest, the past year has been richer and more eventful in our relations than decades of the recent past.

In their talks Mr. Li and Mr. Ryzhkov expressed satisfaction over the development of bilateral trade and economic links. They foresee their further development with new forms of cooperation and emphasis on progressive and high-tech directions. That should be promoted by signing in the course of the visit a long-term program for economic, scientific and technical cooperation.

Substantial progress has been made in defusing military tension on the Sino-Soviet border. The sides also noted the closeness of Moscow's and Beijing's positions on many global issues, including problems of disarmament.

No less important is the new tonality in Sino-Soviet relations. Though Mr. Li used the word solidarity in his speech it's not that to define the essence of a dialogue between Moscow and Beijing. [as heard] It should be noted that both Mr. Li and Mr. Ryzhkov found it necessary to point out the priority of national interests in forming foreign policies, including their bilateral relations. They stressed the underlying and universally recognized five principles of peaceful coexistence. Those principles are essential not only because the two countries bear particular responsibility for global affairs. They're also essential because the political processes in our countries seem to be developing in somewhat different directions. So, freeing interstate relations of ideology should make (?for their) long term stability.

CPSU Official Views Relations With CPC

OW2404001490 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] The visit to China by Soviet leader Gorbachev in May 1989 has not only normalized the relations between the two countries but also restored the ties between the CPSU and the CPC in an all-around way. Amid such a development, a CPSU delegation headed by Fedorov, first deputy chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, visited China recently. After his return to Moscow, he told reporters about his views on the development of contacts between the CPSU and the CPC. The following is his talk recorded by our reporter. Fedorov said:

[Fedorov heard speaking briefly in Russian fading into Mandarin translation by announcer] I should point out that when we were in China, we witnessed everywhere that Chinese people are greatly interested in what is going on in the Soviet Union and in our party's policies. For instance, the Chinese comrades are interested in the significance of the recent plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the significance of the forthcoming 28th CPSU national congress, and other matters concerning our inner party life. We have done our best to answer their questions. The results of the visit have convinced us that the Chinese comrades are greatly interested in the vigorous development of contacts between the two parties. An agreement was reached on a cooperation plan between the two parties for this year. As everyone knows, Li Peng, member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee and premier of the State Council, will come to visit Moscow on 23 April.

On whether contradictions exist between the CPSU and CPC over some issues, Fedorov, first deputy chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, said:

[Fedorov heard speaking briefly in Russian fading into Mandarin translation by announcer] They do exist, of course. It is inappropriate to deny their existence. Besides, we do not want to do so. Problems arose in each other's real life. For instance, because of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in the Soviet Union, there are some articles published in Soviet newspapers and journals that have caused different reaction in China. During the visit, we have tried our best to explain to the Chinese comrades that now our news and publications are no longer subject to control. We will strive to achieve a mutual understanding over this issue. The two sides share the same view that the characteristics in each other's political, social, and economic development may not be the same. Differences in internal affairs should not obstruct the development of relations between the two parties. On the contrary, they should promote the development of the relations. This is because truth can be produced amid conflicts and controversies between different positions. Of course, I am talking here about the political differences of the past that disrupted our relations for 30 years. We have drawn bitter experience in this regard. Neither we nor the Chinese comrades want to see this happen again.

Fedorov, first deputy chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, said in conclusion: It is most important that we may say with assurance that both sides are ready to act on the basis of mutual benefit, and this is a guarantee for steady development of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Soviet-Chinese Military Contacts Examined

OW2204211490 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 13 Apr 90

[Nikolayev commentary from the "World Today" program]

[Text] The era in which observers regarded any contact between the Soviet Union and China as a sensational event is over. Now, especially after Soviet-Chinese relations have been fully normalized, contacts between the two countries have so greatly expanded and deepened that even large research institutes are not sure they can provide full details about all the contacts and cooperation between the two countries. However, there is still an area in which relations between the two countries remains rather unusual, and are being developed for the first time.

Nikolayev, a commentator for this station, pointed out: This area is that of military contacts between the two countries. A military delegation from the People's Republic of China visited the Soviet Union in April for the first time in 30 years. The delegation was led by Song Wenzhong, director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of China's Ministry of National Defense. This event, from a certain perspective, was truly uncommon. From another perspective, however, it was a natural result of the normal development of relations and the bolstering of mutual trust between the two countries. The people of the two countries paid a high price for being estranged from each other for a few decades. Both sides spent tens of billions of rubles and renminbi and invested a huge amount of materials in building an infrastructure for confronting each other. Normalization of relations between the two countries enabled them to lay down this heavy burden, to completely eliminate from their feeling the idea of regarding each other as a potential enemy, and to switch the extra funds, so needed to improve the welfare of the people of the two countries, toward producing goods for civil consumption.

As everyone knows, to carry out agreements reached at the Soviet-Chinese summit meeting, diplomats and military experts of the two countries held two rounds of talks on reducing armed forces and bolstering mutual trust at the border areas. The purpose of these talks was to bring about a total demilitarization at border areas. Observers have not ruled out the possibility that Chinese Premier Li Peng, during his visit to Moscow later this month, may reach specific agreements with the Soviet Union on this issue. In light of the progress of the pan-Asia talks on enhancing regional security, these talks represented a very valuable experience. They denote the first time representatives of the two great powers of Asia, which are also two countries with great military power—including nuclear arms, discussed the reduction of each other's armed forces. Now, military contacts between the two countries have been established. This was what Major General Song Wenzhong commented about concerning his visit to the Soviet Union. He held that development in military relations between the two countries will not only benefit the two countries, but will also contribute to maintaining world peace. The military circle of the Soviet Union also holds a view identical to this.

Concern for 'Stability' in State Affairs Noted

PM2404144190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent Yu. Savenkov under the rubric "Panorama of International Life": "China: Reform Needs Stability. It Proposes Dynamism in Politics, Openness to the Outside World"]

[Text] Beijing—The Chinese make paper kites in the form of birds, insects, aircraft, and deities. Flying them was once invested with magical meaning: People would climb a mountain, fly a kite, and then cut the cord so that it would carry evil and misfortune far, far away. In a park where a temple of the sun once stood an old Beijing resident told me this story while skillfully manipulating a fantastically painted butterfly, and then he craftily added: "Balance and stability are needed everywhere, not only in kite flying but also in state affairs." But how are they to be found?

"Two words—peace and tranquillity—are worth thousands of gold bars," people in China have said from the earliest times. Nowadays they have been joined by another golden word—stability. This broad concept is the center of gravity of all life in modern Chinese society. Ideological, political, economic, social, moral, psychological stability. Even those germs of democracy and openness which began to ripen during the early years of the reform age started by the CPC Central Committee December (1978) Plenum are frequently sacrificed to stability.

Some 18 months ago the Chinese scientist Liu Yuejin advanced this thesis: "Ten years of reforms have done more to shake the huge bastions of Chinese people's traditional way of thinking than the whole preceding century." Among the upheavals he names pluralism (at any rate, the desire for it); individualism, which certainly does not necessarily run counter to the interests of the state and the collective; and readiness to risk and experiment.

Under the new conditions, when the reform has slowed down and the drama of last spring and summer has created the danger of chaos, the Chinese leadership has now begun to shift the emphases: to come out against privatization in the economy, pluralism in politics, liberalism in ideology, and individualism in ethics. Ever more frequent mention is being made of the class struggle. This process is developing in a contradictory, ambiguous way. If it is said of the class struggle that "it will intensify under certain conditions," of course this has nothing to do with what Mao Zedong suggested to the Red Guards at the time of the "cultural revolution": "Talk about the class struggle every day, every month."

The National People's Congress session that ended at the beginning of April also took place under the sign of stability. There were no dramatic changes in the leadership, although the Western press earnestly hinted at the possibility of several vice premiers' being replaced and at other cadre changes. The retreat into the shadows of Deng Xiaoping, who quit his last official post, was rather of a ceremonial nature and was predetermined as long ago as last fall. The parliamentary deputies also behaved with restraint. The previous two sessions had been far sharper. Then deputies approached the microphone, for example, and protested at any aged commission chairman, demanding that he give way to a young person. Many spoke of the need for the National Congress to have more real power, and the idea of creating a Western-style small professional parliament was even advanced. However, at the present session one deputy argued as follows: "Previously people spoke too much about the problems and competed in eloquence, trying to win applause. It is not the done thing to swear in parliament, and it is good that nothing similar happened this year."

Unanimity, like-mindedness, agreement—these are the principles of ideological stability. Some time ago there were four criteria for assessing cadres—youth, professionalism, devotion to reform, and revolutionariness. Political qualities are now becoming the chief qualities. Personnel Minister Zhao Dongwan recently declared that a ceiling will now be set on the number of state employees. Budget difficulties and the need to fulfill the program for improving the economy require the government to freeze the creation of new departments. Political maturity is the chief criterion on which people will be hired and promoted, the minister emphasized.

What is meant by political maturity is, above all, knowledge of Marxism. The Chinese press recently published a speech by Chen Yun, a party veteran and chairman of the CPC Central Advisory Commission, which he made in July 1987. The leitmotiv is a call for an in-depth study of Marxist philosophy. Now that modernization is under way in the country, the author said, fidelity to the views of Marx and Mao Zedong is absolutely essential. Under the new conditions the party is faced with the task of how to apply this scientific methodology in analyzing and resolving problems.

These days the Chinese press is full of articles calling for the party's role to be strengthened in higher educational institutions in order to avoid a repeat of last spring's riots. RENMIN RIBAO, for example, sees as the chief cause of last year's political disturbances the fact that the students, the overwhelming majority of whom were patriotically inclined, lacked real experience. They were unable to apply Marxist theory and method to an analysis of the country's complex social and political problems. The newspaper cites He Dongchang, vice chairman of the State Commission for Education: "Party committees must control the political line of philosophy and social science teaching in higher educational institutions."

The road to economic stability is difficult, too. IZVESTIYA has already written about the difficulties encountered by the economic improvement program. Having curbed inflation and rising prices, as we know, it gave rise to a number of other problems. One of these is the closure of enterprises. A sharp rise in the level of unemployment—6.5 percent—is expected toward the end of the year, for example. Ten million without work. However, this is an incomplete picture, because it includes only those registered at the employment bureaus.

Let us hear the thoughts of Prof. Li Yingying of Beijing University, one of the biggest authorities on the economy. From his viewpoint, in order to prevent a production slump and a fall in budget income, it is necessary to surmount such difficulties as the slackness in the market, the increase in reciprocal debts between enterprises, overstocking with goods, and the serious financial losses of industry. The state has been forced to spend one-third of all expenditure on subsidizing loss-making enterprises. What is needed in the professor's view is a reform of enterprises to encourage better production efficiency. Nevertheless, the easing of credit control must be selective. A preferential policy with regard to key sectors (agriculture, raw materials, energy, transport, communications) must be combined with control over the scale of capital construction and over credits for the processing industry.

Incidentally, Li Yingying and many other economists suggest thinking about encouraging consumer demand. In his view inflation is not a product of the reform but a cause of uncoordinated government actions. Maybe it is time to think once again about the stalled ideas of reforming price formation and a shares market. In short, the idea of making more efficient use of the market mechanism is once again making headway.

...The search is on for practical measures to stabilize the economy and sociopolitical and public life. Naturally, these approaches bear the stamp of "Chinese specifics," as people here say. However, particular special features inherent in the country and in the specific situation cannot and must not hinder the use in their own practice of the experience of other states, particularly those with similar sociopolitical and economic conditions to China's. Cooperation with them, Beijing believes, will play an important role in China's advance along the path of transformations. In this connection special significance is attached here to the visit to the Soviet Union which Li Peng, member of the CPC Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee and premier of the PRC State Council, begins Monday.

Trying to peep into the future of Soviet-Chinese relations, local observers and commentators voice practically unequivocal confidence that the meeting between the Soviet and Chinese leaders will make it possible to exchange opinions on a very wide range of problems and to assess the prospects for bilateral relations and will give them a new boost. In this, as Li Peng once emphasized in an interview with Soviet journalists, the dissimilar nature of the Chinese and the Soviet practice of building socialism is no hindrance to the development of mutually advantageous cooperation. It is useful for our states and our parties, the premier said, to exchange opinions on how to advance along the socialist path.

Press Bodies Sign Cooperation Accord in Beijing

LD2004165290 Moscow TASS in English 1410 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Beijing April 20 TASS—The protocol on cooperation signed here today between the USSR State Committee for the press and the Chinese State Press and Publications Administration puts the accent on direct relations between Soviet and Chinese publishers, envisages much broader book exchanges between the two countries and the publication of more books translated from the two languages.

The document also envisages the organisation of book exhibitions, participation in Moscow and Beijing international book fairs, exchange of editors and translators for training purposes.

Northeast Asia

USSR, DPRK Vice Foreign Ministers Meet

SK2404050290 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 23 Apr 90

[From the "Annals of Friendship" program]

[Text] A meeting was held in Moscow on 7 April between Kang Sok-chu, vice foreign minister of the DPRK, and Igor Rogachev, deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union. The DPRK vice foreign minister was visiting Moscow for a while on his way to a special meeting of the UN General Assembly to be held in New York. During their meeting, they discussed some aspects of the situation on the Korean peninsula and general issues concerning the international situation.

DLP's Kim Yong-sam Meets With Yakovlev

90UF0019A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 28 March 90 p 3

[Article entitled "Own Information": "A Year the Equivalent of Decades"]

[Text] "A new era has opened in Soviet-South Korean relations," Kim Yong-sam, cochairman of South Korea's Democratic Liberal Party, believes.

He was in Moscow at the invitation of the World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO) Institute leading a representative delegation incorporating three dozen ministers, members of parliament, businessmen, and advisers. The leader of what was recently an opposition, but is currently the governing party of South Korea, held a series of talks in the Soviet capital with party figures and statesmen of the USSR, including A.N. Yakovlev and Ye.M. Primakov, members of the Presidential Council; and delivered a lecture at Moscow State University devoted to an improvement in relations between our countries and the prospects of lasting peace in the Far East. A seminar, in which scholars of the IMEMO and representatives of Soviet business circles and South Korean business took part, was held during the visit.

A press conference given by Mr. Kim Yong-sam, at which he made a high evaluation of the processes occurring in the USSR today and of our country's resolve to adhere firmly to the course of normalization of bilateral relations, was devoted to the results of the delegation's visit to Moscow. Responding to a question from a RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent, the cochairman of the Democratic Liberal Party declared:

"Truly, two or three years ago relations between us were of a hostile and estranged nature. The past year saw the start of their normalization and literally explosive development. Both parties then exchanged commercial offices and a number of delegations, which in the course of negotiations charted paths for the continued development and expansion of our relations. We have on this occasion agreed on working contacts between parties and parliamentary groups, and negotiated a government-level meeting."

Mr. Kim Yong-sam observed that our relations were developing dynamically. Reciprocal trade has increased 200 percent and is continuing to grow. South Korean businessmen have an interest in the establishment of the closest relations with the Soviet Union.

"I am of the view," the guest emphasized, "that economics and politics cannot be separated. But we must go even further: recognize the interpenetration of these aspects and their dialectical unity. I am pleased to have met with the complete understanding of my Soviet partners. Such an immense amount of work has been done during our visit that it may be confidently stated that we have not simply negotiated a pass but have reached the wide road of complete normalization of relations between the two countries."

In conclusion Mr. Kim Yong-sam declared the readiness of the Republic of South Korea to make every effort for the peaceful unification of the north and south of the artificially divided country.

ROK Proposes Steps Toward Trade With North

PM2404143990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Step Toward Dialogue"]

[Text] The development of trade and economic links with the DPRK will promote the stabilization of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Such was the conclusion reached by the participants in a conference held in Seoul on the initiative of President No Tae-u with the participation of representatives of the country's various ministries and departments.

As the YONHAP agency reports, a package of measures which, in the intention of its authors, could become the foundation for North-South economic cooperation was presented at the meeting. It was proposed that the first steps in this direction could be to organize direct bilateral trade and link railroad and other main transport routes for this purpose. In addition, South Korea is prepared for the formation of a common power supply system and the joint exploitation of oil fields.

The package of measures also envisages free contact between members of separated families, who number around 10 million people today.

Seoul Radio Staffer Speaks at Moscow Studio

SK2004074690 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 12 Apr 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program: Interview with (Pak Chan-suk), Russian language broadcaster at the Korean Broadcasting System in South Korea by (Katyana Ventrov), editor of Moscow International Service]

[Text] [(Ventrov)] Astonishingly today, here in our studio, we have Miss (Pak Chan-suk), who is in charge of the Russian language broadcast at the Korean Broadcasting System [KBS].

First of all, I welcome you here to the Moscow Korean language broadcast studio. Would you please first tell us about your visit to Moscow?

[(Pak)] It is very nice to meet you here. So far I have been able to listen to the Moscow broadcast only through the radio. Now I am here at your studio to meet you and to talk with you. So I am very happy. My happiness is beyond description.

The first purpose of my visit to Moscow is to report on the life of Koreans living in Moscow. The second is to visit the Moscow radio station and to hear from you about things I am very interested in.

[(Ventrov)] Would you please tell us about the KBS?

[(Pak)] Twenty-nine years have passed since KBS began its Russian language broadcast. Four persons are presently working as staffers on the Russian language broadcast team and one person is also working as a (?visiting staffer).

We produce a 45-minute program and broadcast it five times a day. As for the contents of the program, 10 minutes are allocated for news items, five minutes for commentary, 10 minutes for introducing what takes place in Seoul under the title "Today's Seoul," five minutes for Korean language class for Russian listeners. As for the remaining 15 minutes, different programs are carried from day to day during the week. Sometimes, we introduce ROK culture or sports events taking place in the ROK or various aspects of our development and life in Korea. Sometimes, we also carry a program introducing cultural relics of the ROK. Of course, we also have a music program introducing our folk and modern music. In particular, on Saturday, we introduce the letters we receive from the Soviet Union for 30 minutes. In this program, interesting stories disclosed in the letters sent to our Russian team of the "Radio Korea" from all parts of the Soviet Union by Russian listeners are introduced.

[(Ventrov)] Would you please tell us about the prospect of exchange between KBS and the Moscow Korean language service?

[(Pak)] Not only at this moment but also since long ago, we have felt deeply the need for cooperation and for exchanges with the Moscow Korean language service. [sentence indistinct]

At present, very close relations are being established between the two countries. Under these circumstances, I think that the (?exchanges) between our two radio stations as well will be (?expanded).

I think that here the Moscow radio station faces the same problems as we do have at the KBS. Our problem is that we use the Russian language we have learned only from books and dictionaries and we are unable to broadcast more lively programs, because we don't have our own facilities for our independent use. Here, at your studio, I see you have the same problems. I think this helps our mutual understanding. In this respect, I hope that our cooperative relations will be further strengthened.

[(Ventrov)] Is it true that a Russian boom is presently under way in Seoul?

[(Pak)] That is true. A flood of news reports and special programs on the Soviet Union are carried every day by newspapers, radio stations, and television stations. In particular, these days, many politicians and businessmen visit Moscow. So, in Seoul, we hear many things about the Soviet Union. In particular, the number of students who desire to learn Russian is increasing astonishingly. I suppose, in Moscow, too, a Seoul boom is rising.

[(Ventrov)] I think so. I have enjoyed talking with you very much. Thank you.

[(Pak)] Thank you.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Vorontsov Receives Burmese Ambassador 16 Apr

PM1804124190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs, received U Tin Tun, ambassador of the Union of Myanmar [Burma] to the USSR, 16 April at the latter's request.

Commentary Views Preelection Situation in Burma

BK2204102190 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1030 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Station Observer (Aleksandr Moyeseyev) Commentary]

[Text] The time for holding elections in Myanmar [Burma] is getting closer. Many foreign observers point out that pre-election campaigns are being conducted in a peaceful situation. Candidates from political parties have meanwhile been permitted to distribute their pre-election documents and statements to the public.

From the situation today, it can be seen quite clearly that recent speculation about the majority of people being dissatisfied with the policy of the State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC] have been proven wrong. Station observer (Aleksandr Moyeseyev) points out that many observers are assessing the present situation in Myanmar differently.

Some observers remark that the people cannot do anything and have given up. But others, like the editorial of THE HINDUSTAN TIMES, say the military government has successfully controlled mass activities in Myanmar. Some, however, point out that elections will be held in a disciplined manner, and that the Myanmar people will, for the first time in 30 years, have the opportunity to make a genuine political decision to vote for and elect parliamentary candidates of their choice.

Whatever it may be, it is not easy to assess the situation accurately. This is not merely because news that filters out of Myanmar is difficult to authenticate, but also because reports are interpreted to suit one's wish.

Regardless of what are on the minds of observers watching the situation in "The Land of the Golden Pagodas"—the term used to describe Myanmar—conditions there will continue to evolve solely by themselves.

Regardless of what is being said on the basis of the developments today, I wish to be objective in pointing out the facts.

Firstly, it must be pointed out that the majority of people in Myanmar want to see democratic changes in their country. Secondly, it must also be pointed out with certainty that the leaders of the Armed Forces want to avoid violent armed conflict and civil war. However, it would also be wrong to assume that among those struggling for democracy that no one is working for self-interests or for the narrow interests of an individual or group.

There should also be no doubt that there are many people who want to maintain the system that has existed for the past 25 years in Myanmar.

Whatever it may be, after reviewing the latest developments, an observer must certainly believe that Myanmar can never revert back to what it was before.

The economic measures being introduced by the SLORC are of a long-term nature. Although there are obvious weaknesses in these measures, some basic laws do exist for people who wish to engage in business or make commercial contacts overseas.

None of the parties competing for parliamentary seats today have come up with any other firm proposal that can replace the approach taken to resolve Myanmar's economic problems. This is in fact a weakness of the political parties opposing the SLORC and the National Unity Party.

Statements by some underground organizations allege that the general elections being staged by the SLORC are a sham and are only aimed at getting aid from foreign countries. I believe that these statements reveal the very weakness of the economic policies of those organizations. Only recently, U Thaung Htun, a spokesman for the All Burma Students' Democratic Front, said the same thing in his speech in Hong Kong.

The parties which have chosen the legal path do not slander the authorities because, according to the latest news, they have hopes in the outcome of the elections. There is a wide variety and many political parties, and it is therefore very difficult to predict the outcome of the elections.

According to the spokesmen of the present military government, since those elected to the parliament will be from many parties, they may not be able to establish efficient state administrative organs, and it was pointed out that elections may perhaps have to be held again.

Elections are approaching in Myanmar, and they alone can provide an answer to the numerous outstanding questions in that country.

Comparison of Ryzhkov, Thailand's Sarasin Meeting

PM2004134790

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 20 April 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page 5 a TASS report on Soviet Premier Ryzhkov's 19 April meeting with Thai Deputy Premier Sarasin. Comparison of the PRAVDA item, entitled "Talks in the Kremlin," with the item headlined "Speaks With Ryzhkov" published in the 20 April issue of the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 14 reveals the following variations:

First paragraph, sole sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...Council of Ministers, 19 April received Phong Sarasin...(retranslating):

Second paragraph, last sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...visit and the thorough talks that took...(retranslating):

Same sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...potential of cooperation.

Participating in the talks, which were held in a businesslike and friendly atmosphere, were S.A. Sitaryan, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; M. Chuto, Thai ambassador to the USSR; and Mrs. L. Laokhapan [name as transliterated], the Thai Foreign Ministry's ambassador for special assignments. (adding final PRAVDA paragraph)

Near East & South Asia

Gorbachev Requests Flights for Mecca Pilgrims

AU2404074690 Paris AFP in English 0128 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 24 (AFP)—President Mikhail Gorbachev has ordered the creation of special Aeroflot flights to Saudi Arabia to allow Soviet Muslims to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, the president's spokesman said Monday.

Mr. Gorbachev has issued a decree asking the Civil Aviation Ministry to arrange the flights aboard the Soviet carrier for the month of June, his spokesman Arkadiy Maslennikov said.

He said the flights would leave for Jiddah from Moscow, as well as Kazan, the capital of the Tatar autonomous republic, Baku, capital of Azerbaijan, and Tashkent, capital of Uzbekistan.

Moslems account for 70 million of the Soviet Union's 285 million population.

The Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry and other departments have received orders to expedite "visa, financial or other" problems that arise from the pilgrimage, the spokesman said.

Mr. Maslennikov said the absence of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia would not hinder organization of the pilgrimage but said restoration of ties would be "in the interest of both countries."

Andreyev on Postponement of Hostage Release

NC2004185790 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary]

[Text] Dear listeners, the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine has stated that the previously announced release of Jesse Turner, one of the three American hostages held by the group, has been postponed. A new date for the hostage's release has not been set.

In a statement issued in West Beirut on 18 April, the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine promised that Jesse Turner, the American hostage, would be released within 48 hours. Turner, an associate professor at Beirut University College was abducted in January 1988. The terrorists' statement, which was accompanied by a photograph of Jesse Turner, said that this gesture of goodwill was only made possible by the efforts of the Iranian and Syrian leaders. The American hostage was expected to have been released today, but this did not take place and the goodwill gesture was not made.

The issue is that the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine had demanded that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly travel to Damascus immediately to reach an agreement on questions concerning the practical implementation of the decision to release Turner. However, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker told reporters on Wednesday that the White House had no intention of dispatching its diplomats to Syria to enter into negotiations with pro-Iranian terrorist groupings. At the same time, the U.S. State Department issued a communique calling for the release of all Western hostages in Lebanon, including American citizens Alan Steen and Robert Polhill who were abducted from the Beirut campus along with Jesse Turner. The Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine reacted immediately.

Last night the organization's spokesman contacted the major news agencies and informed them that Jesse Turner's release had been postponed as the United States had refrained from acceding to the organization's wishes.

It is difficult to predict the future course of events. One can speculate that the announcement by the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine was a sort of test of the U.S. stance on the hostage issue. It may be recalled that France contacted the Abu Nidal terrorist group, as a result of which three European hostages were released. However, the White House is in no hurry to follow suit and is not ready to bargain with terrorists.

It appears that Iran has also joined the political game for Turner's release. Yesterday, TEHRAN TIMES Editor Irfan Parviz, who has close ties to the government, commented on the operations of the Palestinian organization and said: I am confident that this is just a beginning and soon all the hostages will be released. In this manner, Tehran once again conveyed the impression that the fate of the American hostages in Lebanon is linked to a great extent to its stance.

It is clear that the TEHRAN TIMES editor was overly optimistic. Present indications are that Iran and the United States could not reach a consensus and so Turner's release was postponed. It would appear that great patience and fortitude and reciprocal concessions are essential if the innumerable obstacles in the path of the release of the hostages are to be removed.

TASS Reports Growing Pakistani-Indian Tension

LD2304091390 Moscow TASS in English 0906 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] New Delhi April 23 TASS—At least 19 people, including 12 Kashmirian separatists, were killed during the past two days in the troubled Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Twelve more people were wounded. Thirty fundamentalists, fighting for Jammu and Kashmir's secession from India, were arrested by security forces.

According to the NATIONAL HERALD newspaper, growing tension in this predominantly Moslem state of India is due to "provocations" by Pakistani troops, perpetrated for the two past weeks along the entire 750-mile frontier with India. These actions have claimed many lives.

Minister for Kashmirian Affairs George Fernandes told journalists in the town of Jammu that there were from 40 to 45 camps in Pakistan and in the occupied part of Kashmir, where 4,000 young people from Jammu and Kashmir are being trained for subversive activity in Indian territory. When ready, they will be smuggled into India.

THE TIMES OF INDIA notes that this information was received from Kashmirian separatists, captured by Indian security forces during the past few months. Some of them said they were forced to undergo training in Pakistani camps fearing for the safety of their families.

The involvement of Pakistan and several other Islamic states in Kashmir events, which is an open secret today, has been again confirmed by separatist sources. Leader of the separatist "Front for the Liberation of Jammu and Kashmir" (FLJK) Amanulla Khan told the ANI news service in Washington that "the Pakistani Government's policy is to support the self-determination and independence of Kashmir."

"In addition to this, the struggle waged by the FLJK for Kashmir's independence," he claimed, enjoys the support of Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, partially Bangladesh, and various Sikh organisations.

India, Pakistan Advised on Peaceful Solution

PM2404122590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Apr 90 Morning Edition p3

[Own correspondent N. Paklin dispatch under the rubric "Panorama of International Life": "Dialogue Essential"]

[Text] Delhi—"The United States has warned India and Pakistan against the use of military methods as a means of resolving the dispute over Kashmir. It has urged them to take the steps necessary to reduce tension in relations between Delhi and Islamabad," the Indian newspaper THE HINDUSTAN TIMES reports.

Quoting the U.S. State Department, the newspaper adds that the United States has been "in contact with the Soviet Union on the Kashmir question, and both sides have spoken in favor of its peaceful resolution." THE TIMES OF INDIA has published a report from Pakistan that a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman "expressed the hope that India and Pakistan will begin friendly consultations to remove the differences that exist between them." "China is sincerely interested in a solution to the dispute's being found on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which will contribute to peace, stability, and development in the south Asian region." The Japanese government has also spoken in favor of resolving the Kashmir problem on the basis of the Simla agreements concluded between India and Pakistan in 1972, envisaging the path of bilateral consultations to resolve disputes as they arise.

To all appearances, both Delhi and Islamabad have heeded the "warnings, recommendations, and advice" of other countries. The first result: The Indian capital has announced that Indian Foreign Minister Gujral will fly to New York on Saturday for a special session of the UN General Assembly and will meet with his Pakistani colleague on Sunday to discuss the Kashmir problem. It is interesting that the initiative for this "overseas" meeting comes from Islamabad, because three times previously Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan refused to visit Delhi. Islamabad had also three times rejected the idea of convening various working groups within the framework of a joint Indo-Pakistani commission. Even the Pakistani Strategic Research Institute cancelled a meeting of its representatives with scientists from the Delhi Defense Research and Analysis Institute at the last moment.

Of course, no one here would venture to predict the outcome of Sunday's meeting in New York between the two foreign ministers. The situation in the region of the Indo-Pakistani border remains complex.

Vorontsov Receives Pakistani Ambassador

PM2304084390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, received Abdul Sattar, Pakistani ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request 19 April. During the discussion there was an exchange of opinions on a number of bilateral and international problems, including Afghanistan and the Kashmir situation. The Soviet side again made an urgent request for Pakistan to help in securing the release of Soviet servicemen captured during military operations in Afghanistan.

Afghan Ambassador Arrives in Moscow 18 Apr

PM2004153990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Mohammad Daud Razmiar, Afghan ambassador to the USSR, arrived in Moscow 18 April.

Vorontsov Receives PLO Official 20 Apr

LD2104000290 Moscow TASS in English 2050 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 21 TASS—Muhammad Abbas, a member of the Palestine Liberation Organisation Executive Committee, was received by First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov on Friday [20 April].

Various aspects of the Middle East situation, Arab-Israeli settlement and other issues of mutual interest were discussed.

Geyvandov Ponders Developments in Mideast

PM2304144190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Konstantin Geyvandov "Political Observer's Opinion": "Near East: Emigration and a Settlement"]

[Text] I was prompted to sit down at the typewriter to produce these notes this time by a news summary from the Near East for just one day last week. Here were some of the items:

—The Egyptian newspaper AL-WAFD, citing Arab diplomatic circles in Cairo, writes about continuing U.S.-Israeli contacts aimed at elaborating a plan to strike against Iraqi nuclear installations.

—The same newspaper reported, citing Iraqi diplomatic sources, that Iraqi President Saddam Husayn has demanded that Egypt break the Camp David peace treaty in the event of Israeli aggression against his country.

—At the same time, AL-WAFD writes that Israel has called on Egypt to elucidate the official Egyptian position on Iraqi threats against Israel (let me add that what were called threats were statements of readiness to rebuff any Israeli aggression—K.G.).

—Strikes and demonstrations by Palestinian insurgents and new clashes with Israeli troops have been continuing on the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the past few days, news agencies report. Some of the population of these territories have been killed or wounded.

—The PLO is "prepared to begin a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue if the Israeli Government, whatever it may be, shows willingness," Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), a figure in the Palestinian Fatah organization, stated to AFP.

—Clashes between the Army grouping headed by General M. 'Awn and the "Lebanese Forces" have been continuing in East Beirut, news agencies report. Intensive fighting is under way in the Lebanese city of Ba'labakk between armed formations of the Shiite Amal movement and the pro-Iranian Hizballah organization. Israeli artillery has shelled a number of South Lebanese population centers in the past few days.

—According to information from the Egyptian newspaper AL-SHA'B, the Israeli Government has sent the U.S. Administration a memorandum on Argentine-Egyptian cooperation on nuclear power. AL-SHA'B states that the United States and Israel are planning to organize a propaganda campaign, accusing Egypt of cooperating with Argentina, Iraq, and Pakistan to allegedly obtain six kg of plutonium to manufacture a nuclear bomb.

—"Egypt is not opposed to Jews leaving the Soviet Union, but it is opposed to this being done at the Palestinian people's expense and the immigrants being resettled on the occupied Arab lands," 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, Egyptian deputy premier and foreign minister, told MENA. The Palestinians, he stressed, should enjoy the same human rights as the Israeli people.

That is how alarming things in the Near East are these days. Whereas some of the above reports reflect long-standing factors of extreme tension in the region, others have come to light relatively recently, although they are nothing but a continuation and development of the old factors. Take the rumpus currently being created by the United States, Israel, and their Western allies about Iraq. It is no secret to anyone that the decades-old Arab-Israeli conflict and then the flareup of the Iraq-Iran war have constantly whipped up the arms race in the countries of the region, making the existence of nuclear missile and chemical weapons there a fait accompli.

Chemical weapons are in service with the Iraqi Army, as its leaders admit. And they have stated that such weapons could be used if Israel were to launch any aggression against Iraq. I cannot, of course, justify the use of chemical weapons or of any other mass destruction weapons. But you will agree that the position of Washington and its allies—which are currently accusing Iraq of having chemical weapons, as well as of attempting to create [sozdat] nuclear weapons—are above all reminiscent of a policy of double standards. In other words, they did not object to Israel's acquisition of state-of-the-art weaponry, but criticize an Arab state when it tries to do likewise. This fact, needless to say, has not gone unnoticed by Arab leaders, who intend to jointly defend Iraq in the event of Israeli aggression.

This entire propaganda war of nerves has now taken a new and, one would like to hope, practical and positive turn. Iraqi President Saddam Husayn, receiving a group of U.S. senators the other day, proposed that all Near East countries, including Israel, agree to eliminate all kinds of mass destruction weapons. After meeting with the same delegation of U.S. senators, acting Israeli Premier Y. Shamir stated that he was prepared to discuss with Arab countries questions connected with the demilitarization of the Near East. I do not know whether these statements will be put into practice, but I am confident that they accord with the spirit of the times.

Another new factor that has recently been adding fuel to the flames of the Near East conflict is direct emigration to Israel, including from the Soviet Union. In general terms, the attitude of the Arabs—and, above all, the Palestinians—to this problem is reflected by the above statement by the leader of the Egyptian foreign policy department, although I must note that, quite honestly, I am somewhat alarmed by the current excessive activeness shown in these matters by representatives of the country involved with the Camp David deal with Israel. Nonetheless, there undoubtedly is an issue here, and—however hard it may be—it will have to be resolved.

In general, I must say that something unnatural is clearly occurring over this direct emigration to Israel. Of course, I am not referring to people's actual right to resettle from one state to another—something which nobody objects to. Now our country's doors are wide open, thank God. Anybody who so desires can change his place of residence at his own choice and—should he so desire—could, I trust, even come back again to his own homeland. But Israel is still in a state of war with its neighbors, with the exception of Egypt. It is occupying considerable portions of their territory and is preventing an entire people—the Palestinians—from exercising their right to self-determination. The Palestinian uprising has been under way for three years now on the Israeli-held West Bank and in the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. This is precisely the kind of situation which is usually called explosive. The above summary of some of the events taking place there today confirms that description, I think. And you will agree that under such conditions it would be at least inhuman, if not immoral, to encourage direct emigration to Israel by our fellow countrymen—even if some of them already prefer to term themselves former countrymen of ours. It would be all the more immoral for us to create air links for this purpose ourselves—something which the U.S. Administration is so zealously insisting on and demanding of us. This is the government, incidentally, of a country which, on the one hand, for some reason by no means encourages its own citizens to emigrate to Israel, yet, on the other hand, rapidly brought in quotas for emigration to the United States from the Soviet Union, despite its claim to be an "implacable fighter for human rights."

Of course, you always feel sad and uncomfortable just from the awareness that your fellow citizen has decided to leave the country for one reason or another. But all the more so if his chosen new place of residence is notable neither for stability nor for security. Knowing the Near East not from hearsay, but from personal experience, I am able to assume that it will scarcely cease to be like that in the near future. In any case, not before a just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which presupposes an end to the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, a full-scale solution to the Palestinian problem, the conclusion of peace treaties between Israel and its neighbors, and international guarantees of the security of all the region's countries. Then, I think, there will be no fears or obstacles for the emigration of Jews to Israel and for the return of Palestinians (in accordance with UN resolutions) to their homeland. But in the meantime it would be only just, in my view, if our fellow countrymen who intend to emigrate to Israel were able to make this decision once they are outside the Soviet Union, and to make it independently.

Insofar as in recent times everything positive in the development of the Near East peace process has been directly dependent on the position of the Israeli leaders, certain hopes have been pinned on the outcome of the current government crisis in Israel. However, so far this has once again misfired. What has happened? So as not to be accused of bias, I will cite the reports of American radio and television corporations. CBS: "Shim'on Peres was ready to form a new Israeli Government Wednesday (last week—K.G.), but he forgot that the most unexpected events are possible in Israeli political life. Two members of a small orthodox religious party refused to support Peres at the last minute, accusing him of being ready to form a Palestinian state alongside Israel." ABC: "The main cause of the political betrayal by the two religious party members makes many Israelis grind their teeth in helpless rage. The two were following the will of Rabbi Menachem Schneerson, the spiritual leader of their ultraorthodox sect, who lives not in Israel, but in Brooklyn (New York, United States)."

The Israelis' rage or indignation is at the peculiarity, not to say imperfection, of their electoral system, which allows small religious parties to dictate their will to the government. The country's public is now demanding radical revision of the law on elections. But meanwhile Israeli President C. Herzog, has given Peres another two weeks for a new attempt at forming a government. No one will venture to predict the outcome of this. One thing is clear—the ball in the Near East peace match remains in the Israelis' court.

Sub-Saharan Africa

ANC Official Denies Soviet Support Decreasing

MB1204175790 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Dear listeners: Recently, the American NEWSDAY newspaper put a large article discussing Soviet Union's attitude towards South Africa.

Among the diversity of assertions, catching the eye was the thought that this country was halting its support of the ANC [African National Congress].

Here is the opinion of Simon Sipho Makana, the ANC representative in Moscow:

[Begin Makana recording] We all know that the Soviet Union, in the eyes of our people, in the eyes of the people of Africa, if anything is regarded as one of the pillars of support for the struggle that is raging in our country today.

We are not the first ones to receive this sort of assistance from the Soviet Union. All the people who have been fighting in the region—Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, and recently SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization]—all of them have received political, diplomatic, and material support from the Soviet Union.

But, we need to point out that there are some forces in the world, particularly in the Western world, who would like to blot out the role of the Soviet Union. Repeatedly we read and hear of allegations in South Africa and in the Western front that the Soviet Union is abandoning the ANC, is abandoning the armed struggle, and is abandoning the oppressed people of South Africa.

Now, we want to say: What is the source of this information? Where do they get all these stories? Where do they get all this information?

Because the record of the role of the Soviet Union has been consistent. We may as well say here that over the years that support has been growing in accordance with the demands of the situation. And so, their people have made it quite clear that they will not abandon the people of South Africa; they will not abandon the ANC; they will not abandon the Communist Party of South Africa; they will not abandon all the mass democratic forces that are fighting for a [word indistinct] South Africa, because they are fully committed to the cause of the removal of apartheid from the soil of the African Continent.

And we feel that the Soviet Union, by making such a statement again, they are fully committed to this cause, that is the cause of national and social emancipation.

Nelson Mandela, when he was released from jail, confirmed this position. He declared that without the continued material, political, diplomatic support which we received from the Soviet Union, our struggle would not have reached the level that it has reached today.

The Soviet Union wants to reiterate that it has no diplomatic, it has no economic relations with South Africa. The Soviet Union has no intention of establishing these relations before the system of apartheid is totally abolished.

Recently, the foreign minister of the Soviet Union, Comrade Shevardnadze, paid a visit to the subcontinent. This visit was part of participation in the celebrations of the independence of Namibia. In that report, the report that he got on the visit to the region, the Soviet Union reiterates its earlier position of supporting the national liberation struggle in South Africa. It reiterates its commitment to the cause of liberation, because the Soviet Union feels, and we also feel, that if there is a politically [words indistinct] of resolving the problem in South Africa, we should opt for this method of solving the problem.

The Soviet Union [words indistinct] said that they would prefer a political solution. The ANC, since it was formed in 1912, has been trying to find a political solution to our situation, and today, our leaders, our people are repeating the same position, that the ANC is fully committed to the resolution of the [words indistinct] through political methods.

Therefore, when the Soviet Union says that they would prefer to have a political solution for the resolution of our crisis, this does not mean a departure from its earlier position of support. In the final analysis, the Soviet Union says that it is a situation that dictates a method to be used by those who are fighting against oppression and exploitation.

I want to say that the ANC is keen to find a political solution, and we hope that the announcements that have been made by De Klerk will be followed with actual deeds to get our country out of its dilemma.

The Frontline countries, who bear the brunt of the aggression from South Africa, are also keen to find a political solution to the problem of South Africa, that is the removal of the apartheid system, which is the source of all the suffering in the region. The Organization for African Unity is also fully committed to the finding of a political solution to the problem of South Africa. The whole of progressive mankind, not only the Soviet

Union, but the whole of progressive mankind, is fully committed to the resolution of the South African dilemma politically.

We, therefore, do not understand why there is a persistent allegation that the Soviet Union is abandoning the struggle for Africa. We feel that, on the contrary, the Soviet Union is stepping up its support for the removal of apartheid, in keeping with the demand of the oppressed people of South Africa, in keeping with the demand of the Frontline countries, in keeping with the demand of the OAU, in keeping with the demand of progressive mankind to step up the political, diplomatic pressure on Pretoria until we've reached a stage where we can say that we've now made tangible, positive results. [end recording]

East Europe

Jaruzelski Cited on Katyn NKVD Documents

LD2304203590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] [Announcer] Polish television has made public a photocopy of material of the former USSR NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] Chief Department on cases of prisoners-of-war and internees, handed to Wojciech Jaruzelski, president of Poland, by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, during the former's recent visit to the Soviet Union. Our correspondent Vladimir Mikhaylenko reports from Warsaw.

[Mikhaylenko] The television interview which Poland has waited for almost half a century took up less than five minutes air time. Wojciech Jaruzelski noted that his visit to the Soviet Union has significant political and economic importance and he immediately stressed its great moral and emotional significance. Following the warm and cordial meetings in Lvov, he said, Katyn was for me the greatest shock. Commenting on the documents he brought from Moscow—among them are some which bear the personal signature of Beria—President Jaruzelski noted that they contain the most varied information on Polish prisoners. [Jaruzelski's voice is heard, fading out to Mikhaylenko speaking in Russian] Among these documents there are no direct indications of the murder itself, but, nonetheless, the conclusion is clearly made: the fate of the almost 15,000 Polish officers was decided beforehand.

The president of Poland regards the approximate list recording the last names, first names and patronymics, and also dates of birth of the 14,793 Polish citizens who were in the Ostashkov, Kozielsk and Starobelsk NKVD camps in 1939-1940 as one of the most important documents given to him by Comrade Gorbachev. This is a very important document, the president stressed; important not only for historians but also for the near and dear, for the families, above all. This is a kind of national relic for us. Evaluating the results of his visit to the Soviet Union, Wojciech Jaruzelski noted that it will be useful for Poland, and that it is of immense political and economic significance.

Defense Minister Yazov Begins Visit to Poland

LD2404090890 Warsaw PAP in English 0842 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Warsaw, April 24—Soviet Defense Minister General Dmitriy Yazov started a visit to Poland at the invitation from Polish National Defense Minister, General Florian Siwicki.

Kondrashov Reflects on Polish Reform, Changes

PM2404084590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Dispatch by special correspondent Stanislav Kondrashov: "Warsaw Spring-90. Impressions and Reflections"]

[Excerpt] Warsaw-Moscow—[passage omitted] A great deal has been written in our country about the radical attempt to extricate Poland from its economic crisis. Not being a specialist, I cannot say whether the risk is justified. Especially since the main "shock therapist," Leszek Balcerowicz, minister of finance and deputy prime minister, is not completely confident of this himself. He is 42 years old, a graduate and scientific staffer of the well-known Main School for Planning and Statistics, until late 1981 he was a member of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party], and since around that time he has been with "Solidarity."

During our conversation he described the situation before the beginning of the economic reform, which was complicated by the fall in production since the middle of last year and a high level of inflation which threatened to become hyperinflation. There were two main questions: Toward what economic system should we advance and what sequence of actions should we choose. There were no doubts on the first question, Balcerowicz stressed—we chose to advance toward the market economy, which has proved its supreme effectiveness in the West. As for the second question, it was decided at virtually the same time to implement radical structural changes and secure economic stability by halting inflation and eliminating the problem of shortages through "shock therapy." This represents, as it were, the first stage of the reform, which began in January and is designed to last until approximately the middle of the year. The second, longer stage involves the privatization of industry, transport, and trade. Talking about privatization, Balcerowicz noted that even previously there was a high percentage of private ownership in Polish agriculture and also in trade and transport. Now, for instance, in trade state stores will be transferred to private hands via auctions. State enterprise personnel will be given initial preference when the shares are sold, but only to a value of no more than 20 percent of the total cost of the shares and not exceeding the annual wages fund.

The main elements of the "shock therapy" consisted in the complete removal of price controls and a strict wage freeze. It must be said that moves toward a market economy were made under Mieczyslaw Rakowski's last communist government, but the liberalization of prices was not universal and was not accompanied by a wage freeze, which effectively resulted in even higher inflation. In January—the first shock month—prices soared by an average of 80 percent at a stroke and as it were reached their ceiling; in February they rose by only four percent. Waiting lines virtually disappeared and food products and commodities appeared, since demand for them had declined in view of the exceptionally high prices. The level of consumption fell and real wages dropped. At the microeconomic level of each ordinary person there was a more modest, sometimes semistarvation diet, privation, the threat of unemployment, and an increase in social tension and crime. At the macroeconomic level there was the stabilization of the market, elimination of shortages, internal convertibility of the zloty [Z]—albeit at the astronomical level of Z9,500 per dollar—and the establishment of a single stable rate of exchange without even borrowing from the $1 billion stabilization fund granted by the West for this purpose.

The emergency measures were taken not, of course, to demonstrate dizzying prices and a sudden abundance of goods in the stores but as the key to getting a more productive economy off the ground. Balcerowicz told us that the people's reaction, like a patient's temperature, was probed by polls but the main question was: Has the new economic mechanism been engaged? Production is regrettably still falling. That is the most alarming thing. In the first quarter of the year it fell by 30 percent in comparison with the same period last year. There have also been reports of a decline in labor productivity. So has the patient been roused by the high-voltage dose of "shock therapy"? Has he been delivered from his age-old weariness? Even optimists are in no hurry to answer in the affirmative.

I will now permit myself one digression—from spring in Warsaw to spring in Moscow. Owing to the increasingly obvious untenability of our government plan for economic recovery, the idea of an immediate transition to the market has now become generally accepted in our country, too. In our quest for arguments we also look to Poland and its "shock therapy." We are seeking a new miracle, according to the ineradicable Russian habit. But there are no miracles, even among our neighbors. And if miracles do suddenly appear, they are not necessarily suited to transplantation into a country with almost eight times the population and many many times the territorial and ethnic diversity.

The transition to a market economy is certainly more than overdue. But I would like to give warnings regarding two interconnected points: First, the people's weariness and, second, the depleted—like the Tyumen oil reserves—credit of trust in the authorities, which is now affecting everything everywhere and may make itself felt with unbridled force if thoughtless measures are taken that encroach even on working people's current humiliatingly low standard of living.

Balcerowicz refused to voice an opinion of Rakowski's government. But he hinted that his predecessor lacked determination, although he was advancing in the same direction economically. The lack of determination was attributable above all to his lack of support among the population.

Mazowiecki is popular with approximately 90 percent of Poles and the people's trust is his government's most valuable political asset. It is this asset that is invested in the economic reform, which enjoys perhaps half that popularity. The high level of trust is, in my view, explained not so much by the government program (only time will tell its correctness and its outcome) as by the fact that its predecessors failed to justify the people's trust for many years. Paraphrasing the biblical saw, if you once fail to justify yourself, who will believe you? Do we not now have this problem of a party that has been unrelievedly in power and proceeded on the premise that it had "eternity in store"? When eternity or, more precisely, three-quarters of a century have been spent on experiments that have not vindicated hopes, the people are not in the mood to extend the credit of trust.

A Soviet diplomat in Warsaw enumerated "three sources of support" that Mazowiecki's government enjoys. The first is the support of the population. The second is the support of the church, which tells Poles that the government is "ours" and for that reason we must be patient, things will be worse at first and then better. The third kind of support is that of the West and Western capital. There is a real possibility of credit of $3.5 billion and firm pledges of credits of roughly $15 billion. Poland is the first country to switch from a planned to a market economy and Western states are interested in the success of this experiment in historical reversibility. Above all the United States. The Polish lobby is influential there in political life on Capitol Hill.

Professor Stanislaw Kwiatkowski, an authoritative recorder of public opinion, expressed the Poles' attitude to economic reform with a quotation from GAZETA WYBORCZA: "They are squeaking but giving their support." State sector workers are "squeaking" loudest of all, but there is also dissatisfaction among the peasants and artisans over tax and credit policy.

We asked Kwiatkowski about the Poles' attitude to the Soviet Union. The so-called "thermometer of feelings" shows a "plus temperature" among 62 percent of respondents. This is much higher than with regard to Germans from the FRG or the GDR; the comparison is important in connection with the process of German unification.

I happened to attend the conference for which Aleksander Drawicz, the new chairman of the Polish Committee for Television and Radio Affairs, assembled his staffers and Soviet correspondents in Warsaw to exchange opinions for the first time. A Soviet Embassy spokesman also attended. Ironic, with an impeccable knowledge of the Russian language (he is a specialist in Russian philology by profession), Drawicz set the tone by stressing the importance of objective information from both sides at a time when Soviet-Polish relations are changing to become relations between two pluralist societies. The image of "perfidious, conceited Poles" who do nothing but desecrate monuments to Lenin and the liberating Soviet soldiers has emerged from the Soviet press of late, he gibed. He urged his audience not to arouse bad feeling.

A trenchant exchange of opinions and complaints then ensued. Soviet participants, parrying recriminations, indicated that references to Auschwitz and Majdanek cannot be found in the Polish press now, only articles about Katyn and the postwar deportation of Poles to Siberia. The Polish participants recalled Molotov's disgraceful toast welcoming the destruction of Poland as the "monstrous progeny of the Versailles Treaty" and the cooperation in executions in 1939-1941 between the men of the Gestapo and the NKVD. The Polish list was longer: Monstrous trails of blood remained wherever Stalin and Stalinism penetrated.

President Jaruzelski, who covered the road to Siberia in the dim dawn of his youth with hundreds of thousands of his compatriots in penal trains, has just been given Soviet evidence of the elimination in 1940 of thousands of Polish officers at Katyn. This crime has at last been officially acknowledged. Jaruzelski is right: Truth heals. The more timely it is, the more it heals. But we are always late, the truth becomes bogged down en route when insensitive bureaucrats or uninterested departments are entrusted with supplying it. For 50 years—37 of them after Stalin—we have disowned and denied the terrible truth of Katyn. Although the people—both ours and the Polish people—knew or sensed it.

One must consider thrice over the feelings of this nation of almost 40 million—small in comparison with us—geopolitically and historically squeezed between Russia and Germany, which is again on the rise and uniting. I heard a story from many people in Warsaw that I had not known about in Moscow: of how the FRG delegation headed by Chancellor Kohl drank champagne in the aircraft while overflying Polish territory on its way home after the 10 February meeting in the Kremlin, celebrating the carte blanche which the Soviet leadership had allegedly given for Germany unification. "The Germans have begun shooting, but only champagne corks at the moment," Poles joked grimly.

Disquiet was aroused by the fact that the question of Poland's western border was not stressed in the report of the Soviet-West German meeting. Mazowiecki then telephoned Gorbachev and assurances were conveyed via the Soviet ambassador to reassure the Poles. A breakdown in communications. After all, our contacts with the new government, especially with the new political system that is being set up in Poland, have not yet acquired the experience which brings sufficient trust and understanding. Furthermore, a specific incident from the era of glasnost compounded this: Twice at CPSU Central Committee plenums Soviet Ambassador V.I. Brovikov criticized the head of state whom he was representing in Warsaw. As a Central Committee member he is of course entitled to make this kind of statement, but the fact that his opinion was made public made the Polish leadership distrust the ambassador's ability to authoritatively represent the Soviet leadership's stance in Warsaw. This happened, I repeat, at a qualitatively new, complex period in relations between the two countries. The incident has now been closed with V.I. Brovikov's request to retire and the appointment as ambassador to Warsaw of Yu.B. Kashlev—a diplomat who has proven his worth during the Vienna talks on humanitarian and military aspects of the Helsinki process.

The question of Poland's western border has also been completely clarified. Moscow wholly supports the legality of the Polish principle of "nothing about us without us." In general the prospect of the emergence of a united Germany has brought Warsaw politically closer to Moscow. One proof of this is that Warsaw, unlike Prague and Budapest, is not active on the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. They are, incidentally, deployed on former German territory.

Prof. Bronislaw Geremek is one of the most influential figures in today's Poland. Since August 1980 he and Mazowiecki have maintained the links between the Catholic reformist intelligentsia and the "Solidarity" trade union movement. He is now the head of the Citizens' Parliamentary Club, which unites the majority of deputies from the Polish parliament. The following is being mentioned in Warsaw as one possible scenario for the near future: If Jaruzelski is "retired" ahead of schedule from the post of president and Mazowiecki rather than Walesa becomes the new president—although the latter has already expressed a desire to run—Geremek may fill the post of premier.

Carefully picking his words in English, Geremek said that Poland's future depends on what the future of its eastern and western neighbors—the Soviet Union and Germany—is like. "Poland wants good relations with the Soviet Union and"—he singled them out separately, as it were—"with the Lithuanians, the Belorussians, and the Ukrainians, with whom the Poles have a mixed legacy of enmity and friendship."

Then:

"What has happened in Poland is wholly connected with what is happening in the Soviet Union, and we are very interested in the development of these processes. We would like to know what will happen after the collapse of the imperial order in the Soviet Union. A few months before his death Sakharov said that the Soviet Union should be a union of free and independent peoples. This idea seems to be accepted by everyone both inside and outside the Soviet Union and outside, but how do different people understand it?"

With regard to Germany Geremek said: "We are concerned that Kohl is still being vague about the borders. We are concerned not because the actual question of the borders is vague but because this means that the chancellor is appealing to the psychology of some Germans. We hope that a united Germany will act and contain itself within a united Europe. We would like to see Europe as a polycentric confederation of democratic countries without hegemony on anyone's part."

Believing that the Polish economic reform is regarded in the Soviet Union as a "return to capitalism," Geremek noted: "This is a return to a market economy for us. We must view things pragmatically and not in terms of ideological division."

Pragmatism—this is the key word in the new world of Eastern Europe and Soviet relations with it. Pragmatism is of course also penetrating the sphere of trade and economic ties—from both sides, moreover. It is dictated by the economic reforms in both countries and is encouraged and at the same time checked by the lack of freely convertible currency, of which both we and the Poles would like to obtain a bit more and shell out a bit less. Forms of cooperation within the CEMA framework have proved their ineffectiveness but it is hard to establish innovations in life. The Soviet-Polish protocol on commodity turnover for this year was not signed last November-December, as it should have been, but in the second half of March, after S.A. Sitaryan's hurried visit to Warsaw to assist K.F. Katushev—signed at the last minute, at the airport, "on the way into the aircraft." We wanted Polish imports to the Soviet Union to exceed our exports to Poland by 1 billion rubles, but we did not obtain this. This signified an abortive attempt to "surreptitiously" drag the Poles into paying their debt to the Soviet Union, which we estimate at R6 billion but which they question, believing that it was wrongly formed via prices for Soviet energy sources that do not take the world market situation into account. We even thought of switching all trade settlements this year to freely convertible currency, but only managed to switch 15 percent. Next year, too, the movement toward hard currency will not be as rapid as the Soviet side would like. The total volume of trade has not increased, but is dropping, as with other CEMA countries. The fact that ties with neighbors have ceased to be the usual help at a difficult time is yet another burden for perestroyka.

I clearly remember another of my meetings in Warsaw—my meeting with Adam Michnik. A world-renowned name, but my knowledge of Michnik—am I the only one?—is unfortunately scrappy. He is considered the "Solidarity" theoretician. He has spent eight of his 40 years in jail. He is part of the core of the new Polish establishment and organized my meeting with Balcerowicz; he could have done likewise with Mazowiecki, but the latter had flown to Washington, and he could also have organized a meeting with Walesa, but, alas, I did not have a chance to go to Gdansk. Though he has never worked in Polish newspapers or had his work published at home, but only in Western Europe and America, he is now the chief editor of the new GAZETA WYBORCZA. Wearing jeans and no tie, he has a Napoleonic brow. From the outset he attracts you with his intelligence, talent, and ability to grasp the crux of the matter. He apologized for his Russian, but spoke precisely, sharply, and tersely.

The influential and popular GAZETA WYBORCZA occupies the first story in an apartment block—a former kindergarten building. The chief editor has a small office that probably belonged to a schoolteacher and has a door and a window into the corridor. There are 140 staffers. I asked Adam whether he lays claim to some of the wealth of property that belonged to the self-disbanded PZPR and is now being shared out. His response stuck in my mind: "I am afraid of this. I do not want to take someone else's belongings. That would be Bolshevism all over again."

Michnik is most alarmed by the Polish extremists who advocate "new Bolshevism" and the interethnic outbursts, clashes, and conflicts rampaging round Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and, of course, the Soviet Union. What will happen there?—he asked about Lithuania in alarm. Almost a month has gone by since then. Of course, his sympathies, like those of most Poles, are on the side of Lithuanian independence. But like most of his thoughtful compatriots he does not want explosions, blockades, or a "war of nerves," but a regulated process, a peaceful settlement between Moscow and Vilnius that takes all sides' interests into consideration. Including, by the strictest criteria, the Polish side because the Poles, by the strictest criteria, have a gigantic interest and historical stake in ensuring that political, economic, and interethnic perestroyka in the Soviet Union occurs calmly and fruitfully.

I remembered another of Adam Michnik's aphorisms perfectly well from our conversation: Chaos cannot be reformed.

Chaos cannot be reformed. That is an incontestable idea and a valuable warning.

Albania Wants To Restore USSR, U.S. Ties

PM2304084190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Statement by Ramiz Alia"]

[Text] In his speech at the Albanian Workers Party plenum which ended 17 April Albanian leader Ramiz Alia stated his country's interest in restoring diplomatic relations with the USSR and the United States and establishing ties with the EC.

Changes in East Europe's Economy Analyzed

LD2104154490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1115 GMT on 21 April broadcasts a 30-minute program analyzing East Europe's transition to a market economy in the "Spectrum" program. Vladlen Krivosheyev, chief of the Economic Institute of the World Socialist System sector of the USSR Academy of Sciences, presents the program.

Georgiy Yakovlev in a recorded interview asks Vladimir Dlouhy, Czechoslovak deputy premier and chairman of the State Planning Commission, what Czechoslovakia dislikes about CEMA today. Dlouhy replies that "in the present form, CEMA completely fails to meet the requirements of the future market and trade between the USSR and other East European, so-called socialist countries" and that it is "not an effective instrument in the development of further trade." He particularly blames the plan regulating trade within CEMA which does not take account of the existence of "sensible hard currency exchange rates when the convertible ruble does not play its designated role." In view of the rapid market reforms underway in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and also in the GDR, it is only natural that they cannot remain "in an organization the character of which exists in CEMA today," he concludes.

In the studio, Krivosheyev interviews Hugo Kisilka, Czechoslovakia's deputy permanent CEMA representative and asks him if it is true that Czechoslovakia opposes CEMA and is prepared to leave it. Kisilka says that Czechoslovakia is in no way interested in leaving CEMA or in seeing it fold. He maintains that the relations built up over the past 40 years should be preserved, but "on the basis of real market relations, which will encourage both a change in the quality and technical level of mutual trade exchange." He says there is also a need to change the name of CEMA to more actively reflect its function and role, although this is a secondary consideration.

Then S. Zhelezynak reports from Romania. The video shows lines for food and other goods and then long shots of an industrial enterprise. Zheleznyak notes some of the economic and social problems caused by the Ceausescu policy and in particularly of electricity supply, as well as the measures taken by the new government to rectify the situation. He points out that "the economy is operating worse than it did under the dictatorial regime" in view of the confusion in the country caused by leadership changes and strikes, while highlighting the flourishing of the black market. He interviews Vikltor Romert, chief of the main directorate of Romania's electricity grid, from inside the central control office of the main directorate. The official says that the population suffered most from Ceausescu's policy of electricity production. Zheleznyak then interviews economist Sentim Meszaros, a member of the Executive Bureau of the National Unity Provisional Council, who doubts that the measures taken by the government will resolve the main problems and gives his views on what needs to be done.

In the next report Viktor Nogin reports from Yugoslavia. The video shows a crowded Belgrade street lined by market traders. He notes the previous difficulties faced by the new government and highlights some of its measures to improve the country's economy which have helped Yugoslavia out of its deep economic crisis.

Yuriy Yulynaov then reports from Poland. The video shows street traders selling food and consumer goods. Ulyanov reviews some of the results of the "shock therapy" method of economic revival applied there, noting the abundance in street stalls of produce sold at prices lower than the state's. He interviews Minister Jerzy Osiatynski, chairman of the Central Planning Office, on how the free market and the centrally planned economy can be made compatible. Osiatynski says that the Polish economy is now in a transitional stage and points out that the main task of his directorate is to gather information, analyze it, and work out the optimum ways to develop the economy further. He says everything can be bought now in Poland, but at higher prices. Ulyanov notes that prices of basic goods are three to four times higher than in the USSR and he highlights the plight of the unemployed and other categories of the underprivileged.

In conclusion, Krivosheyev says that the latest reports show that "shock therapy is yielding positive results, but far too painfully. That experience is gained with far too much difficulty." "Our economists should think very seriously about whether it is worth our while to follow blindly that experience," he cautions.

Hungarian Reaction to Troop Withdrawal Viewed

LD2304164190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0630 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] [Announcer] The Hungarian news media have of late been according much attention to the Soviet troop pullout from Hungary's territory. Our correspondent Vladimir Fadeyev reports from Budapest.

[Fadeyev] The problems that the Hungaryian press is today intensively highlighting in connection with the pullout of our troops concern the installations we are leaving behind—airports, military camps with a substanial housing stock, various depots and other installations built mainly by the Soviet side. According to preliminary estimates, the overall value of all our installations comes to 2.5 billion hard currency rubles, which is 50 billion Hungarian forints. We are naturally interested in reasonable compensation for the many installations being left at the request of the Hungarian side. The principle that comes into play here is that friendship is one thing, but the money has to be counted—it is public money.

For some reason, the question of monetary compensation is giving rise to a sharp controversy in the local press. A few days ago NEPSZAVA carried an article headlined: "The Repair of Officers' Families' Appartments Will Be Expensive." It emerges that the housing is in a lamentable state, and the conclusion is drawn that it should not be paid for. Or rumors are put about alleging that the presence of our units has had a ruinous effect on the environment of the regions where they are stationed.

These statements, it must be said, are groundless and unsupported by any evidence: As a recent check at one training ground revealed recently, not a single discarded tin can was to be found and there was even a marked increase in the number of trees and shrubs.

Much is being written at present about the airport in the town of Debrecen. The Hungarian Government wants to use it in the future as a commercial facility, with which it will be possible to earn a considerable amount of hard currency. We want to be paid for it. That is natural, as we built it. The Hungarian press, however, is currently inflaming passions around this matter, asserting that the Hungarian Defense Ministry subsidized the construction. No documents have so far been produced to back this up, but the ordinary person does naturally gain a certain impression from this, and the main thing is that it is made to apply to relations between us.

I have already reported that our lads are not always seen off on their way home with good wishes; and that there have also been actions that insult the integrity of Soviet troops. The entry of Soviet units into Hungary in 1956 is also a matter that is not being allowed to rest. It is not difficult to imagine what feelings this can arouse in the minds of Hungarian young people, who frequently learn about history from hearsay.

Hungarian Reportage on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

WA2404114390

For Hungarian reportage on Soviet Troop withdrawal from Hungary, including an interview with Major General Antal Annus, Hungarian Government commissioner for Soviet troop withdrawal affairs, and statements by Colonel General Matvei Burlakhov, commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group, speaking in Esztergom, Hungary, see the Hungary section of the 23 April issue of the East Europe DAILY REPORT.

West Europe

France's Schmitt Meets Moiseyev, Views Aircraft

LD2104173190 Moscow International Service in French 1700 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Interview with General Maurice Schmitt, chief of General Staff of the French Armed Forces, by station correspondent Vladimir Krivosheyev; date and place of interview not specified—recorded]

[Text] General Maurice Schmitt, chief of General Staff of the French Armed Forces, is currently visiting the USSR. He has already had talks with Gen. Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, and visited several Soviet military units. The details of his visit are presented in an interview given by Gen. Schmitt given to our correspondent Vladimir Krivosheyev.

[Krivosheyev] General, what are the main aims of your visit to the USSR? What themes did you discuss with your Soviet counterpart? I think that for the moment there is no question of drawing up a joint military doctrine—so what?

[Schmitt] I think that to talk about a joint military doctrine would be going perhaps a bit far, although we are getting toward a finality rather than a doctrine—I prefer that word—a defense finality regarding our military apparatus. This is why, first of all, I prefer to talk about a goal before talking about a doctrine. Doctrines operate for the purposes of goals and not the other way around.

[Krivosheyev] Are you happy with your talks in the Soviet Union. Did you bring your viewpoint closer to that of your Soviet counterpart?

[Schmitt] First of all, and I want to stress this, we had extremely frank talks with Gen. Moiseyev. This is probably the result of the fact that we now know each other well. This is the third time we have met in less than a year, and on each occasion we have had the opportunity to have long talks together. Yesterday, in particular, we spent over two hours together before going to dinner together. So you see, these are not protocol talks which last a few minutes.

Also, as should be the case between people who have mutual respect and consideration, in my view, we very frankly outlined our viewpoints, political-military, the future of the Vienna talks, and the reunification of Germany. I would not say that our viewpoints are identical but in any case we both demonstrated greater frankness, and I think that it is through getting down to problems, through frankness, that we can begin to build something which is stable before entering into another kind of relationship. But stability at least.

[Krivosheyev] You visited a few Soviet army units. You were let into secrets, a few military secrets—even though military secrecy is not a total mystery now. But all the same a few years ago this would not really have been possible. How do you explain this change?

[Schmitt] You yourself said the key sentence. A few years ago this would not have been possible, and the most important thing is this change of climate in relations between the different European countries, particularly between France and the Soviet Union, which I hope are in the process—and I hope this will continue—of setting up relations based on a friendship which is after all a traditional one, as we have fought together several times for our freedom. So it is a very important fact that this visit could have been decided on last July during the visit made by Mr. Gorbachev and Gen. Moiseyev to Paris, and that the whole program Gen. Moiseyev and I signed together, and on which we reached agreement, is being carried out without the slightest problem. We have decided to interpret it in the broadest way possible.

Now, with regard to my visit itself; yesterday and the day before I had the opportunity, as you probably know, of visiting an air base. I was able to watch the demonstration of two of your air force aircraft—the Mig-29 and the Sukhoi-27—which are ultra-modern aircraft, and which make me realize the high quality of the equipment of your forces. I hope you don't have too much of this equipment, but it must be said they are very good planes. I was also able to realize the skillfulness of the pilots. Yesterday I was in an area in which I feel at home as I went to visit the Soviet airborne troops at Ryazan—I myself have been a parachutist for a long time—and there I found that it's very special when parachutists meet up throughout the world. I have jumped with Italian and Canadian parachutists, I have visited the U.S. airborne troops college at Fort Bragg, and now I have been in your country. Well, I think one finds this overwhelming characteristic of parachutists, which is fervor, or, rather enthusiasm, dynamism, their great patriotism, and—this is a joke—their legendary modesty.

Mitterrand Receives Parliamentary Delegation

LD2404011690 Moscow TASS in English 2059 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Paris April 24 TASS—A delegation from the Soviet Parliamentary Committee for International Affairs, headed by Committee Chairman Aleksandr Dzasokhov, was received by French President Francois Mitterrand at the Elysee Palace on Monday night.

In the spirit of the traditionally good relations between the Soviet Union and France, the sides had a warm discussion of the present development of cooperation and contacts between the two countries.

The delegation also met Jean-Louis Bianco, secretary-general of the Elysee Palace. They discussed some topical issues connected with the situation in Europe.

Internal Affairs Minister Bakatin Arrives in Rome

LD2204114490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1028 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] Rome, 22 April (TASS)—V.V. Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs, arrived in Rome today at the invitation of Italian Internal Affairs Minister Antonio Gava.

The program of his visit here includes the signing of a memorandum on cooperation between the USSR and Italian internal affairs ministries in combatting crime.

Latin America & Caribbean

PRAVDA Notes Bay of Pigs Anniversary

PM1904143990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent A. Moiseyev: "Five Days and a Lifetime"]

[Text] Havana, Apr—... It was April 1961, the third spring of the revolution. Five powder-scorched days of this month have gone down for eternity in the history of the Cuban people as an example of heroic resistance. And triumph. In this brief but dramatic engagement the island proved its determination to follow an independent course of development.

Let us think back: In response to the radical transformations begun in Cuba by F. Castro's government, the United States resorted to political and economic pressure, denied the republic credit, terminated oil supplies, banned the sale of sugar on the American market, and swamped the island with propaganda campaigns. Washington soon realized that none of these actions against Cuba could break the will of its people, so the CIA drew up a plan for armed intervention.

The aggression in fact began 15 April 1961, when Cuban airfields were bombed. And in the hours before dawn on 17 April the notorious "2506" brigade—formed, armed, and trained in the United States and backed up by U.S. destroyers and fighter planes—made its landing on the sandy beaches of Playa Giron. The fighting lasted 65 hours and ended in the total defeat of the interventionists. Pedro Jorge Caro, a young museum worker in Playa Giron, gave me the final statistics: A total of 92 mercenaries and 155 defenders of Cuba died in the fighting. The 1,197 counterrevolutionaries who survived surrendered. In 1963 they were returned to the U.S. Government in exchange for children's foods, medicines, and tractors.

It is common knowledge that, though they suffered the fiasco in Playa Giron, the enemies of the new Cuba still continue to interfere in the republic's internal affairs. The latest example of this is the launch of trial television broadcasts by so-called "TV Marti." Havana regards this action as unconcealed aggression. One can only be amazed at the stubbornness of some high-ranking U.S. politicians who are so unwilling to learn lessons from the past. Back on the eve of the landing on Playa Giron, the CIA leadership tried to persuade the government that the island's population was just waiting for the moment to rise up against the "Castro regime." Washington evidently now believes that it will succeed in undermining Cuban society with the help of "TV Marti." Washington is still continuing its trade and economic blockade of the republic and constantly organizes military shows of strength off its shores. The movement of warships has become particularly active recently at the U.S. naval base of Guantanamo, situated on Cuban territory. There are now 11 of these ships. A nuclear submarine has been making port calls.

In these difficult conditions of constant military-political pressure, the Cubans are strengthening their defense capability. "We do not want perpetual antagonism between the United States and Cuba," F. Castro has said. "We are prepared to live in peace with the United States and believe that the day will come when its policies become wiser. But we are also aware that our independence is closely bound up with our defense capability."

I recently visited Playa Giron again. Much has changed. The museum and the name of the settlement are the only reminders that bitter fighting took place here 29 years ago. This once remote, godforsaken corner of Cuba has been transformed: There are good-quality wooden houses, kindergartens, a clinic, and a family doctor service. All this has been built since the U.S. aggression. A modern tourist center with 500 rooms now stretches along the sandy beach—the very same beach where the mercenaries made their landing.

I became acquainted with 83-year-old Leoncio Flores in one of the small gardens. He has lived all his life in Playa Giron. Like many of his fellow villagers, he earned his living by preparing charcoal. It was backbreaking, thankless work for which he was paid a pittance. The revolution shook up the settlement. The peasants received land. Leoncio Flores spent his last working years as a cook in the tourist center, and he is now retired on a pension. One of his daughters works as a guide in the museum and his grandson, David Alvarado, has completed secondary school and now works as a mechanic right here, in the tourist center. "We do not live a life of luxury but we have enough to get by," the young man said with somewhat defiant pride and rushed off to work. He was born here, but after that memorable spring of 1961.

My conversation with Leoncio Flores' grandson put me in mind of the biblical legend of David and Goliath, which has become extraordinarily popular, with its images extensively used in speeches by the country's leaders, journalists, and public speakers. The Cubans constantly compare their country to the legendary David, who held his own in single combat and gained the upper hand over the mighty Goliath, who for them personifies their powerful northern neighbor. After all, the organizers of the intervention on Playa Giron had intended it to deal a fatal blow to the revolution. The whole world knows what came of these intentions.

Supreme Soviet Session

Moscow TV Carries Supreme Soviet Session 23 Apr

Soviet of Nationalities

LD2304211290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1840 GMT on 23 April begins broadcasting a recording of the Soviet of Nationalities session in the Kremlin. The session is chaired by Rafik Nishanov. The recording consists of edited highlights of the session presented by an announcer.

The announcer states that the Soviet of Nationalities held a second reading of the taxation bill, Viktor Andreyevich Gubarev reported. Gubarev is shown having already begun his report, listing committees and commissions that examined proposals for amendments, listing deputies who suggested them. Gubarev describes various categories of people getting special treatment under the draft, including low-paid and artists.

At 1850 GMT Gubarev gives numerous examples of how different categories of earners would pay tax.

At 1857 GMT Gubarev explains that many suggested amendments were either impracticable or went beyond the scope of tax laws.

At 1858 GMT The announcer says that Gubarev answered questions. Finance Minister Pavlov then took the rostrum. Pavlov is shown speaking about concessions for Afghanistan veterans; the concessions that have been suggested exceed even those for relatives of the war dead, but a compromise has been worked out. Concerning concessions for those with three dependents, Pavlov says it would make better sense to instruct the government departments to work out how best to help the children most in need.

At 1904 GMT Nishanov asks Deputy Kucherenko if the government proposal for a R90 per month minimum tax level was considered in his commission. Kucherenko says the commission is sticking to R100. Pavlov asks for more precisely calculated figures.

At 1906 GMT Deputy Likhanov comes to the rostrum to speak about a tax on charities. While contributions are freed of tax, what the charities pay out gets taxed; he gives some examples of how charities are affected.

At 1909 GMT The announcer says the law was voted on by sections. An unidentified deputy is shown putting forward an amendment to one section concerning bonuses for specialists. He asks Pavlov to explain why his amendment could not be put in. Kucherenko says the question has been under discussion for months, and that the proposal would benefit better paid people at the expense of the less well off.

At 1913 GMT Pavlov says the issue is not a new one. Essentially, bonuses have become another form of pay. He explains the provisions of the draft, which are intended to establish fair conditions for people in seasonally affected jobs, such as fisheries and gold-digging. Their income will be assessed on an annual equivalent basis. The payment for labor in the draft should cover both wages and bonuses. Nishanov offers a vote on refining wording to say pay and bonuses, which passes with 170 votes for. The law on income tax is passed with 158 in favor. Complete figures are not shown.

At 1920 GMT The announcer says that the Soviet examined the AIDS issue. USSR Health Minister Denisov is shown reporting, outlining the world situation and that in the USSR. Denisov details figures to date: Approximately 55 million people have been screened; 984 infected of whom 502 are foreigners. HIV-infected people must be guaranteed their rights, says Denisov. Outbreaks of AIDS at children's hospitals have shown that medical staff must be made strictly liable, under criminal law if necessary. The Ministry of Health, of Justice and other government departments have drafted a bill on combating AIDS. It aims to protect the rights of infected people and protect the population from the disease. Medical and law enforcement staff are obliged to keep medical details of infected people secret. The Council of Ministers has examined proposals for preventing the spread of AIDS, as have various committees and commissions. A draft resolution would ask the government to form an emergency commission to combat AIDS.

At 1930 GMT Denisov says that the law and the resolution on how to put it into force would help prevent discrimination against AIDS sufferers.

Soviet of the Union

LD2304214190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1931 GMT continues its recording of the 23 April Soviet of Nationalities session in the Kremlin.

At 1931 GMT the announcer lists a number of those who spoke in support of the draft. Yu.I. Borodin is then shown answering a question about the cost of the measures; the question being based on the OGONEK article.

At 1932 GMT the law is passed by all present, that is by 174; no deputies are against or abstain.

At 1933 GMT Moscow television carries the caption: "Session of the Soviet of the Union." Laptev is shown in the chair and declaring the sitting open. Three issues are to be examined. First: income tax. The discussion of tax on enterprises was to be extended, but the commission has asked for this to be postponed.

AT 1934 GMT Laptev reminds deputies that the first reading of the tax laws was on 27 March. He invites Viktor Andreyevich Gubarev to take the floor. Gubarev is shown answering questions and suggestions from the floor.

At 1937 GMT Gubarev speaks in defense of the proposals for the taxation of families. He assures another questioner that concessions sought for invalids do remain in force.

At 1940 GMT Gubarev speaks about the progressive nature of the proposed taxation.

At 1941 GMT Deputy Chelyshev asks about how priests will be taxed. Gubarev says that they will be taxed as workers after the law on the freedom of conscience has been passed.

At 1944 GMT Deputy Bocharov asks a question about the taxation of agricultural workers; Gubarev replies.

At 1945 GMT an undentified deputy asks about the procedure whereby one has to account for the source of the money when one purchases high value articles. Gubarev tells him that this question does not fall within the competence of the taxation law.

At 1946 GMT Deputy Shchelkanov asks about the position of war veterans.

At 1947 GMT another unidentified deputy asks about the position of people who combine two jobs. Gubarev explains the technical procedures governing their taxation.

At 1949 GMT Deputy Veprev asks about the tax on land use and is told that that is not income tax and the proposal must be put when that paticular tax is discussed.

At 1952 GMT there is a vote on the taxation law as a whole. The Soviet of the Union voting figures: 187 in favor; one against; and three abstentions.

At 1953 GMT Laptev then moves on to the next subject on the agenda: There is a vote on the procedure of introducing the law: 188 vote in favor; there are no votes against; and two abstentions.

At 1955 GMT there is a vote on the procedure for introducing the law lifting the tax levied upon bachelors and citizens without families: 189 vote in favor, there are no votes against and there are no abstentions. Both the law and the decisions are adopted.

At 1956 GMT the Soviet of the Union hears reports on the law concerning the fight against AIDS. Excerpts from deputies' contributions to the discussion of these reports are shown. An unidentified medical deputy lists his feelings on the law, stating that there is a need for more funds to be put into the fight against AIDS.

At 2002 GMT another medical deputy—Shcherbak—speaks in support of the law of AIDS, though he had reservations about Article 3 which requires certain individuals to undergo juridical testing, and about several other specific features.

At 2008 GMT Deputy Tsyurupa takes the floor. Most of those infected, he says, are foreigners who are well supplied with one-trip-syringes, condoms, and other devices. The heart of the problem lies in the spread of prostitution and homosexual activities. Medical staff throughout the country are at risk because they are not provided with proper safeguards. The Council of Ministers is under an obligation to provide the material and technical base for the law. Tsyurupa makes observations on specific points of the law. He proposes editorial amendments to the proposed text of the law.

AT 2013 GMT Deputy Probylova takes the floor. She says the figures that have been heard are horrifying and goes on to make specific proposed amendments.

At 2019 GMT Deputy Bogdanov asks who in the schools is going to be responsible for implementing the proposed government program for combatting AIDS? Will it once again fall to the lot of the teacher?

At 2023 GMT an unidentified speaker on behalf of the committee that drafted the bill replies to points that have been made by individual deputies in their contributions.

AT 2028 GMT Academician Pokrovskiy takes the floor. He says that there isn't such a thing as a high risk group: In fact everyone belongs to the high risk group. Second, you cannot compare AIDS with Chernobyl or any other disaster: It is an infectious disease which has its own specific course of development. Third, all this talk about single-trip syringes draws attention from the main point: Medical staff have to be educated and literate—provision of one-trip syringes is no substitute for that!

At 2032 GMT Laptev invites those in favor of the law to vote now: There are 194 in favor; one against; and no abstentions. The law is adopted by the Soviet of the Union.

2033 GMT Laptev asks for a vote on making relevant changes to the basic health law: 190 vote in favor, three vote against; and one abstains.

At 2034 GMT the recording ends.

Soviet of Nationalities Passes Tax, AIDS Laws

LD2304124490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1100 GMT on 23 April carries a three-minute report from the Kremlin in which correspondent Andrey Nikiforov reports on the day's proceedings in the Soviet of Nationalities. Two laws were passed dealing with taxation: one on income tax and the other phasing out the bachelor tax. If they are now passed by the Soviet of the Union these laws will come into force on 1 July 1990.

The Soviet of Nationalities passed another law on preventing AIDS. This, Nikiforov says, is the first time that the Soviet parliament has passed a law without having to have a second reading: There were no votes either against or in abstention. It contains just 10 articles. USSR Health Minister Denisov spoke of AIDS in the world and in the USSR. "As far as our country is concerned, something of the order of 55 million people have so far been screened; 986 are infected, of whom 502 are foreign citizens. There have been 29 with the disease, of whom 19 have died. Unless urgent and serious steps are taken, then some estimates indicate that by the year 2000 we will have 1.5 million carriers of the virus."

The law provides for medical and social assistance for people infected with the virus; antidiscrimination measures are included, too. "One of the articles makes it a criminal offense for one person deliberately to place another in danger of infection, and for somebody who knows he has the disease to infect another. It also makes it a criminal offense for medical workers not to carry out their professional duties properly, and for them to divulge medical secrets. The law comes into force on 1 January 1991."

The USSR Council of Ministers has been given the job of forming a governmental commission to combat AIDS and of drawing up a state program to combat the disease this year.

Denisov Speaks on AIDS 23 Apr

LD2304224290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1920 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Report by USSR Health Minister Igor Nikolayevich Denisov at the 23 April session of the Soviet of Nationalities in the Kremlin—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] In the USSR the first Soviet citizen suffering from AIDS was identified in March 1987. As of April this year over 55 million citizens were tested for AIDS and 984 HIV-infected people were identified, out of which 502 were foreigners and 484 Soviet citizens. Twenty nine of these have developed the full-scale disease, from which 19 people already have died. To date HIV-infected citizens have been identified in 12 union republics. Out of all the HIV-infected persons 43 percent consist of people of working age up to 55-years old; the rest are children. According to Soviet scientists' predictions, the number of HIV-infected people in the country could reach 1,625 already during this year. In 1992—24,000 people. And if we take the year 2000 as the point of departure, and if the situation does not change, the number of HIV-infected people in our country may reach between 1 and 1.5 million. [passage omitted on the existing lack of legal and social protection for the AIDS sufferers, cases of discrimination and medical negligence which should be prevented]

Cases of mass infections of chldren with the AIDS virus in Ellista, Volgograd, Stavropol, Rostov-na-Donu have sharply emphasized the question of introducing strict liability, if necessary under the criminal law, for the medical workers who show criminal negligence in their professional obligations. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's decree on the measures for prevention of the AIDS virus infection, which was adopted in August 1987 and is currently active on USSR territory, does not envisage legal protection of HIV carriers and people with AIDS as well as criminal liability for the medical and pharmaceutical personnel for improperly carrying out their professional duties and breaking the confidentiality of medical information.

In connection with the above, the USSR Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the USSR Procuracy, the All-Union Research Institute of the Soviet State and Legislation attached to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Academy of Sciences State and Law Institute, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have prepared a draft law on the questions of dealing with and preventing the further spread of AIDS.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's decree of 25 August 1987 was taken as a basis for this draft law, and augumented by a number of principally new provisions aimed at providing legal protection for the infected persons, protection for all the population from the threat of the virus spreading, and increasing medical personnel liability. In comparison with the decree which is currently in operation, this draft is more democratic; the grounds for, and procedure of, the compulsory testing and preventive observation have been clearly formulated in it. The procurate's sanction is envisaged where undertaking compulsory tests is concerned as a guarantee for the inviolability of the individual. It's the duty of medical personnel and other responsible persons—these are militia, procuracy personnel and so on—to keep all information about the person undertaking the tests, and the results of such tests, confidential. The right of the infected persons to medical and social help is secured in the draft law. Any infringment of the rights of such people in connection with their disease is not allowed. In order to enlist the help of all members of society in fighting the spread of AIDS, the draft law envisages offering help to the managers of enterprises and departments, assisting the health authorities in carrying out the law. [passage omitted on procedure of preparing the draft—suggestions and preparation of the final draft]

In the USSR Supreme Soviet's draft decree which was presented it was suggested that the USSR Council of Ministers should be ordered to form an Emergency Commission for the Prevention of AIDS in the USSR. Taking into account the pressing nature of the AIDS problems in the USSR and the world this commission, according to the suggestion of the two Supreme Soviet Committees, should be headed by one of the deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers. During 1990 the said commission is offered to develop the state program on prevention of AIDS in the USSR, having first taken into account the questions of the material and technical provision of the means for the prevention of the disease and propaganda on hygienic and moral aspects of educating the population. The necessity for broad international cooperation on the problems of AIDS in all its aspects—medical, social, legal, judicial and moral—is being considered. [passage omitted]

Soviet of Union Passes Tax Laws

LD2304142190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Excerpt] At the USSR Supreme Soviet session. Over to the All-Union Radio correspondent Andrey Nikiforov in the Kremlin:

[Nikiforov] The Soviet of the Union has examined and adopted the draft law on income tax for the USSR and foreign citizens, and stateless persons. Let me remind you that this draft law was also adopted today by the Soviet of the Nationalities. It therefore comes into force on 1 July of this year, as decided by the two chambers.

Discussion in both chambers was similar in many ways. It was the proposal to amend the first section, in which incomes not liable to be taxed and tax relief are determined, that took the most time.

What does the law stipulate in this section? The following incomes are not liable to be taxed: State social insurance and security payments, other than those paid for temporary inability to work, including caring for a sick child. Student grants are not taxed, nor are payments to students at vocational and technical schools, alimony, state pensions, or additional pensions paid out through voluntary pension insurance. Blue and white collar workers and other citizens in the same tax bracket are not liable to pay any tax if their income does not exceed R100 per month. If authors' royalties for the creation or use of a work of science, literature, or art do not exceed a monthly average of this R100 level, these sums are likewise not subject to taxation. Let me alert you to another norm: The members of peasant farms are not liable to pay taxes on the income earned from the farm for two years, starting from the year in which the farm was set up.

The law also contains what I see as a very important clause whereby the local soviets of people's deputies have the right to exempt individuals from liability to income tax, after taking specific circumstances into account. The size of the tax can similarly be lowered. This clause is in keeping with the law adopted by the Supreme Soviet on the general principles of local self-government and the local economy, under which all sums from income tax now go into the budget of the local soviets. A resolution adopted on this law provides for the preparation over two years of proposals for holding the second stage of reforming income tax levied on citizens, which will stipulate a transition to integrated principles of levying taxes on the personal incomes, expenditure to maintain children, dependents, and other socially justifiable spending.

Literally a few moments ago the Soviet of the Union voted to adopt a law on the step-by-step revocation of the tax on bachelors, people living alone, and those with small families. This law, too, will come into force on 1 July this year. [passage omitted]

TASS Explains New Income Tax Law Provisions

LD2304161490 Moscow TASS in English 1533 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 23 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The Council of Nationalities, one of the two houses of Soviet parliament, approved today the income tax bill, one of the legislative acts that are to lay the legal foundation for a regulated market economy.

As distinct from the law in force, which is actually based on egalitarian principles of taxation, the submitted bill envisages progressive taxes. It raises the minimum sum that is exempt of taxes from 70 to 100 roubles a month. Taxes will be smaller for earnings up to 150 roubles and will remain practically unchanged for earnings up to 700 roubles. However, they will grow sharply when earnings exceed 1,500 roubles. This will mainly affect businessmen. The tax on incomes exceeding 3,000 roubles a month may reach 60 per cent (the salary of the Soviet prime minister amounts to 1,400 roubles).

Proposals to grant taxation priviledges to some groups of the population were accepted. Individual farmsteads will not be taxed for two years following their establishment. Smaller taxes will be levied on families with three or more children. Student scholarships will be exempted of taxes. Taxation of author's emoluments and royalities will be milder. At the same time, the bill repeals all earlier adopted government decisions on taxation privileges to various professions.

The Council of Nationalities also approved a bill abolishing the tax on unmarried people and childless families. It was formerly paid by men aged from 20 to 50 who had no children and by married women aged from 20 to 45. This law, adopted during the Second World War, brought many complaints from taxpayers. The bill provides for its stage-by-stage abolition up to January 1st, 1993.

The Council of the Union is expected to consider these bills this afternoon.

Bills are deemed approved if they get an absolute majority of votes in each house.

Supreme Soviet Discusses Ethnic Development

LD2404082190 Moscow TASS in English 0745 GMT 24 Apr 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS—The two chambers of the Soviet parliament will separately examine today the second reading of bills on the free ethnic development of Soviet citizens living outside their national-state entities and on the languages of Soviet peoples.

These documents, aimed to create the new legal foundations of the Soviet federation, were examined by parliament's autumn session in their first reading.

The first legal act contains various guarantees for full equality and equal opportunities for all Soviet citizens, irrespective of their nationality or place of residence.

The second provides for the right of a union or autonomous republic to determine the legal status of a republic's languages, including the right to establish them as state languages.

The Russian language is recognised as the official language of the USSR and is used as a means of communication between Soviet peoples.

Political & Social

Maslennikov 23 Apr Briefing With Journalists

Economic Plan's Guarantees

LD2304173790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] A meeting between Maslennikov, the USSR president's press secretary, and the journalists has taken place today. Generally, the subject of the conversation was the joint sitting of the Presidential Council and the Council of the Federation, at which the problems of speeding up the country's economic reform was discussed. According to Comrade Maslennikov, no concrete program was discussed at the session. It was the concept that was discussed. The government has to work out a concrete program. Naturally, it should have to find its legislative basis. So, it is envisioned that 15-18 new laws or amendments to the existing ones are to be adopted. Here are the fragments of this news conference.

[Begin Maslennikov recording] To avoid all sorts of false interpretations I should like to say it straight away that conjectures or stories which have appeared in some publications—including the central newspapers—with reference to someone, that the Soviet Union is almost planning to make a so-called jump into the unknown, to undertake something like a shock therapy after the Polish example; these reasonings are wrong. This does not reflect either the factual side of the matter that was discussed, nor the concepts and the prevalent opinion which exist in the minds of the Soviet economists, the president and his close aides. When it is being said to us that we need to give the full freedom to the market forces, and let the loser weep, let the strongest win; such approach is not suitable to us. Our choice, our concept is the choice and the concept within the socialist transformations. Therefore, any transformations, including those in the sphere of the prices reform in the sphere, well, of the whole economy's transition to the market principles, will necessarily be accompanied by the inbuilt mechanisms which would guarantee the social protection for the majority of population—first of all, the layers of society with insufficient and average incomes. In the development of this program consideration will be taken, in general, of all kinds of realities, including, let us say, some purely psychological realities. It is not a secret that during the last, practically 70 years, except for the short period of New Economic Plan, we the Soviet people have become accustomed to thinking that, in general, the state takes care about all our social needs. Alongside with all that we were always proud of—the social protection, absence of fear for tomorrow—this thinking had some negative results. It brought about the psychology of dependency, the hope that whatever happens the salary will be paid, the education provided, all other needs, e.g. housing will be provided. Let it be of a bad quality, so to speak, let it be insufficient, but if you wait in the line long enough, it will come. Such a hope that somebody will do something for you without fail, whether you work well or not very well, this are of course the social excesses of the previous policy. It is necessary to rid ourselves from them, but we should not simply ignore them. It is not possible to force people, let us say, to force them to change their way of thinking overnight. [end recording]

Lithuania, Economic Reform

LD2304192590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1650 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 23 Apr—TASS parliamentary correspondent Andrey Orlov reports from the Kremlin:

Arkadiy Maslennikov, press secretary of the USSR president, has expressed the opinion that Lithuania's leaders ought to "replace political audacity with political realism." They should "return to the path of the law," he said, "but how they do so—by repealing the illegal decisions or freezing them—is up to them." Commenting on the situation in Lithuania at a regular briefing for journalists today, Arkadiy Maslennikov said that talks between Moscow and Vilnius are "possible only on the basis of the USSR Constitution."

"Declaring political independence and becoming economically independent are different things," he stressed. Lithuania depends 100 percent on deliveries from central resources of cotton, oil and gas, metal, and combined feed for livestock farming; and to the extent of 50 percent for deliveries of grain and many other things, the press secretary of the USSR president said.

He described assertions about an "economic war and a blockade of Lithuania" by Moscow do not correspond to reality.

Asked whether the USSR would agree to Lithuania's independently importing oil from abroad, Arkadiy Maslennikov replied: "Lithuania remains an integral part of the USSR, and questions of imports into the USSR are decided on a centralized basis. This is not a question of resources, this is a question of sovereignty."

The USSR president's press secretary described the Presidential Council and the Council of the Federation joint session which took place last week. Those taking part in it concluded that it is necessary to speed up the implementation of the economic reforms in the country and make them radical in character.

Dissatisfaction was expressed at the session with the way that the government program for market stabilization and the deepening of economic reform—which was adopted four months ago—is being fulfilled, he said. The Presidential Council and the Council of the Federation of the USSR thus deemed it expendient to speed up the reform by 12-18 months.

The government's new program was not discussed at the joint session. "Discussion took place only of its concept," the press secretary stressed. In his words: "The USSR president will be happy if the government is able to present a program in May." It is expected that the government will submit a package of 15-18 economic plans for consideration by the Supreme Soviet.

Arkadiy Maslennikov refuted assumptions that have appeared in the press to the effect that the USSR is allegedly "intending to take a leap into the unknown, having resorted to a method of shock therapy." Any reforms, including price reform, will be accompanied by builtin mechanisms which would guarantee the social protection of those strata that are poorly provided for or with average means, he said.

"The year 1990 must become the year of the stabilization of the market and 1991 the year of the beginning of reform," Arkadiy Maslennikov said. What is understood by stabilization is the "pumping out of superfluous money by means of issuing shares and selling real estate, construction materials, and bonds at fairly high rates of interest." Also envisaged is the prevention of the population's further uncontrolled income growth, which rose by 14 percent during the first three months of this year alone against a zero or negative rate of growth in national income.

Speaking of the possibilities for utilizing the experience of reforms of East European countries, Poland in particular, Arkadiy Maslennikov noted that it is useful to study foreign experience but "harmful to copy it mechanically." It is necessary to take into account the political and social realities of our country, including living at the expense of others, something that is a result of the administrative system. "It is essential to rid ourselves of it, but to ignore its presence is not only irrational, but also dangerous," the press secretary of the USSR's president stated.

Commenting on the USSR president's decree setting out regulations for the holding of meetings in the center of Moscow, he noted that restrictions of this kind are in force in many countries, in Great Britain, for instance.

Economic Transformations

LD2304221890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1746 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Briefing for journalists by the press secretary of the USSR president, Arkadiy Maslennikov in Moscow on 23 April; identified by screen caption; broadcast in progress—recorded]

[Text] [Maslennikov] It was deemed essential to accelerate the implementation of the economic transformations and to give them a more radical character. The point of those transformations consists in transferring the Soviet economy into the track of a regulated, market economy. One is talking about bringing forward the schedule of fulfilment of the planned measures by approximately 12-18 months, about compressing the process. Both acceleration of the process and thorough preparation and study of every stage were considered essential.

I would like to state straight away that conjectures and stories which have appeared in some publications including the central newspapers, with reference to someone, that the Soviet Union is just planning to make a so-called jump into the unknown, to undertake something like a shock therapy after the Polish example; these reasonings are wrong. This does not reflect either the factual side of the matter that was discussed, nor the concepts and the prevalent opinion which exist in the minds of the Soviet economists, and the president and his close aides. There will be no shock therapy. There will be an accelerated implementation of the economic reform, with radicalization of it, and comprehensive economic and legal preparation. When we speak about legal preparation, the point is approximately 15 or 17 laws which need to be passed, or amendments to existing laws. Naturally one is talking about thorough consideration of the social consequences of all those measures.

When we are told that we need to give the full freedom to the market forces, and let the losers weep, let the strongest win; such an approach is not suitable to us. Our choice, our concept is the choice and the concept within the socialist transformations. Therefore, any transformations, including those in the sphere of prices reform, in the sphere of the whole economy's transition to market principles, will necessarily be accompanied by in-built mechanisms which would guarantee the social protection of the majority of the population—primarily, the low-income and average-income strata of society.

Once more I will refer to Academician Shatalin. Those who read what he said evidently noted that in the penultimate paragraph of his speech he expresses not only his own opinion, but expresses what, for the most part, is fairly precisely the spirit and character of the discussion. I refer to the place in his interview where he says clearly it would be naive to think one can guarantee the constancy, or, so to speak, the protection of the incomes of all the strata of the population. He says someone will obviously have to concede something, primarily the low-paid category of the population. But, when and so long as the point at issue is the working people, the people with low incomes, the pensioners and students and other strata, here the guarantees must be complete, here the guarantees must be absolute.

I believe it necessary to mention this or to insistently repeat this idea because there are concepts, and they are being discussed broadly in the press, to the effect that we need to proceed along the road, to proceed along the road of radical transformations come what may—even if there is a growth in, or rather the emergence of mass unemployment. This also is an unacceptable road for socialism.

The most sober-minded economists, and I would even say the most serious economists who discuss this problem not merely in the conceptual aspect but who also count the costs, come to the conclusion that generally such transformations may be conducted, without allowing grave social shocks. This is unacceptable, because the overall situation in the country is sufficiently acute, sufficiently tough today, and it would be not merely incorrect from a moral viewpoint, but also probably extremely irrational from any other viewpoint, including a political viewpoint, to ask Soviet people to agree to still more serious sacrifices. This year should be devoted to stabilization of the market and to preparation for that very stage of radical economic reform. The reform itself evidently ought to proceed, gathering impetus, from 1991 on.

[Unidentified correspondent] Were any variants examined at the sitting of the Presidential Council and of the Council of the Federation for conducting a money reform of any kind, a confiscation money reform, a regressive money reform or a property one? That is the first question, and after that, please....

[Maslennikov, interrupting] I will answer that immediately. No, none were examined, and I can tell you that, if one is to speak about the preponderant opinion, generally the opinion of the president and of those people whom he considered it necessary to invite for the discussion of his economic policy, the question of a money reform was not raised and is not being raised.

[(L'ETADA KHORASAN) correspondent] I am from the (L'ETADA KHORSHAN) newspaper. With your indulgence, I have the following question. For over 70 years you have been saying—and I do not mean you but rather, that the USSR believed—there can be no unemployment under socialism. Suddenly, precisely at the end of the eighties and at the start of the nineties, you say: Yes, there is and will be unemployment. What is the reason for this? That is one question. The second is....

[Maslennikov, interrupting] Let us commence with the first question. Actually, I said something quite the opposite. I said that that socialism and socialists, if they are worthy of the name, cannot proceed from the fact that it is possible to develop the economy at the expense of people, that, for instance, it is possible for them to adopt and mechanically copy, let us say, the method of Mrs. Thatcher when she is in a country where the working population is less than 26 million people and when her policy created unemployment at the level of 4 million, and some trade unions considered it was nearly 5 million people. That road is closed for us. Therefore, I said, and incidentally criticized precisely those who consider that unemployment is, so to speak, just about a good thing for the development of the economy. But, as an economist, and I am an economist by education, I understand that any structural upheaval, including a structural upheaval connected with scientific-technical progress and not necessarily with social things, implies a change in the structure of employment, and consequently the emergence in individual areas and in individual sectors of a partial lack of full employment. You can call it unemployment if you like, but I would prefer to cal it lack of full employment, within which framework it is necessary to organize retraining of the workforce, to teach new skills and to train people for new jobs. That kind of unemployment, that kind of lack of full employment in individual sectors and regions, is a normal phenomenon, with which one must learn to live, which one must be able to spot. That is a task one must be able to resolve. That is more honest, notably from a viewpoint of social justice, than to merely repeat that there can be no unemployment, especially when it arises independent of our will and desire.

Finally, evidently, I should say a few words about Lithuania. You know about the instruction which was issued and signed by the president and by the chairman of the Council of Ministers, by Gorbachev and Ryzhkov. This instruction met, as they say nowadays, with a varied reaction, both in Lithuania itself and in international circles. But, despite all the clamor we are hearing from Lithuania, one thing is clear: This issue is being discussed most actively both by the public and by the parliament of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], by the Lithuanian SSR's Supreme Soviet, and by political circles, opinions differ there. You know that Brazauaskas, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, made a speech and called for those problems to be solved by means of political dialogue, by political methods.

Those, who yesterday watched the late evening news program, must have noted the remarks of another eminent public figure of Lithuania, who bluntly said that evidently any haste here is inappropriate now. Attention has been drawn also to a number of commentaries in the Lithuanian press, particularly to calls for the Lithuanian leadership to replace political audacity with political wisdom. Obviously, despite the fact that emotions are continuing to hold sway, the awareness of many inhabitants of the republic and hopefully of the leadership is graduallly being reached by thoughts that one nevertheless ought not to resolve grave political and economic issues by means of such impulsive decisions. One must seek a way to a worthy dialogue on a basis of legality, on the basis of the Constitution. No one is preparing—

anyway, there is no such sentiment in the center—to bring somebody to their knees. I repeat: The dialogue can and must take place with observance of...[changes thought] with respect for the people, for the traditions of the people, for the opinion of the people. But evidently, attempts on the part of the Lithuanian leadership to dictate their will are also unacceptable. There are no grounds for that.

Lithuania Seen as 'Matter of State Policy'

LD2304222890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2005 GMT 23 Apr 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The transition toward a regulated market economy is gathering pace at the wish of the USSR president. Everything will be done here to alleviate the cost society will have to bear. This is the main conclusion that can be made from the results of today's briefing by Arkadiy Maslennikov, press secretary of the USSR president.

The briefing was reported on in the "Vremya" program and later. As for us, we will add to what you were already able to see just one detail which, in our view, is of great importance; it concerns Lithuania.

[Begin recording] [unidentified correspondent] You said no one in the center wishes to put Lithuania on its knees. If Lithuania were able to find a country or an organization be able and willing to sell it oil and if it were able to find money to pay it for it, will, in this case, the centre here allow for such oil deliveries to Lithuania to take place?

[Maslennikov] I can only answer in the most general way: Lithuania continues to remain a part of the Soviet Union and the question of what can and what cannot be brought into Soviet ports will be solved by the Soviet state. The matter does not just boil down to whether or not Lithuania will find hard currency through donations of one kind or another; it is a matter of the Soviet Union's sovereignty and a matter of state policy. So, thank you all for your attention. TASS will, as usual, inform you of the next briefing. [end recording]

Conference of Party Ideological Workers Convenes

Medvedev Gives Opening Speech

LD2304211190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Apr 90

["Excerpts" of the opening speech by Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev at the conference of ideological workers at the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow on 23 April—recorded; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A qualitatively new stage has begun in the work of the party itself, and its main specific feature lies in in fact that the CPSU has to act henceforth on the basis of democratic, constitutional norms, in conditions of competition and contest with other political forces and social movements. To consult on these questions, to elaborate a joint position—this is where the main aim of our conference actually lies. Of course, they arise in particularly acute form in the runup to the 28th CPSU Congress, which has to provide fundamental replies to them. I would ask you to view my address not as a ready reply, but as an invitation to discuss these complex problems, and I will express my view on them. The party is currently going through a process that is, in many respects, painful, full of twists and turns, a process of reassessing values, reinterpreting many phenomena. The entire viewpoint of socialism is changing in essence, and this is accompanied by acute political polemics during which various opinions and judgments are expressed.

Certainly, we recognize the right of all communists to defend their position, and we proceed from this premise, but it is impermissible in the current situation to come to terms with appearances of feelings of panic, unconstructive criticism of the party's strategic line and the basic fundamentals of our doctrine, from whatever side, from left or right, this criticism might stem.

The question today in many respects stands like this: Is socialism to exist, in renewed form, on democratic and humanist principles, or is socialism to cease to exist at all? For this reason I would personally abstain from using, using excessively, the term de-ideologization of social life—it is incorrect! It is not possible to save social life from ideology. what is at issue is the measure, how to approach the solution of pressing problems, in ideology itself, in the spiritual, ideological and cultural sphere itself, and in the economy, and in other spheres of activity.

Kapto Views Party Tasks

LD2304193690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Interview with Aleksandr Semenovich Kapto, head of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department, by correspondent Vladimir Korablev at the conference of party ideological workers in Moscow; date not given—recorded]

[Text] A conference of ideological workers opened today in Moscow at the CPSU Central Committee. Secretaries of the central committees of union republican communist parties, party obkoms [oblast party committees] and kraykoms [kray party committees], and functionaries of the central ideological departments have been invited to it. Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and member of the Politburo, delivered a report at the conference.

We present a recording of a conversation between our correspondent Vladimir Korablev and Aleksandr Semenovich Kapto, head of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department.

[Korablev] Tell me, Aleksandr Semenovich, what are the principal aims and tasks of this conference?

[Kapto] Well, I think there are several aims at the conference. First of all, to exchange opinions on the sociopolitical situation in the country, in conjunction with the participants in a conference which include so many ideological functionaries from local level and from central ideological institutions. It is only on the basis of an analysis of this situation that specific measures can be developed. This is the first point.

The second one, which is naturally of extraordinary importance, is to analyze the experience accumulated in the ideological sphere under the conditions of perestroyka. The very first speeches after the report attest to the fact that all in all, these are the weak points in the party committees' activities: generally applying experience; taking timely notice of positive aspects in everything that is appearing; and passing this on to others. Here I would say that both party committees and the mass information media suffer from this shortcoming.

And third, still on the subject of the conference's aims, is to develop recommendations on how the party committees and mass information media should best work in the period remaining until the 28th CPSU Congress.

[Korablev] In other words, what is involved is perestroyka in all ideological work.

[Kapto] Of course, perestroyka in ideological work and how it can most appropriately correspond to the changes which have taken place already—which are not just taking place, but which have taken place already—in the economic, cultural, and intellectual spheres, and in the state and law. Unfortunately, ideological work is not keeping pace, as we say, in all these areas.

[Korablev] It is lagging behind the perestroyka process.

[Kapto] In a number of cases it is lagging behind perestroyka, even though I can cite you examples where a number of party committees are taking charge of this perestroyka and are carrying out interesting measures. There is, of course, a kind of dissipation of experience here. In principle, however, today's conference is expected to consult on how to make this work more active.

Ryzhkov, Ligachev Review Fuel Situation

LD2304190190 Moscow TASS in English 1844 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 23 TASS—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov today summoned a number of officials to report on how their ministries and departments have coped with the implementation of the instructions they received after the premier's meeting with oil and gas workers in late March.

Special attention was paid to difficulties faced by oil workers in Tyumen Region—the country's fuel centre.

The State Planning Committee and the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supplies were lambasted for their failure to supply pipes and oil-extracting equipment.

Instructions were issued to prepare proposals for oil and gas wholesale prices.

The Soviet premier was furious at delays in improving oil and gas workers' living conditions. He urged more persistence and initiative on the part of the government of the Russian Federation and the USSR Ministry of Trade to ensure adequate supplies of consumer goods and food stuffs to workers in Tyumen and Tomsk Regions.

Politburo Member Yegor Ligachev told the officials that the union republics' drive for greater sovereignty ought not to hamper the concentration of effort and means to solve issues of national importance, including in the areas where natural deposits are being developed, as each republic and the country as a whole are in acute need of these resources.

In closing, Prime Minister Ryzhkov reminded the officials that he will keep monitoring the implementation of the plans made at the meeting with oil and gas workers.

Komsomol Congress' Last Day Reported

PM2004154790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 p 1

[Special correspondents S. Romanyuk and A. Khantsevich report: "21st Komsomol Congress: Last Day. Has the Choice Been Made?"]

[Text] **Fifteen Minutes for Self-Determination**

The extra day was of no help to delegates. By the end of the day, the value of each minute had increased manyfold. Many people's train and air tickets were "about to expire." There were desperate people who did not begrudge the cost and postponed their return home—the finish promised to be too intriguing.

The Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Statute had already been adopted on the whole. The spontaneous debates on the subject of the federation had already ended. Suddenly there was a rejoinder from the auditorium: What about the Russian Komsomol? Indeed, the First Russian Komsomol Congress has not completed its work and the new organization's structure has not been determined. Yes, the chairman confirmed: A situation might develop whereby, under the statutes approved by the congress, the league with the largest number of members could find itself excluded from the newly-created federation.

Another deadlock? There was virtually no more time for deliberation. The Russians were given only 15 minutes "for self-determination."

Passions ran too high. The press center had already seriously discussed what would happen if the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] delegations were to leave "Russia." Fortunately, this did not happen, common sense prevailed. A solution was found nonetheless after heated debates, during which the hall was rather reminiscent of Pushkin Square. It proved to be simple—until the organizational formation of the Russian Komsomol is completed, its interests will be represented by All-Union Komsomol Central Committee members elected from these territories.

Opposition in the Gallery

And now the elections. First a new Komsomol Central Committee was ratified. This seemed simple enough. Prior to the congress, all the candidacies within the approved quota were discussed at local level and recommended for election. But sensations were not avoided here either.

The first was caused by Valentin Denisov, former Komsomol Central Committee secretary. Something which, admittedly, no one expected.

"Considering that our congress has committed a number of political blunders and organizational mistakes, I do not consider it possible for me to remain on the Central Committee and hold any professional post." That was said, word for word, by a a recent candidate for the post of Komsomol Central Committee first secretary, whose name had still not been deleted from the preliminary lists.

Before the auditorium had time to recover from the slight shock caused by V. Denisov's statement, the "recalcitrant" gallery spoke. Aleksandr Shlapak, first secretary of Lvov Obkom [oblast committee], refused to join the supreme Komsomol body. What were his reasons? Aleksandr told the congress that the Lvov delegation had come to Moscow with its own platform and specific proposals. But the congress documents took none of them into consideration.

Well, what are these proposals?, we asked Aleksandr after his withdrawal had been agreed. It turns out that the people of Lvov unequivocally want to revise the ideological foundations of youth policy, they favor an alliance of independent organizations and the division of Komsomol property between them.... Shlapak is convinced that it is useless to fight for the adoption of such decisions within the newly elected Central Committee.

"Why We Are Quitting..."

Just a year ago this issue could have been settled within a matter of minutes—we recall how the Komsomol Central Committee first secretary was elected at a plenum by a simple show of hands. This time, despite the late hour, the delegates favored a completely different procedure—much more lengthy, but truly democratic. The candidates "ascended to Golgotha" one by one. And one by one they withdrew their candidacies. Why?

Tape Recorder in the Auditorium

V. Mironenko: "We have ourselves tried to restructure our league and rethink the content of its work. The 21st congress marks the close of a very complex stage in Komsomol history. The new stage will require fresh people without too many connections with the burden of previous decisions. I am convinced that the organization's future will be safeguarded by young people who rely on the experience of those who worked within the Komsomol at various times, including recently."

A. Bek: "I consider the adoption of the Address on the CPSU Central Committee letter to be a most serious step.... The congress documents are extremely contradictory, they do not reflect any victorious concept. This is not a compromise of opinions, it is a compromise of interests. I failed to notice a common ideological platform. Our league has not become a league of left-wing forces. I cannot betray my stance, I cannot be the top man of such an organization."

A. Matviyenko: "Today, with the Ukrainian Komsomol in mind, I would deem it right to withdraw my candidacy. I must report back to the republic's congress and it is for the congress to decide whether I should carry on working or not."

I. Tasmagambetov: "Literally two weeks or so ago, the republic's Komsomol congress made me responsible for leading the republic's Komsomol organization. I believe that I am obliged to concentrate on this area of work. I choose to withdraw."

The outcome: Only six of the 17 previously nominated candidates remained on the secret ballot papers. Discussion of candidates for the post of chairman of the Komsomol Central Control Commission began immediately.

Tape Recorder in the Auditorium

N. Klykov: "I worked in the Komsomol central control organ during the very complex post-stagnation period. This demanded a great deal of effort and energy. I would like to withdraw my candidacy, and to see preference given to younger comrades."

V. Grayvoronskiy: "How can I join the leadership of an organization with transport expenditure incurred by the Secretariat and the Central Committee leadership approaching R1 million, an organization which has more than 30 black Volgas for what is effectively personal use? ...An organization whose apparatus gets through about R400 million and spends no more than R80 million on specific business? ...An organization whose congress—with this hall, the hotels, and restaurants—costs R2.5 million, and yet allocates [only] R2 million in aid to Chernobyl Komsomol members?"

The results of the elections are well known, we have reported them.

New Komsomol Leader Zyukin Interviewed

LD2104151890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1740 GMT 20 Apr 90

["Topical Interview" program: Interview with V. Zyukin, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, by correspondent V. Minayev; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Minayev] How does the new first secretary see a renewed Komsomol?

[Zyukin] First of all, the reply to that question is already contained in the main documents adopted by the congress the declaration of the program and aims of the Komsomol, and the Komsomol rules. As far as the future model of the Komsomol is concerned, it will above all be an organization in which there is a distinct federal structure. The characteristic feature here is that the union republics will continue to be completely independent to determine their structure, their internal set-up, and the selection of their forms and methods of working. And the center, the Komsomol Central Committee, retains mainly political functions, the functions of coordination.

As far as the resolutions adopted at the congress are concerned, a special congress resolution established a separation of the jurisdiction of the higher elective bodies and the apparatus. In connection with this, the Komsomol Central Committee retains powers such as the coordination of activity and adoption of decisions containing recommendations, and decisions binding for Komsomol organizations can only be adopted on a small range of matters.

[Minayev] What priority tasks do you propose to address?

[Zyukin] Among the priority tasks that will have to be addressed in the first weeks and months will be to get the new model going. There will be a series of Komsomol congresses in the union republics, which, in accordance with the decisions of the 21st congress, are to bring their legislative base into line with the general decisions of the congress. After that, there will obviously be an all-union Komsomol conference, since it is difficult to imagine that in a complex organism like the Komsomol the creation of this model can be completed with the holding of a congress. Changes will of course also have to be made to the rules adopted at the congress. All this has to do with the internal set-up of the organization.

As regards the main tasks of a political and social nature, the priority task is to ensure that the organization really does become something that people, young people, need. It is no secret that our Komsomol structure sticks very much in people's gullet, and an ordinary, real person in the street can't, as a rule, see what the organization can do for him. Today there is the system of part-time earnings. There is the system of tourism which tens of thousands of young people make use of, there is the young people's residential complex network and the young people's scientific-technical creativity system set up with the help of the Komsomol. But that is naturally not enough.

At the initiative of the Komsomol Central Committee, a law on youth has been given its first reading. We are now preparing a further package of measures, the most important and interesting of which—something that young people will no doubt be attracted by—is the creation of a unified Komsomol information network. I have in mind that a kind of club is going to be set up at every rayon Komsomol comittee. The primary organizations themselves, or groups of primary organizations, or the rayon Komsomol committee, will be able to choose. Ordinary people will be able to make use of such a club every day. They will be able to obtain information about where to get work, where to study and how to spend the holidays.

Another reason we have an interest in the creation of such a network is that in a situation when a multiparty system is approaching, and when annually we are now losing tens of thousands of primary Komsomol organizations, particularly ones with a large membership, the primary Komsomol organization as the basic organizational form of the Komsomol should in a number of cases no doubt be replaced by a club-type organization, as is the case with many youth leagues abroad. Thus, the establishment of an information network of this kind will enable a very interesting new club system to be made the basis of the Komsomol.

[Minayev] Only 15-20 percent of young people followed the congress's work attentively. It is no secret that many ordinary Komsomol members are quite indifferent to whether or not the congress took place and as to who represented them at this congress. Therefore, I think it is important, let us say, to know your thoughts about the club movement and about what may await the unpoliticized young person, not working within the apparatus, but the ordinary Komsomol member.

[Zyukin] Well, I am distinctly conscious of and we would probably not be realistic politicians, realistic people, if we did not understand how the activities of Komsomol bodies were evaluated, how the progress of the congress was evaluted in the eyes of—I repeat once again—a normal, real, young person. But when I spoke about this club system I also said that this was one of the elements in the return of the organization to the place where it should be. It should be in these, in the group of these people who hang around outside in the evening, or....

[Minayev] Who have nowhere else to go.

[Zuykin] Quite right. Well, I would like to say this again. If we put the issue in such a way that the Komsomol today, as an organization, is able to resolve all the problems and with its own resources and even by its own, let us say, political activities in parliament, this would probably be a great mistake. The point is that I am profoundly convinced that in the coming next few months a whole series of youth organizations will be created—there are the higher legislative prerequisities for this today although not all laws on social organization have been adopted yet—so I think that the state has a great interest in this. If today both the Supreme Soviet, the government, if the president, understand that by influencing the younger generation correctly it is possible to gain very good political dividends then we may hope that this very difficult stage of perestroyka might pass in a better manner. As far as we are concerned, we are ready now, not only ready, but are planning in the near future to sit down to the negotiating table or to invite people so that this bloc of leftist forces, about which much is being spoken, but which practically does not exist, becomes a reality.

[Minayev] The Komsomol is coming out in favor of the adoption of a law on state youth policies. It has already been adopted in the first reading by the parliament. Is the Komsomol not transferring concerns for the interests of young people onto the powerful shoulders of the state? The Komsomol does after all have both the means and the opportunities to occupy itself with this.

[Zyukin] I think that the question should be turned around. The point of the matter is that for centuries things turned out in such a way that on the contrary, the state placed all concerns for young people on the weak shoulders of the Komsomol. Practically speaking, there were no other structures in existence within the state, in the legal procedures, in the legal and executive branches. And this lack continues today. Well, I would say that at the central level there is already understanding of the fact that the Komsomol is a social organization, but as the subject of a political system it can also have an influence on the resolution of these issues but it is not responsible for them directly. As far as the slightly lower level is concerned, frequently there still, depending on where and the extent to which the processes of perestroyka have moved on, frequently the state of affairs continues to remain such that the Komsomol is the main bearer of responsibility for how young people feel today, how they relax, how they study and work, and how they behave.

For this reason I consider that this question should be turned around, but I consider that the Komsomol should not of course cast off its responsibility for that part of work, for that part of the activities which concerns young people.

[Minayev] What is awaiting the apparatus? Will it be reduced.

[Zyukin] Yes. The apparatus will be reduced, of course, undoubtedly. I do not now wish to speak about any figures since everything needs to be considered here. Its structure will be formed from the decision which, as I have already said, was adopted at the congress, the resolution on the powers and functions of the Komsomol Central Committee. Everything is clearly defined there, it is possible to see which commissions of the Komsomol Central Committee should exist, what minimum of officials attached to these commissions should be engaged today can be seen literally from the groups of resolutions. I think that there are very many interesting people in the Central Committee today, I am profoundly convinced of this, who will be able to continue to work in the central apparatus. Well, of course, there are also people who will leave.

[Minayev] You headed the Komsomol in a period which was very difficult for it. Were you not afraid?

[Zyukin] When I was elected I really did have very mixed feelings, feelings of alarm, feelings of gratitude, naturally, towards those who entrusted me with such a great matter. But there were feelings of alarm since today, our organism, the Komsomol, is also very sick, very tense—and tense not because of its personal illness but because everything which is occurring in society today is being reflected in this organization. Moreover, in connection with its specific nature and in connection with the fact that these are young forces, energetic forces, people who are not completely formed and do not yet have internal highly democatic cultures. The situation is somewhat unhealthy here. For this reason we saw that there were crises at the congress and there were many of them.

What inspires confidence in connection with this, is that, it seems to me that the moral potential of those people who came to the congress is very high. Things did not reach the point where further conversation would be useless. So a gap remained where the sides took a step backwards, weighed everything up once again, thus attempted to meet one another halfway and saw that in principle compromises were found. Yes, this makes the decisions adopted somewhat contradictory, but I am profoundly convinced that decisions simply cannot be different, smooth in the situation in which we find ourselves.

Frolov Engages in Komsomol Debates 14 April

PM2004130190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 90 pp 2-4

[Unattributed report on 14 April evening debates at 21st Komsomol Congress: "Speeches in Debates at 21st Komsomol Congress"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Arkadiy Trachuk—secretary of the Oktyabrskiy Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Rayon Committee, Leningrad City:

Esteemed comrade delegates! Allow me to give you the results of today's work by the "Komsomol and the Party" discussion center.

Having devised a three-point agenda we finalized only one point because great passions were heated around the question, around the CPSU Central Committee open letter to the country's communists. From 250 to 100 people took part in the center's work. The debate was more than stormy, over 20 people mounted the rostrum and CPSU Central Committee Secretaries Comrades Ligachev and Razumovskiy, Comrade Ryzhov, deputy chief of a party Central Committee department, Comrade Yakovenko, one of the leaders of the Democratic Platform Coordinating Council, and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputy Comrade Lysenko, senior teacher at the Higher Party School, took an active part in the work.

The range of opinions was extremely wide, from the view that no document should be adopted to the view that a document should be adopted which would call for the recall of the party Central Committee letter. By 1700 hours three main documents had been devised around which serious talk proceeded. The first document was the 21st Komsomol Congress appeal to the country's communists submitted by the Leningrad delegation and groups of delegates from Volgograd, Moscow, Yaroslavl, and other cities.

The second document is the 21st congress resolution of a group of people's deputies and representatives of delegations and the third document is the draft authored by Comrade Zolotov from the Gorkiy delegation. In the documents issued to you it is submitted as a draft signed by 51 delegates of the 21st Komsomol Congress.

The authors of the first two documents, considering the similarity of their approaches, concluded and considered it possible, and the section supported the decision, to examine at today's sitting only the appeal of the 21st Komsomol Congress and to refer the resolution according to the usual procedure and examine it, like other resolutions, at a plenary sitting. Thus the alternative at the section consisted of the drafts of the appeal of the 21st Komsomol Congress prepared and submitted by the Leningrad delegation and groups of delegations from other cities and the draft authored by Comrade Zolotov.

According to the results of the discussion and the vote after the discussion at the section, opinions were divided as follows. Some 85 people voted for adopting the appeal and 44 voted against. Thus the 21st Komsomol Congress appeal to the country's communists was adopted by the discussion center as the basis for discussion. Unfortunately, because of lack of time and the debates which overwhelmed us we were unable to consider this document in full and to take account of all the comments heard at the discussion center. That is why the document remained adopted as a basis and not adopted as a whole.

But despite that I should like to convince the congress as far as I can that a very great many amendments were considered during the finalizing of the document, that it already contains three or four of the amendments submitted and that, therefore, in the opinion of our discussion center, this document could be a serious basis for the delegates' work.

In conclusion I should like to notify you of the center's information. After the vote it was decided that the discussion center deems it necessary to examine at the congress the question of holding an individual vote on this appeal. Naturally, it is essential that the technical services be prepared for this, if that is really possible. Thank you.

I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA:

Thank you very much. It seems to me that the congress has adopted an important decision, essentially in some sense one that confronts the Central Committee, as I understand it. But I should like to turn your attention, young people, to the way the document is compiled. You have already adopted it, but that still means nothing, I think....

Chair:
I ask you to listen.

I.T. Frolov:
Comrades, turn your attention to paragraph three.

It says that the 11 April 1990 CPSU Central Committee letter contains an appeal right now "to investigate what to do with those party members...." (There follows an ellipsis. In my life I have seen a lot concealed behind ellipses). Then: "Who by their views and convictions have placed themselves outside the party." Any one of you who has read this quotation obviously concludes that we must investigate those who have some special views and convictions. We are already familiar with this. My generation experienced it and I have experienced it personally.

But let us read what there actually is in the letter. The letter does not say "convictions" but "conduct." Those are different things. (Applause).

Now as regards the ellipsis. Dear friends, allow me to read out how it sounds as a whole: "The time has come when, without forgoing freedom of discussion and consolidating its constructive basis, we must investigate what to do with those party members who persistently and purposefully lead matters toward a split, create organized factions within the CPSU, deny the socialist choice of the Soviet people, and by their views and conduct have placed themselves outside the party." (Applause. Whistling).

Chair:
I ask you to listen quietly, if possible. Let's respect each other.

I.T. Frolov:
Viktor Ivanovich, I am full of respect for you, but in this case I cannot even speak, I shall say this to the congress. PRAVDA has for many months been discussing precongress problems. That includes our discussion of the CPSU Central Committee draft platform and we invited representatives of the Democratic Platform to visit the

PRAVDA editorial office, talked with them, and published the results of the talk. This can be confirmed by Comrade, as you call him, Lysenko. We invited Comrade Lysenko. He could set forth his views after the platform was published. Comrade Lysenko, a lecturer in scientific communism, came to me and brought the text of the "Democratic Platform." As you know, in his presence, with the participation of the rector of the Moscow higher party school, we had a discussion on this platform. We published it in PRAVDA in the "Discussion Pamphlet" so that, comrade delegates, I do not address Viktor Ivanovich, he should know this in the line of duty as a member of the CPSU Central Committee, I address you young people so that you should know that there was no discrimination, no suppression, during the discussion of, for instance, "View" and "Democratic Platform." I do not know whether you read PRAVDA. You may not, but after the publication of this letter I read the phrases as they actually were. "Discussion Pamphlet No. 23" was published today and it also has discussions on these problems. It also discusses the Central Committee open letter but this "Discussion Pamphlet" also criticizes the CPSU Central Committee draft platform. I have a question: Why was this interpretation of what the party Central Committee is doing needed and why in your resolution did you need to falsify the text of the letter so that it was adopted like that and sounded like that. (Applause).

Chair:
Thank you. Thank you, Ivan Timofeyevich. I still want to address the congress delegates. This is a very serious comment, it is connected with the fact that the quotation from the letter was indeed presented in a biased way. That is why there is a proposal to amend this inaccuracy and cite the quotation in its full form. (applause).

Aleksandr Bek, scientific staffer at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics (Moscow):

1. I believe that the rules of the standing orders extend to all delegates and guests of the congress without exception and I believe that the CPSU Central Committee secretary who spoke has caused the congress in a certain sense moral harm by saying: "The congress has adopted the decision, that means nothing." (Applause). I ask the chair to make comments in such cases. (Applause).

2. The quoter from the newspaper emphasized the fact that the time has come, that we must look into what is to happen to those party members, and stopped without reading out the next phrase: "Surely such people cannot remain in the ranks of the CPSU," thus distorting the quotation as well.

A. Trachuk:
Any document has somebody who has read it out. I read out this document, so I apologize deeply to the congress and to Ivan Timofeyevich Frolov for the fact that an inaccuracy slipped into the quotation. Therefore, to eliminate the tension which has arisen, we are undoubtedly agreed that the entire phrase should be included in full in the document. No one wanted to distort the phrase of the document or most importantly the meaning we invested in this quotation and that, that word, is reflected. This word is conviction and in our opinion that word is fundamental.

V.N. Lysenko, member of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" coordination council and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy:

I thank the Komsomol congress for giving the opportunity to speak to a representative of the "Democratic Platform" in contrast to the CPSU Central Committee March Plenum, which did not give us this opportunity.

Now for the thrust of the matter.

Comrades! I visited Ivan Timofeyevich Frolov and I am indeed grateful to him for deciding to publish the Democratic Platform. And it was published 3 March. It said that the "Democratic Platform" regards the split of the CPSU as inevitable.

The "roundtable" published together with the Democratic Platform came down to the point that the comrades who held the discussion with us argued that there is no difference between the Democratic Platform and the CPSU Central Committee Platform.

But within literally two months the situation has changed radically. The influence of the "Democratic Platform" has started to grow rapidly. Public opinion polls held by the Moscow Higher Party School have shown that 40 percent of the country's communists now support the "Democratic Platform," 24 percent support the CPSU Central Committee Platform, and the remainder either have not decided or advocate the dissolution of the CPSU. it is no accident that very soon there was a flood of abusive letters and articles in PRAVDA addressed to the "Democratic Platform" and its individual figures. To this day Ivan Timofeyevich has not published and is not publishing a single document of the many thousand sent there in support of the "Democratic Platform" and denouncing the CPSU Central Committee letter because, unfortunately, to this day PRAVDA is in fact under the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, which prepared this letter. But I know that many enterprises have also adopted appeals and today our Moscow aviation institute adopted a resolution.

Now I should like to say what has actually happened in these two months.

First, I think that at the March plenum there was a retreat compared with the February plenum. At the demand of the overwhelming majority of CPSU Central Committee members the provisions on communism as the ultimate goal of the CPSU and on democratic centralism were returned to the draft CPSU Statutes. (Noise in the auditorium).

Chair:

Comrade Lysenko, I ask you to pay attention. That is the auditorium's reaction to the fact that you are not speaking on the thrust of the matter. (Noise in the auditorium).

V.N. Lysenko:
Now I want to say a few words about how the "Democratic Platform" coordination council treated the CPSU Central Committee letter.

The fact that the CPSU Central Committee announced a discussion and gave an opportunity for various views to be expressed and printed our platform but later, when it started to become clear that the majority in the party were being won over by the Democratic Platform, in fact decided to purge the platform's supporters. [sentence as published]

Next. The situation is such that today many organizations stand for the Democratic Platform , some stand for the CPSU Central Committee Platform, and there are organizations which stand on the positions of the United Front of Working People. In fact an internal party war could begin now when those people who stand on different platforms start to exclude each other from party organizations. That is why I believe that this document on the contrary accelerates and intensifies the process of delimitation within the party.

A dangerous precedent is being created. I think that here it is not only a case of the democratic platform but also of any other viewpoints which are expressed in society but which do not accord with the Central Committee line which in the very near future may be ostracised.

Next, I know that a democratic faction has long existed in the Komsomol. I did not see this affecting the Komsomol in any fundamental way. The fact that they categorically refuse to create a faction in the CPSU, although it is obvious today that there are three distinct platforms in the party which today are incompatible on the majority of their positions attests that these platforms will be unable to continue to exist in this party without a factional structure. At the same time we were accused of the fact that the very idea of the faction is antiparty, anti-Leninist, and so forth. While until 1921, as you know, there were factions in the party.

And the last thing I wanted to say. Comrades, you must consider that the public opinion polls held by the Academy of Social Sciences show that whereas six months ago the majority of the population would have voted for the CPSU at general parliamentary elections, now less than half would vote for the CPSU. The situation is deteriorating with every passing day. The elections in East Europe have shown that today it is not even the centrist parties, not the democratic socialist parties which have come to power but the right-wing forces.

Therefore, if we today, the Komsomol, the party, and the democratic structures, are not aware of our responsibility to the people, not aware that people are not accepting our organizations of the communist type today, I believe that it will be too late tomorrow. Then it is not the socialist idea which will be dominant in our country, but an idea utterly opposite to it.

Thank you for your attention. (Applause).

Chair:
This proposal has just reached me from the presidium: that the congress sitting be interrupted and a conference of representatives of the delegations be held. I want to address the congress. The proposal has been put, I ask you to vote to show who is in favor of the proposal. (Noise in the auditorium).

I ask you not to shout. A proposal has been submitted, I ask you to vote, who supports it? Thank you.

I want to tell you that Ivan Timofeyevich Frolov, who came out with a rejoinder on the inaccurate quotation, has asked to speak in connection with Comrade Lysenko's speech.

I.T. Frolov:
Esteemed comrades!

Indeed, this was not simply a tiresome habit of accuracy although decades of studying science accustom me to this. But the point is that, having rectified this error and included the quotation in full, I agree with the comrades who have spoken that the congress has in fact cast doubt on the appeal proposed. That is how it seems to me.

I would not like to preach any sermons to you. I have never engaged in that in my life. I merely draw your attention to the blatant discrepancy between the texts of the quotations.

There is one more point. I should also like to draw attention to it. Although I am already an ex professor I, too, was very moved by these events and thoughts. But of course not by the fact that I am addressing such a big audience. Perhaps I was inaccurate but I would like to explain what I had in mind. That was not an insult to the congress. I am very punctilious about that. With regard to such a large number of people. And with regard to each person. I said that it meant nothing. That was my rejoinder as a man accustomed to accuracy. I have frequently seen many objectively thinking people, when they see some inaccuracy, which is very often the case in books and articles and so forth, wanting to correct it. I expressed my opinion in the sense that it was not final, that it meant nothing. Of course, you yourselves have proved this by voting for the quotation to be cited in full. That means I was right. And nonetheless I apologize to those who perhaps misunderstood me.

I would not like to dispute now the theses developed here by Comrade Lysenko. You see, I value very much the "special relationship" which I have in a sense won, and it was not that simple, even from the leaders of the "Democratic Platform." Behind this there stands not only its publication in PRAVDA. The publication itself—it is after all in general, in my life, in my publishing and journal activity—a logical episode and I see no kind of feat in it. It is something normal. Wherever I have been I have always organized discussions, "roundtables." I believe that is an essential condition for the development of Marxist thought. Our discussion was also very useful and interesting. Today I was at the center which deals with the press and to be honest I was simply pleasantly struck by what skilled and interesting young people have grown up in our country. I look with hope at how everything will develop in our country in the future. Although I wanted to say a few more pleasant words to you, I shall move to the thrust of the matter. What does this letter mean? I urge you to think, a Central Committee secretary or Politburo member cannot give you instructions everywhere, especially not to the congress of the Komsomol, of young people. That in general is an utterly absurd undertaking and I reject it out of hand. That is why I urge you to think. What does this letter mean? It is primarily a continuation of the line which emerged in the drafts of the CPSU Central Committee Platform and the new Statutes. Work on this took a very long time. Now very many people, including the leaders of the "Democratic Platform," want to compare everything: Aha, we once published a draft platform and you once did the same; either this is a coincidence or someone did the work beforehand, and so forth. That is an absurd assertion. The point is that this work began with the very start of perestroyka, I can personally bear witness to it, and it was done even earlier—even in the hard years of stagnation—by many people in the works of the people who in fact prepared and are now implementing perestroyka. So the accusation that the Central Committee document was hasty should be rejected. There was very thoughtful but complicated work here.

Now the next point. What is the basic, the main thing in this letter? The appeal and the definition of measures for consolidation, dear friends! That is the main thing and it is from precisely this that we are being deflected by the same people who feel that in general they will not be so comfortable in the new conditions. Think about the following point, too. The Central Committee and PRAVDA have been literally inundated with letters demanding of the party leadership: Sort yourselves out, say precisely and specifically how matters stand, what the situation is, what the line of conduct should be, and so forth. This was what was done in the Central Committee in a somewhat compressed form, so to speak.

Consolidation—why? Because we are threatened with a split. Think about that, comrades. The party is threatened, and it is defending itself. Now you will tell me, what party, in what state, would not defend itself? If the Komsomol does not defend itself that is very bad. But I see here at the congress and have read many speeches (we are also publishing the materials in PRAVDA) that the Komsomol is defending itself. But why can the party not defend itself? It is defending itself against a threat. And this threat is perhaps at the same time the greatest threat to perestroyka. We are essentially faced with the breakdown of perestroyka. One more point. Yes. I will not keep your attention but you know I would like to say something more to you.

Chair:
Esteemed comrade delegates, I ask you to listen. Go ahead, Ivan Timofeyevich.

I.T. Frolov:
Good, then I ask you, let's really observe procedure—well, I am a special person, I need five to seven minutes.

Chair:
Five to seven minutes. Go ahead. Ivan Timofeyevich.

I.T. Frolov.
Yes. I will be to the point.

I will keep track of time but I ask Viktor Ivanovich also to keep track, I may get carried away.

The discussion is continuing. What Comrade Lysenko said here is wrong. The discussion is continuing primarily in PRAVDA, it is continuing in the party, and the Central Committee letter gives some guidelines and incentives for continuing the discussion. But at the same time it puts this discussion within a specific framework: What we must do and where we must go—discussing theoretical, ideological, and organizational questions or leading matters toward a split. We decided we must travel the first path.

Now as regards our attitude toward the "Democratic" and other platforms. They are being examined in our editorial office. We will examine everything valuable contained in any platform, in any letter, and will publish it. If we have not published something, that depends, first, on the plethora of mail and, second, on the fact that this has happened literally in the past few days. This is hellish work, we are trying to do it, I can assure you that we shall also publish what was revealed at this congress.

Now one more question. After long consideration the Central Committee decided that it was nonetheless better to sort out things in the party before the congress and not at the congress itself as is proposed by, inter alios, the supporters of the "Democratic Platform" and also by those delegates to your congress who essentially, as I have seen, stand on these positions. Why? Because we realize that otherwise there could be some kind of East European version. A "gesture for effect"—a split at the congress, the division of the party's material assets, the division of the party mass media, and so forth. That is obvious, my dear friends, that is obvious. Why do those who are opposed to this, those who see this prospect, not have the right to take appropriate measures? We took these measures by using this letter to appeal to the communists.

Finally one last point. I have not strayed from the standing orders, it seems, and what I have to say is very important. We already have, and that includes PRAVDA, we already have the following information that locally—and after all we turned to the primary party organizations and asked them first of all to discuss the open letter—in many rayons and oblasts there are what can mildly be termed exaggerations. I myself know of many instances which attest that it is indeed the old forces, the conservative forces, the forces which ground their teeth when they came to terms with perestroyka, which now want to wreak revenge.

What follows from this? Should this letter be condemned? No, I believe that is irrational. It follows from this that we must take an active part in the discussion of everything which arises, we must prepare the congress more actively and give a rap over the knuckles to those who are trying to turn this matter into the old, pre-perestroyka channel which leads us backward.

I am coming to a close. It was not for nothing that I cited in full the quotation from the Central Committee letter. Why? Because it reflects everything I have just said and shows the negative things which could exist here.

You see, my generation, and that includes myself, have a certain complex formed mainly in the mid-sixties. We were assured then that if we proceeded along the path of stabilization, if our critical ardor was moderated, and so forth, then that would only benefit the cause. We paid bitterly for this and we made a very serious blunder. But now there is a different situation, because the processes of perestroyka are developing in a truly revolutionary manner and what is needed is indeed support for perestroyka, not its undermining and cessation. It seems to me that this is precisely where some factionalists are leading, concerned only for their personal ambitions and not for the destiny of the people and the destiny of the party.

Vladimir Ulyanov, secretary of the Vsevolozhsk Komsomol city committee, Leningrad Oblast:

Comrade delegates, it seems to me that the main task, in addition to the solution of the fundamental question of the assessment of the CPSU Central Committee letter is to preserve some kind of consensus in our ranks. So that this question does not become a pretext for serious antagonism in our ranks. In this connection we have a proposal: That today, from the representatives of, I do not want to say this word, opposing, delegations, we form a conciliation commission which will prepare this question, that is whether the decision must be repealed or changes made to the decision we have adopted. It seems to me the only option which will not continue the confrontation further. [passage omitted]

Frolov Outlines Plans for PRAVDA

PM1404191190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 90 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA, by V. Kozhemyako and S. Kolesnikov: "Perestroyka, Glasnost, and PRAVDA"—no place or date of interview given; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee resolution "On the Newspaper PRAVDA" was published a few days ago. Judging by initial responses, it immediately attracted attention among a broad circle of readers and aroused considerable interest among all sorts of people. There were plenty of questions: How was this document prepared and discussed at the Central Committee Politburo sitting, how was it perceived by the editorial collective, what are the current concerns of PRAVDA journalists, how are they restructuring their work, what are their future plans in view of the very complex processes now under way in the party and our entire society. These and other questions were answered by I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA.

[PRAVDA] Ivan Timofeyevich, readers would first like to hear your opinion of the document which has been adopted.

[Frolov] I consider it to be a very important resolution. It is not just a question of the fact that such a partywide document on PRAVDA had not appeared for a long time. The main point is that it precisely formulates the principles of leadership of the party press at the present stage. Thus the resolution is important not just for PRAVDA. In our complex time it lays clear guidelines for the entire party press and for the party committees and organizations which exercise leadership.

[PRAVDA] It would be interesting to hear how the resolution was prepared and adopted.

[Frolov] Preparatory work lasted several months. It was a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the work of the editorial office and all its subdivisions. An analysis of the newspaper's content and appearance, of its past, present, and future. The final draft was actually discussed at a sitting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. I must say that the atmosphere was both amicable and exacting. I was given the floor first.

[PRAVDA] Was that some sort of report?

[Frolov] No, it was rather to express my opinions of the document. I deemed it necessary in my brief speech to focus attention, first, on the recent new developments in our work and, second, on PRAVDA's basic problems which await and demand solution.

Speaking of the newspaper's content, our key avenue today concerns preparations for the 28th party congress. We have carried a series of principled articles expanding the ideas of the draft CPSU Central Committee platform and the draft party statutes. We are also aware of our responsibility for ensuring that PRAVDA promotes the theoretical and practical interpretation of contemporary social processes, that it is the party's broad political platform, a platform for debates.

We launched the "Discussion Pamphlet" rubric. More than 20 such pamphlets have already been published. This is hard to believe: It seems as if everything started just a short while ago. But this is in line with PRAVDA's long-standing tradition. It can be said that we did not invent anything special here. We simply revived a tradition which originated under Lenin in 1921. Every reader can now see for himself that the "Discussion Pamphlet" represents a broad spectrum of the most diverse opinions on problems concerning the party's renewal and, at the same time, we hope that it expresses the clear-cut party position contained in the draft CPSU Central Committee platform. The discussion of this document constitutes one of our paramount tasks.

Another important avenue for efforts by the editorial collective is to "debureaucratize" the newspaper, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said during his visit to the PRAVDA editorial office last fall. This expression of his has become a byword among PRAVDA staffers, and it means a lot to us. Our Sunday editions have been favorably welcomed by readers. There are more articles on the problems of culture, art, and sport. The newspaper's range of topics has expanded. In this way, while preserving the party "profile," we are getting closer to the most diverse interests and needs of a wide circle of readers.

There has been a more active development of PRAVDA's public contacts, meetings with readers, and editorial office press conferences for Soviet and foreign journalists. They are regularly held and, on the whole, already well established.

I also told the Politburo sitting about the PRAVDA festival which we plan to hold 5-6 May at the Exhibition of National Economic Achievements in Moscow—this will be our newspaper's first such festival. We would like to see PRAVDA's annual festival become a tradition.

We were surprised by the emergence of local friends of PRAVDA clubs. Their number is steadily rising. These clubs are truly unsponsored and informal organizations. Both party members and nonparty persons join them. It is typical that membership of these clubs is determined on the basis of ideological beliefs. This was perfectly well expressed especially by writer Viktor Afanasyev who addressed the Krasnoyarsk Friends of PRAVDA Club. It is very important for us to know that all kinds of people take part in the PRAVDA clubs' work. We feel that there is real growth in many people's informal interest in the newspaper and their desire to identify their positions with those expressed in PRAVDA.

[PRAVDA] Is this also reflected to some extent in the editorial mailbag?

[Frolov] Yes, despite the fall in the number of subscribers in 1989 (the newspaper lost almost 3 million), the flow of letters remains unabated, and actually increased substantially, by almost 12,000, in the first few months of this year (I attribute this to the "Discussion Pamphlet" and the additional eight-page issues). But the main point is that we have started making more use of readers' letters in our pages—we are using more than twice as many as we did last year. Of course, this figure can and probably will fluctuate, but nonetheless we will try to maintain and develop this trend. In my view, this is the decisive criterion of work quality. I attach great importance to the editorial mailbag. I think that it is a convincing indicator of the popularity enjoyed by the newspaper, even though there are quite a few justified complaints about the paper.

Much is changing now, but what has been done is only a beginning, and we have adopted a highly self-critical attitude toward our work. During my brief time as chief editor I have seen for myself (as I already mentioned) that the PRAVDA collective has a great creative potential and, given the appropriate conditions, this can show itself more fully and more graphically now and in the future. But this calls for work—a great deal of hard work. After all, the PRAVDA collective took shape largely for the performance of different tasks. Many people still find it impossible to abandon this, to abandon the kind of "didactic" style which evokes in me, for example, sad memories and a negative reaction. This is why I attach great importance to the influx of fresh, young journalistic forces and to their promotion to key creative and leadership posts.

The collective needs, badly needs "new blood." The appearance of new capable staffers immediately produces tangible results. A few days ago, for example, we published an "Economic Panorama" prepared by Doctor of Economic Sciences Yegor Gaydar, our new—and, quite significantly, young (he is only 34 years of age)—member of the editorial collegium and editor of the economic policy desk. I believe that this was a very substantial contribution to a topic that was somehow inadequately covered by our newspaper. In general, a certain renewal of cadres is one of PRAVDA's real problems.

[PRAVDA] What other problems demanding attention did you raise at the Central Committee Politburo sitting?

[Frolov] Above all, the newspaper's status. In their letters and during meetings with journalists, readers raise the question of PRAVDA's role as a central organ of the party, not just of the Central Committee. There are specific proposals that a somewhat clearer stand be taken, including proposals that the chief editor be elected by the party congress or conference. Even though I perceive both pros and cons here, since the question has been raised it ought to be examined and resolved.

The problem of PRAVDA's new status is dictated by the time. I told the Politburo sitting that this question—about the newspaper's political and ideological status—is most closely associated with the question of its economic, financial, and other autonomy. It therefore seems necessary to me for PRAVDA to be split off as a special association enjoying such autonomy.

A study of this question should be made very soon. PRAVDA's proposals on this score are already taking shape as a kind of system, and we will submit them in addition in the very near future.

[PRAVDA] As far as we know, they are already being discussed in the editorial office, taking the opinion of both journalists and readers into account....

[Frolov] There are some very interesting proposals. What they boil down to is that, in the new conditions, PRAVDA could and should become an autonomous creative and economically accountable enterprise with all the ensuing consequences.

None of this exists at present, the newspaper is not a "legal entity." Wages, apartments, travel vouchers, cars—the editorial office receives all these from the CPSU Central Committee publishing house, which has several dozen other newspapers and journals in addition to it.

The problem of the renewal of our technological base demands special attention. I even told the Politburo about the first time I attended a PRAVDA editorial collegium sitting and started recalling my youth, when I was just beginning my work in publishing as a junior editor. While learning about printing, I went to the print shop and an elderly gray-haired compositor told me: "Come on, sonny, correct the galleys." So I did. He then started prizing the type out with an awl, and I saw for myself the complex and hard work that my corrections entailed.

What happened was that members of today's PRAVDA editorial collegium tactfully kept silent; a few days later I went down to our print shop and suddenly saw... that same awl. Of course, a few things have changed but, generally speaking, very few. In many cases we are still using our grandfathers' technology, and it is necessary to renew everything very substantially and radically—to start using electronics, computer technology, phototypesetting, and so on. Of course, if the newspaper is self-financing, we will be able to resolve all this ourselves, just as we will be able to solve the question of newsprint, which is in short supply, to better resolve the collective's social problems, and much else besides.

[PRAVDA] In short, the course to be taken must ensure that PRAVDA becomes more modern in every respect, more in line with present-day technical, organizational, and other potential, needs, and demands?

[Frolov] Most certainly! This is also the line of the next issue, which I consider to be very topical—the need to amalgamate different news media within PRAVDA. The newspaper's autonomy is only the halfway mark. You cannot play a fiddle with just one string in present-day conditions, you need polyphony. I, therefore, believe that PRAVDA should unite newspaper and journal editorial offices and—most importantly—should have its own television and radio studios. I could cite other countries' experiences, I was convinced of this during my meetings and conversations with representatives of companies like NTV, the newspapers YOMIURI and ASAHI in Japan, and ABC in the United States. Robert Maxwell, a major publisher, has already visited us twice in the last few weeks. I expect a lot from contacts with the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers, which unites more than 14,000 newspapers worldwide. Their experience convinces me that this is a progressive path and that PRAVDA must take it.

[PRAVDA] What was the attitude of Politburo members toward your ideas and suggestions in the discussion that followed?

[Frolov] On the whole, I would say they were very interested and understanding. Mikhail Sergeyevich was the first to speak. He emphasized that PRAVDA now gives more scope to different thoughts and ideas than many mass media which pride themselves on their superperestroyka attitudes but never allow anyone to express ideas which are at odds with their own views. PRAVDA does this. Even though only in the "Discussion Pamphlet."

Mikhail Sergeyevich noted that PRAVDA's political line is correct in this regard. Much depends on how different material is presented and commented. After all, we also offer a platform to bourgeois figures, since ideological opponents often perceive our shortcomings more clearly. But the whole point, I repeat, is the way this is presented. And the ability to promote the party point of view in any clash of opinions. PRAVDA does this, and does it successfully. This is what the general secretary of the Central Committee thought.

He went on to emphasize: PRAVDA is developing, its role is growing, it is becoming more interesting. But he did express the wish that we provide greater and more systematic coverage of the development and materialization of the socialist idea. PRAVDA must set an example for other publications in this regard. Actually in the elaboration and implementation of the socialist idea. After all, despite all the most acute tribulations and difficulties, the people have remained loyal to this idea, it is being realized in our country, and we must report all this very well.

Another most important topic for the newspaper of which the general secretary spoke is propaganda of Lenin's legacy and the defense of Lenin. Yes, actually the defense of Lenin as a person now being subjected to attacks for various reasons. PRAVDA does pursue this line but, M.S. Gorbachev remarked, much still remains to be done here.

He said that there must be greater emphasis on the patriotic theme. The general secretary noted that PRAVDA is doing a lot along this avenue. There are some impressive items. But the coverage of this topic must be built up, especially in connection with the 45th victory anniversary.

The following wish—or maybe rather instruction—to PRAVDA staffers is also topical: They should "worry" members of the Politburo and the government more. If some topical question arises, the leaders of the party and the state must be immediately given space in the newspaper. Not necessarily long articles, maybe brief and timely interviews. Talk with them on the telephone sometimes, on the spur of the moment—and it goes straight into the next issue. This, Mikhail Sergeyevich said, is mandatory for full and candidate members of the Politburo and for secretaries of the Central Committee. The situation has changed now. We have not encountered a single refusal recently. Nonetheless, the general secretary emphasized once more the importance of and need for such forms of work.

Mikhail Sergeyevich noted: It is good that PRAVDA maintains a spirit of criticism, but without reveling in negative facts. In his opinion, the newspaper has been successful in this. He said that if you now take all the critical material published by PRAVDA, hardly anyone else will be comparable to it in this regard. But the important point is that the overall spirit in the newspaper should be constructive and creative, a party spirit.

Mikhail Sergeyevich emphasized another idea: It is very important for party committees to support PRAVDA. Such an approach will also benefit the entire party press.

Mikhail Sergeyevich also spoke about the need for PRAVDA to move toward daily eight-page publication. Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev remarked: There is no newsprint. This is really so: There is a very acute shortage of newsprint, but the situation could be improved and PRAVDA could achieve this without hurting others. If we had greater autonomy, we could secure our own newsprint supply in the quantity and quality needed by the newspaper (or association). Briefly speaking, this idea—about PRAVDA possibly publishing eight-page editions every day in the future—sounded quite definite. We will proceed toward its implementation with due consideration for our potential, including the availability of resources like newsprint and so on.

During the subsequent discussion, this idea came together with the problem of publishing so-called "official material." PRAVDA's leadership has been raising the question of cutting down on such material for a long time now. But I perceive this problem from a rather different angle. It is impossible merely to make mechanical cuts here. There is, after all, a lot of official material that is of great interest to PRAVDA readers. Why should we deprive them of an opportunity to read it? Like, for example, very important statements by the foreign minister on foreign policy questions. No, we must not deprive them of this, what we need is an opportunity to print this material as well as other material, in forms to be determined by the editorial collegium. This is why we so badly need the two additional pages—and that will be that, there will be no more problems.

Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov then made a remark to the effect that we actually do not publish certain official documents. In this context, he proposed revising and clarifying the article of the resolution concerning the problem in question. The result was that a formula was arrived at to the effect that the editorial collegium should be granted greater autonomy in this regard but its responsibility for the solution of such questions should also be enhanced.

Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze had this to say—PRAVDA and other party publications should provide broader coverage of life in the union republics. There should be more about their science, culture, and history. The healthy section of the intelligentsia responds keenly to this. So far, our work along this avenue has not been very active.

As for material and technical support for the editorial office and the solution of our everyday life and social problems, these questions will be additionally examined by the Central Committee Secretariat. I already said that this package of concerns is very important for us. Let us hope that substantial progress will be achieved here.

[PRAVDA] What is the current situation with PRAVDA's print run and what, in your view, are the future prospects?

[Frolov] The daily print run has increased somewhat since the start of the year and now averages about 8.1 million copies. There are some insignificant fluctuations, with subscription figures standing at 6.87 million in January and 6.917 million in March.

The prospects? We will aim to increase the number of subscribers by improving the newspaper's quality and attracting them through meaningful and vivid material. At the same time, we take into account the fact that this is still hindered by certain prejudices and negative feelings toward our newspaper which, unfortunately, are often artificially inflamed; people still revel in the newspaper's difficulties over subscriptions and so on. This may sound paradoxical, but everything good that is being done in PRAVDA today is hardly ever reported by the other mass media. Maybe we should blame ourselves, for being insufficiently active.

All this, however, is the surface background to our activity. There are also more deep-rooted phenomena and, in the context of the complex processes now occurring within society and the party, I cannot rule out the possibility that some more of our subscribers might drop out, in the same way as they might "drop out" of the party. Never mind, I do not think that this should be overdramatized. To a certain extent, this is a natural process, bearing in mind that new parties and new publications will appear. PRAVDA does not intend to adapt to anyone's views if they differ fundamentally from the CPSU Central Committee platform. We will never do this! Yet we must work better, more energetically, more creatively. In this sense, the Central Committee resolution gives us a very powerful creative fillip. This is exactly how it was perceived by PRAVDA staffers.

We will consistently uphold the line of consolidating the party ranks "on a principled basis, for lasting unity of all who hold precious the goals of perestroyka and the ideals of humane, democratic socialism," as the CPSU Central Committee open letter to the country's communists says.

We will do everything possible, everything within our power, for the successful development of perestroyka and glasnost in our country, for the party's renewal. A renewed society, a renewed party, and a renewed PRAVDA—this is our aim! This is how we will approach the 28th CPSU Congress, which, I am convinced, will bring much that is new as regards both PRAVDA and our entire party press.

PRAVDA Publishes 'Marxist Platform'

PM1704144590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

["Marxist Platform in the CPSU" signed by the Council of the Federation of Marxist Party Clubs; carried under the rubric "Discussion Rostrum;" first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] PRAVDA is discussing the draft CPSU Central Committee platform "Toward Humane, Democratic Socialism." Many positive and critical opinions and constructive proposals have been expressed in the "Discussion Pamphlet" feature. We have also published the text of the "Democratic Platform" and analysis and assessment of the tenets contained therein. Today we are publishing yet another alternative document—the draft "Marxist Platform in the CPSU" prepared by the Federation of Marxist Party Clubs. The editorial office invites readers to continue the debate.

The country is at a crossroads. The objective impossibility of effectively developing society within the framework of a partial reform of the old system leaves open only two ways out of the crisis enveloping all aspects of our life. The first is the more or less consistent reproduction of the centuries of the formation of modern capitalism. The other path is that of democracy and socialism. The struggle for the resolution of this question is entering a critical phase.

The crisis of the social model known as the socialist model has led to the discrediting of the socialist ideal. Marxism has reached this moment in a state of extreme weakness as a result of many years during which the vulgarizing concepts and apostasy of those who deemed it more advantageous to join the overthrowers of Marxism have been propagated under the name of Marxism. We advocate a return to classic Marxism, which presupposes a critical attitude toward the theoretical legacy of its founders and their followers and constant revolutionization of the theoretical base of scientific socialism together with the changing world. It is from this standpoint that we seek to provide answers to the challenge of our time.

1. What Kind of Society Are We Living In and What Are the Roots of Its Crisis?

1.1. For Marxists, socialism has always been the objective result of the development of the preceding society's laws and trends. This development leads to the formation of a system of relations which inherits the achievements of the capitalist era and the entire history of mankind and at the same time resolves their intrinsic contradictions. Socialism thereby appears as the product of a mass social movement expressing objective historical necessity and as the initial stage of mankind's movement along the road of communist civilization, which ensures the free and comprehensive development of the individual.

1.2. The 1917 October Revolution was the historically conditioned consequence of the world social crisis and the mounting social contradictions within the Russian empire. After the February Revolution, the Provisional Government's policy of halfhearted reforms, the delay in implementing the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the collapse of mechanisms of power, and the mounting anarchy led the state to national catastrophe. It was this that determined the inevitability of the revolutionary process in Russia transcending the bounds of a bourgeois-democratic revolution—power in the country inevitably had to be either in the hands of a right-wing bourgeois dictatorship, or in the hands of the proletariat.

1.3. The attempt to advance toward a socialist society in extremely unfavorable internal and external conditions led to a contradictory result.

A breakthrough was made in the front of world capitalism, and the working people's capacity for the independent historical creation of new social relations was proved. But the relatively low level of development of capitalism in Russia and the defeat of revolutions in the more developed European states made movement toward socialism extremely difficult even given the implementation of a scientifically based and carefully thought-out policy. However, trends characteristic of preproletarian and early proletarian utopian socialism gained considerable influence in the bolshevik party, which reflected the pressure exerted on the party by the social strata numerically predominant in Russian society. After V.I. Lenin's death the unscientific, dogmatic, utopian approach became dominant within the party, which led to disregard of the objective laws of the country's social development—with consequences that were tragic for the country and the world communist movement and profoundly marked the entire subsequent history of the Soviet state and the workers movement.

1.4. In effect what has now taken shape is a society based on an unstable (in the historical sense) conglomerate of elements of precapitalist, state-capitalist, and socialist social relations. The relative stability of the social structure has been determined by the cementing force of the authoritarian-bureaucratic system. This system, by retarding the progress of productive forces and alienating man from the means of production and from society, has increasingly undermined the foundations of its own existence, which has resulted in the emergence on the surface of social life of previously contained contradictions: between deformed socialist production relations and modern productive forces, between socialist and nonsocialist trends in the economic base and the political, juridical, and ideological superstructures, and so forth.

2. The Disposition of Sociopolitical Forces

The disintegration of the society of the authoritarian-bureaucratic type releases social forces aiming both to restore a capitalist or semicapitalist mixed economy and to revive a real socialist prospect.

The special features of the historical path traveled by our society condition the nature of its most important sociopolitical forces and their political trends.

2.1. The first trend is reflected by leaders of a **bourgeois liberal** tendency. Those social strata which by virtue of their position within the system of the social division of labor can occupy a privileged position in the market are interested in borrowing market economic structures on the capitalist model. These strata include a small proportion of the technocracy and the bureaucracy—the specialists who occupy administrative posts in financial and economic organs and economic units possessing a monopoly position in the national economy. The section of legal and illegal private entrepreneurs that is hoping to be able to freely utilize its capital also aligns with them. Finally, similar interests are displayed among the section of the intelligentsia that is hoping to capitalize on its monopoly on high qualifications or talent in market conditions.

While attacking the ideology of revolutionarism, this current is itself proposing the radical smashing of the existing social system. The building of capitalism in our country can create prosperity in the foreseeable future only for a small group of nouveaux riches and the upper stratum of "people in the free professions" without ensuring the fundamental modernization of the economy.

2.2. The so-called **social democratic** current occupies a duplicitous position. Without verbally renouncing socialism, social democracy reduces it to a set of common human moral and legal values while gambling in its practical program on mechanically borrowing the modern socioeconomic structures of the most developed industrial states. The section of the working people, especially the intelligentsia, that sees social democracy as a mass democratic movement capable of becoming a real alternative to bureaucracy aligns with this current. This stratum forms social democracy's left wing, which is oriented toward a socialist choice and makes the transition to a market economy conditional on the creation of a system of social guarantees preventing a total switch to the tracks of private enterprise.

The right wing of social democracy is more organized and therefore often determines the movement's political line. It is based largely on technocratic circles and occupies essentially liberal positions, believing that the harsh conditions of a free enterprise system are the necessary price of subsequent progress.

In the future the positions of the social democratic current may be supported by the section of the peasantry that is oriented toward individual farming.

Unlike Western social democracy, which is oriented toward democratizing and humanizing capitalist society, the social democratic current in the USSR regards capitalism more as a goal and, only insofar as it is attained, as a field of struggle for a better future.

2.3. Practical implementation of the program of the social democratic movement will inevitably mean that it will have to choose one of the poles between which it is wavering—either adopt the direction of a right-wing liberal trend by completing de facto and de jure the dismantling of the system of social guarantees or adopt an essentially socialist character by developing and strengthening people's social protection within society and promoting the social self-realization and activeness of the individual.

2.4. We believe that only a **democratic movement oriented toward the socialist choice** and Marxist in its ideology accords with society's vital interests. The social base of the Marxist movement stems from the contradictions of all preceding development. On the one hand, the majority of the working people cannot resolve their material and social problems without an improvement in the life of society as a whole. On the other, alienation of man from the functions of master of the economy and of society—alienation which retards opportunities for self-realization within the collective—continues to exist.

A way out for people in the grip of this contradiction is possible either along the path of private enterprise (that is, ultimately at the expense of other people) or along the path of creating for the majority of the people the conditions for joint free labor. The implementation of the latter task is the most important thing for the supporters of the Marxist Platform, which unites not some individual professional, territorial, or age group but people in whom a special social quality is well developed—the need for free labor and for self-realization through work and social activity, in contrast to those who seek to be parasites on an authoritarian-bureaucratic or liberal-capitalist system.

2.5. The sociopolitical **movements that share illusions that it is possible to restore the former model of socialism** provided that it is slightly "humanized" and democratized stand somewhat apart. Relying on the section of the working people that fears, not without reason, that the development of the market and the liberalization of the economy and society are hitting the country's ordinary citizens, these movements attract people by their proclaimed loyalty to socialism and its principles and ideals and by promises to expand social guarantees for working people. While recognizing the abstract correctness of these positions, it should be noted that the simple repetition of slogans, even slogans that were once correct, will not resolve today's problems. The disagreement of this movement's leaders with attempts at reforms which encroach on "principles" leads them to form a bloc with the section of the bureaucracy that sees a need for social maneuvering. Capriciously combining conservative and democratic trends within the workers movement, this heterogeneous current will ultimately be forced to choose between a democratic struggle for socialism and defending an updated authoritarian-bureaucratic system.

2.6. The **conservative-bureaucratic** current is based on the bureaucracy, on the state employees oriented toward it, and on the passively conformist and declasse strata in city and countryside. It does not have its own openly proclaimed program or political movement expressing their interests, but attempts to oppose the perestroyka of Soviet society by exploiting its own position within the state apparatus.

2.7. **National movements,** which are extremely heterogeneous in their sociopolitical nature, have acquired considerable influence in the country's political life. One current in them is the democratic trend toward the restoration of the legitimate rights of nations and ethnic groups in the economic, political, and cultural spheres. At the same time the influence of the bourgeois-liberal trend, which actively imposes the identification of its own aims with general national aims, portrays its class opponents as opponents of national interests, and essentially rejects the concept of the equality of nations, is strong within national movements. This kind of campaigning is especially attractive to lumpen elements inclined to seek the roots of their problems anywhere at all except in their own home. Extremely nationalist and chauvinist political movements, often based on the corrupt bureaucracy, smart operators in the shadow economy, and declasse and downright criminal elements, are developing against this backdrop.

Russian national movements have also begun to organize politically and are represented both by currents oriented toward boosting national culture and awareness and by chauvinist groups with two trends—a separatist trend and a great-power trend. These trends are fraught with the emergence of a new nationalist version of the totalitarian system.

2.8. The leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet state, though it is not ideologically united, is now seeking at all costs to preserve the formal unity of the party and society, to avoid political upheavals, and to ensure the implementation of a policy of reform by means of maneuvering among all these social strata and political movements. This leads to an eclectic, inconsistent position, to loss of the political initiative, and to deepening of the crisis in the country. As events develop this position is gradually evolving from a conservative-bureaucratic to a social democratic position.

3. The Road to Socialism Is the Road Out of the Crisis

3.1. Political transformations must be the starting point for the way out of the crisis. In the political sphere socialism inherits the experience and traditions of democracy developed by mankind, including a system of formal legal guarantees of citizens' individual rights, but is not limited to these traditions. The political system of socialism does not boil down to a multiparty system, parliamentary democracy, or even the system of soviets. It presupposes genuine people's power that ensures for everyone the opportunity to join directly in resolving social problems at any level—from the team or apartment block to the region or the country as a whole.

In order to switch to such a system it is necessary:

—on the basis of a broad mass movement, to ensure a gradual peaceful transfer of power from the hands of the bureaucracy to the bloc of democratic forces espousing the socialist choice while providing guarantees of the constitutional rights of social and political movements of a different trend which observe USSR and republican laws and while observing the Declaration of Human Rights;

—to transform primary organs of self-management created on the production (labor collective councils, workers committees), territorial (social self-management committees), and functional (consumer societies) principles into the mass base of the soviets;

—to ensure the gradual transfer to the local soviets and the organs of self-management that constitute their base of the full panoply of power in managing the social infrastructure of regions;

—to transform all-national social movements and organizations—workers, trade union, consumer, and environmental movements—into the working democratic foundation of the Supreme Soviet by ensuring mandatory participation by these movements in the preparation and discussion of legislative decisions by Supreme Soviet committees and commissions.

3.2. The Soviet Union, as a socialist state, can only be a voluntary association of free and sovereign states on the basis of the principles of internationalism.

With a view to the renewal of the USSR all republics should be instructed to hold referenda for self-determination and in order to decide the question of being party to a new union treaty. After the referenda have been held the new union treaty should be concluded on the basis of the principles of the sovereignty of its member states and the equality of their rights and obligations. The unity of all republican movements espousing the socialist choice should be ensured on this basis.

3.3. The progress of the scientific and technical revolution and of all 20th century civilization has brought to the fore the need to develop economic relations ensuring the overcoming of working people's alienation from the means of production, the emancipation of their creative initiative, and great social and labor activeness.

The socialism that realizes this objective need must be an economic system based on people's power (social ownership), the democratization of economic power, the liberation and emancipation of people's creative activeness, and the overcoming of exploitation and alienation.

In order to switch to such an economy it is necessary:

3.3.1. To change ownership relations:

—key sectors of the economy and natural resources remain exclusively owned by the whole people, with the management and disposal of them being democratized as much as possible;

—regional ownership at all levels is widely developed; all powers to manage the region's social infrastructure are transferred to local soviets and self-management organs;

—collective ownership by enterprise workers and cooperative ownership are used chiefly in the spheres of small and medium production and services, and hired labor is used in these spheres only in the transitional period;

—private ownership of means of production is permitted only in the transitional period within a limited framework under strict state control and with the social protection of the workers being ensured.

3.3.2. To transform the management system, including:

—decentralization of rights, responsibility, and resources at all levels of management and under all forms of ownership;

—the retention by central and sectorial organs of the resolution only of strategic questions of the development of sectors and the national economy as a whole;

—the development of a system of self-management in the economy from bottom to top: from labor collective councils and workers committees to associations of them at the level of sectors, regions, and intersectorial complexes;

—a consistent transition to a market in means of production as the shortage of certain types of them is eliminated; economic regulation of this market via agreements between state organs, voluntary associations, and individual enterprises;

—opposition to the diktat of sectors and producer-enterprises on the basis of the unification of collectives and citizens as consumers and people needing a clean environment and humane culture; the vesting of consumer societies and environmental, creative, and similar unions with rights to monitor the activity of producers;

—participation by organs of self-management and their unions in monitoring the formation and activity of state economic organs.

3.3.3. To ensure the liberation of labor and emancipation of social creation through the consistent supplanting of the system of extraeconomic coercion to work (residence permits, quotas, departmental allocation of benefits); the transition to free labor whereby each person independently and freely chooses as master (not as hireling) the sphere of application of his capabilities (the principle of free association).

3.3.4. To implement as a strategic task structural changes in the country's economy and a sharp redistribution of all resources in favor of the sectors producing consumer goods and the spheres ensuring the free comprehensive development of man and the harmonization of his relations with nature.

3.4. As urgent measures aimed at preserving working people's living standards and preventing the further growth of property inequality, and without this there can be no social and political stability, it is proposed:

—to make public [obshchenarodno obyavit] the entire system of privileges existing in the country and to discuss a program for their phased elimination, beginning with the upper echelons of the party-state structure;

—to switch to a system of territorial guaranteed normative-based distribution of the most vital necessities implemented on the basis of uniform principles, in an atmosphere of glasnost, and under the democratic control of mass social organizations; as this task is resolved, to abandon all forms of the closed distribution of benefits;

—to elaborate and implement a statewide program for combating the shadow economy; to carry out a monetary reform with a view to creating in the present and the future barriers to illegal income and to ensure social monitoring of the correspondence between the extent of labor and the extent of consumption (registration of major civil deals, tax declarations, and so forth); to create a system of workers control;

—to create a system of progressive taxation ensuring socially justified differentiation of income between different social groups while taking into account here money incomes, resources from social consumption funds, and benefits;

—to lift all restrictions on working people's individual earnings if the growth in earnings stems from increased labor efficiency;

—to strengthen price controls by employing all means at the state's disposal—political, economic, and administrative—in order to stabilize prices; in reforming prices, to preclude a general increase in them in view of the fact that the state budget revenue from turnover tax exceeds expenditure on subsidies to loss-making sectors and enterprises producing consumer goods;

—to immediately create a social-state system for the social protection of the population including the right to work, to health care, and to education, and also the right to an adequate living standard in accordance with the norms of consumption necessary for the normal reproduction and development of the individual.

4. Reform of the CPSU

4.1. There is a need to eliminate the existing model of the CPSU as the party of "barracks communism," but not to eliminate the Communist Party itself.

One condition of the CPSU's emergence from the crisis is the immediate transformation of it from a state-economic organ into a political organization on a Marxist ideological foundation, an organization advocating the socialist choice and the communist prospect, an organization uniting on voluntary principles members of society who share the party's program aims and take a practical part in implementing them.

The party's main task must be work in labor collectives, at people's place of residence, and in mass democratic organizations with a view to uniting the efforts of our country's citizens in order to resolve social problems and implement the socialist choice. The party must directly abandon claims to political privileges, regarding parliamentary struggle as one means of resolving the key task—winning working people's trust through practical work among the masses.

The following are proposed as the main steps to transform the CPSU:

—the release of the CPSU from functions of directly managing the country's economy, which do not properly belong to it; the total transfer of power to state and soviet organs;

—clarification of the CPSU's ideological base and ideological demarcation among party members through the formation of various ideological and political platforms;

—the cleansing of the party from people who discredit it by various abuses or are to blame for the emergence of stagnation and crisis processes within society;

—democratization of the party.

4.2. The **democratization of internal party relations** presupposes:

—the participation of CPSU members on a regular basis in the process of forming its policy or adopting basic political decisions via mechanisms for partywide or regional debates and referenda;

—the election of delegates to party congresses and conferences from a platform-based choice of candidates on the basis of a direct, equal, and secret ballot;

—the election of party control organs and party press editorial collegiums only at congresses, conferences, and meetings, and their responsibility only to these forums;

—that all elected organs are under the control of and accountable to CPSU members, and that the apparatus is under the control of and accountable to elected organs;

—total glasnost in the activity of the party, including the Central Committee and organs elected by it (this is ensured by the openness of party documents and archives and the publication of transcripts of sessions of party organs);

—the retention by congress and conference delegates of their powers in the intervals between these forums;

—the right of the minority to uphold its viewpoint even after a decision has been made by the majority provided that those who remain in the minority fulfill this decision;

—the right of different groups of communists to express diversity of ideological and political views in platforms.

4.3. The **democratization of the party's organizational structure** presupposes:

—the right of CPSU members to create primary party organizations on the production, territorial, functional, or other principle;

—freedom of permanent and temporary associations of CPSU members (party clubs, councils of secretaries of primary and other party organizations, and so forth) ensuring a choice of approaches when decisions are being formulated;

—the right of the CPSU member to choose the primary party organization and association of communists within which he will work, priority being given to party work in labor collectives.

4.4. The **democratization of internal party life presupposes the self-management and independence of primary party organizations** within the limits of the competence granted to them by the CPSU Statutes. Supporting numerous proposals from primary party organizations, we believe that their competence should include, in particular, the right:

—to make the final decision on the question of admission to the party;

—to determine the structure and size of their apparatus and the wages of its staffers;

—to determine their own programs and forms of activity within the framework of the CPSU Program;

—to utilize a considerable proportion of membership dues for their own needs.

With a view to increasing the role of primary organizations it is necessary to enshrine a rule that decisions adopted by them within the framework of the powers granted by the CPSU Statutes are not liable to cancellation by other party organs.
[Signed] Council of Federation of Marxist Party Clubs

Bakatin on Combating Crime, Lithuania

PM2304134190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 90 Second Edition pp 1, 3

[Interview with USSR Internal Affairs Minister V.V. Bakatin by A. Chernenko and A. Chernyak: "Within the Limits of the Law. USSR Internal Affairs Minister V.V. Bakatin Answers PRAVDA Readers' Questions"—date and place of interview unspecified; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Alarming information relating to crime is a worry for society. The rate of growth of crime, legal nihilism, negative trends among adolescents and young people, ethnically motivated violence— all this has introduced into society an atmosphere of tension and edginess, and, in a number of places, downright fear and lack of faith in the ability of the local forces of law and order to protect our fellow citizens' constitutional rights—honor, dignity, and life itself. PRAVDA readers want to know what the internal affairs organs are doing at the moment to ensure that people feel secure. We put this question to the minister, but first we congratulated him, albeit somewhat belatedly, on his appointment to the important post of Presidential Council member.

[PRAVDA] Vadim Viktorovich, have your functions as USSR internal affairs minister been widened or modified as a result of this appointment?

[Bakatin] Thank you for the congratulations. As for the ministerial functions, they are defined by the law and remain unchanged: A minister must strictly abide by the law. The main principle in his work is that no authority can violate the law itself. No authority, if it is an authority, can with impunity permit anyone whatever to violate the law.

[PRAVDA] Alas, not everyone really acknowledges the second part of this formula....

[Bakatin] Perhaps it is not so much not ackowledged as not implemented. During the years of perestroyka we have gotten away from the arbitrariness on the part of authority that occurred in the past. That is definitely the case.

[PRAVDA] But we have not gotten anywhere yet....

[Bakatin] Yes, we are still on the way. The second part of the politicolegal formula has not yet been implemented.

And to be honest, and honest one must be, it should be said that there are still three ways we can resolve this formula:

—our official doctrine: the building of a democratic rule-of-law state;
—the arbitrariness of anarchy;
—a return to the arbitrariness of authority.

The last two are strenuously exaggerated in the Soviet and foreign media. Nevertheless, the reality is that, no matter what, society is taking the first path, emphasizing the principle of establishing a rule-of-law state. But I would point out that we must watch that we don't turn off onto the second or third path, since there have been recent examples of willfulness on the part of deputies of newly elected local soviets, diktat by excited mobs, and impotence on the part of the legitimate legal authorities, which have coalesced with egoists' extremism. A return to arbitrariness on the part of authority and, equally, the spread of arbitrariness on the part of anarchy cannot be permitted.

[PRAVDA] However, Vadim Viktorovich, letters to PRAVDA note that legal nihilism is making itself felt. The historical moment and its legal aspect are marked by a certain instability.

[Bakatin] That is the whole point. But the instability is due to many factors. It is not just crime. I would say the paramount factor is the social tension caused by the inevitable recession in the course of economic perestroyka. The reasons are well known. The administrative-edict framework of the rigidly centralized planning system, on which our economy hinged, has collapsed or has been severely distorted, but the new mechanisms of self-regulation and economic incentives for initiative have not yet been created.

I would allocate second place to the interethnic factor, to conflicts based on nationalism and separatism with what is now a critical dose of adventurism, and sometimes outright extremism and violence. Note that 93 people died in interethnic conflicts in 1988 and 221 in 1989. In the first three months of 1990 317 died.

It may seem strange, but the third destabilizing factor, in my view, is the drawbacks (or concomitant processes, or perhaps distortions) in what is in principle undoubtedly a positive phenomenon, namely, the politicization of a society that is waking from a deep sleep. The political situation and the galvanization of society are being skillfully exploited by certain "ideologists" (the quotation marks are deliberate) who have set themselves the aim of stooping to anything to discredit authority.

A desperate power struggle is in progress.

[PRAVDA] But this is typical of any democratic society....

[Bakatin] Indeed, it is splendid when no one is guaranteed power and it has to be fought for. But no society can countenance a struggle without rules if it considers itself democratic. Alas, the recent election commotion convincingly demonstrated that our political standards are low. In some cases personal political ambitions outweighed public interests; uncouth methods were used, to put it mildly. Pressure on the authorities has now dramatically increased, for instance, through rallies, blockades, pickets, hunger strikes, strikes, and sometimes deliberately provoked mass disturbances. The weapon of moral terror is being dusted off from the vile arsenal. The organizers of many rallies use an immense variety of slogans, but you do not often come across calls for national concord for the sake of productive labor and an escape from the crisis.

Finally, the fourth factor is crime. The number of recorded crimes increased by 31.8 percent in 1989 and by 17 percent in the first three months of 1990.

[PRAVDA] But by putting this factor in only fourth place you would appear to be treating it as a factor of secondary importance.

[Bakatin] All the "places" are relative and operate as a single whole. Maybe, as some claim, it might be more advantageous for me to use crime to "intimidate" people and "wrest" funds from the legislators. It is true that the situation in the crime sphere is very complex, but I believe that crime is not the main danger today. Certain people are making a much bigger fuss about crime than it merits. There is a wave of "pure detective fiction," and we are even competing to see who can come up with the most frightening, the most realistic story. It's understandable: The topic was banned for so many years.

[PRAVDA] Vadim Viktorovich, comparisons are revealing. Our readers ask about the crime situation in other countries. Let us compare a few figures.

[Bakatin] Okay. Last year the number of crimes increased in our country from 657 to 862 per 100,000 people. Is that a small number or a large number? The figure is 7,114 in the FRG, 5,624 in France, and 3,305 in Italy.

	USSR (1989)	United States (1988)
All crimes	1.87 million	13.9 million
Murders	21,500	20,700
level	7.5	8.4
Rapes	21,900	92,500
level	7.7	37.6
Robberies	133,800	542,900
level	46.8	220.9

[PRAVDA] So we appear to be better off, but, clearly, it makes sense to make a few amendments to our "informal" statistics?

[Bakatin] Discrepancies are possible. The pernicious stereotype of percentage mania, embellishment of statistics, and so on was long established in the minds of our personnel. And it caused a great deal of trouble. Although times have changed. Already one can say that assessments are more accurate.

[PRAVDA] Then the question arises: If the situation is not bad yet, then we only have to make a bit more effort and tighten our grip on crime....

[Bakatin] In the first place, the situation is bad, the conditions do not exist at the moment to ensure that crime begins to fall.

Second, unfortunately, the profoundly mistaken view, the dangerous illusion, that you can quickly and easily put a stop to crime is very widespread at the moment. All you need to do for this is "take steps." It just takes a little pressure.

Now they have started linking these demands to the introduction of the institution of the presidency. You cannot quickly and easily put a stop to crime. One must not expose the president by expecting a miracle and then being disappointed. No president in any country—even with shelves laden with goodies—has ever managed to conquer crime with ease. And certainly not without considerable expenditure and public support.

The activation of law enforcement work is quite another matter. It is certainly necessary. Although we are sometimes fairly criticized, the militia is beginning to overcome the crisis trends. It has started working, if not better, then at any rate more intensively. Some 5,800 operational covering detachments and mobile groups to neutralize the actions of dangerous criminals have been set up. The number of apprehensions primarily of this type of criminal has increased by 55 percent compared with 1988 and the number of arrests by 45 percent. I would point out that this is the first increase following a three-year decline.

Last year the militia used weapons on 3,891 occasions, which is nearly four times as many as in 1988. Only three percent of these cases were deemed unlawful by prosecutors. And 45 percent more criminal cases were investigated than in 1988 by an operational and investigative staff of practically the same size; nearly 20 percent more serious crimes were cleared up. These are facts.

[PRAVDA] Do they reflect the situation regarding crime in the economic sphere?

[Bakatin] In my view, this figure does not fit in the traditional statistical parameters. For example, in the January-March period 34 percent more large-scale and especially large-scale thefts were detected than last year, 20 percent more cases of bribery, and eight percent more speculators. And 2.5 times as many violations of the rules of trade. But all these examples are merely an illustration both of the increase in crime and of more intensive work by the militia.

At the same time, the chief indicator—the residue of unsolved crimes, which rose over the year from 463,000 to 927,000—indicates that the measures that have been adopted are inadequate. The crime crisis has not been halted; it continues.

[PRAVDA] In the editorial mail people wonder whether the quantity of crime exceeds the technical and physical potential of the country's law enforcement system.

[Bakatin] It does. With the legal base that we had (and still have) and in view of the great new demands that have been made on our social and everyday consciousness—we are running out of time. But if one is talking about these high demands, one must mention two opposite trends.

First. There is people's resistance to any changes in legislation, which would make it possible in present-day conditions to combat crime more successfully. The advocates of "pure democracy" and "crystal clear law" are by chance, or perhaps not by chance, opposing amendments to criminal procedure legislation that would protect the witness, admit investigative operation movie and photographic materials as evidence, allow the possibility of telephone tapping, under strict conditions and strict supervision, and the admission of this evidence in a number of particularly important crimes. Legal norms must reflect the realities of life. Practical experts can adduce specific arguments and references to the experience of a number of other countries.

The second trend is a diametrically opposite one: legal nihilism, total negation of all legal norms. Out-and-out mob pressure on the law enforcement system, which has resulted in disarray and chaos and official paralysis in a number of regions where there have been fierce conflicts.

[PRAVDA] Readers would like to know what solution you envisage, the minister's vision.

[Bakatin] We must move persistently, consistently, and obstinately along the path of creating a humane, democratic, and socialist rule-of-law state.

The philosophical and political vision I share is that of maximum legality and minimum coercion. In the first place, there is the refinement and in many respects creation of a new legal base that corresponds to socio-historical and economic realities. The current legal basis is hopelessly obsolete. There is a colossal gap between actual law and the ideas that have gripped the democratized, politicized social consciousness. It must be reduced. Second, we need organs of criminal justice that are considerably stronger and have a high degree of legal competence, social prestige, and authority and the material and financial base must be built up.

[PRAVDA] But measures are being taken today. The MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] budget has been increased by 14 percent....

[Bakatin] And we are grateful to the government. As is known, privates' and sergeants' pay has been increased and the salaries of operational personnel and investigators were increased at the beginning of the year. It has been decided to increase the salaries of officers in other services on 1 May.

Third, there is the improvement of legal awareness and culture and the need to revive general human morality.

[PRAVDA] Another question: What is the social picture of the criminal today?

[Bakatin] It is varied, heterogeneous, and contradictory. In terms of social groups, 53 percent of criminals are workers, six percent are kolkhoz (collective farm) members, nine percent are employees, and 17 percent are not engaged in socially useful labor (or education). In 1989 1,304,000 people were identified as having committed crimes; 792,600 underwent criminal prosecution. The number of criminals aged between 14 and 29 increased from 55 to 57 percent. This age group accounts for 74-82 percent of those who committed robberies, thefts, or acts of hooliganism. The number of young offenders increased by 15 percent (to 212,500), and they now account for 16 percent of criminals. Some 192,000 of the criminals were women.

One in three of the offenders committed crimes while drunk. The number of repeated crimes and recidivists has increased. It is one in four. Correctional labor establishments, where, as you know, conditions have deteriorated sharply, now house some 310,000 criminals who have been convicted three or more times. The professionalization of the criminal element is very worrying.

[PRAVDA] Vadim Viktorovich, this group constitutes a milieu that is constantly on the point of throwing up negative manifestations clearly. Are there any trends toward its politicization?

[Bakatin] I would say first of all that no matter how we regard this contingent, they are first and foremost people. Human beings, tortured by doubts and grievances. Some are weak-willed, some incredibly cruel, but they are all people. They may be living in their own strange world, but they are living in our time. But the approach taken toward them is that of 10 or 20 years ago.

To some extent society itself contributes to the creation of this milieu by failing to provide guaranteed jobs and by continuing to restrict residence permits for people who have been released from prison. It must be said that our crime prevention institutions are weak, obsolete, and geared to the old realities of the administrative-edict system.

[PRAVDA] The Second Congress of People's Deputies examined the question of stepping up the struggle against organized crime. We have finally acknowledged that we have organized crime.

[Bakatin] One of the main difficulties involved in combating it is the fact that it is covered up by corrupt officials in our law enforcement system and also, of course, by degenerates in the party, state, and economic apparatus. This shows why organized crime is exceedingly dangerous socially. But it is pointless as well as naive to combat it as something separate from general crime.

[PRAVDA] How does the international aspect fit into this scheme?

[Bakatin] In my view, we have started to fall behind in this area. Formerly we had no major problems connected with the international mafia and the activities of our criminals abroad. Now they have ballooned. I will not give any examples: They have been all over the newspapers. What is more important is: How do we reduce the gap that has developed here, too? Can it be done? Not only can it be done, it must be done. And our international activity presupposes the following specific approaches: exchange of experience with a more practical orientation; organization of direct bilateral links on crime-fighting problems of mutual interest; integration in the Interpol system; active crime-fighting work within UN structures. So far six intergovernmental agreements have been signed with the United States, Britain, France, the FRG, Italy, and Canada on actual, specific cooperation in the sphere of combating drug trafficking. There is similar cooperation with other countries.

[PRAVDA] You mentioned Interpol. A great deal has been said about it. Are we going to join?

[Bakatin] We are. Everything could be finally decided in September, at the session of this international organization's General Assembly.

[PRAVDA] Are our people ready for this kind of cooperation?

[Bakatin] As professional investigators, certainly. But you would not call the standard of linguistic, technological, and computer training high. Unfortunately, current realities do not enable us to train people intensively for this. The MVD is currently performing a great number of functions that are distracting its attention from the purely criminal sector. Just take interethnic conflicts, for example....

[PRAVDA] Since we have broached the topic, I would like to hear your opinion of the events in Lithuania.

[Bakatin] The situation in Lithuania—what I would call a political crisis caused by a one-sided, hasty decision by the republican Supreme Soviet not in fact on secession, but on virtually severing relations with the union—continues to deteriorate. It is my personal view that it is unnecessary, unproductive, and simply harmful to artificially dramatize the situation and exaggerate petty disputes between departments and organizations over some facility or some fact. The USSR Government's position remains principled and strictly accords with the decisions of the extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies and directions of the USSR president. It also coincides with the Federation Council's recommendations. No one can accept what is, to be frank, a dictatorial scheme: First we make a decision and then we are prepared to talk with you. To put it mildly, this violates basic ethical norms.

But the point lies elsewhere. No sane person can deny a union republic the right to self-determination. But, equally, one cannot deny the union—that is, the other republics—the right to demand a preliminary examination of the guarantees of observance of their interests, the union's interests.

This contradiction can be resolved not by "slamming doors," on the one hand, and by pressure, on the other, but only by a preliminary joint examination of all the questions on the basis of the USSR Constitution and existing legislation.

The new Lithuanian leadership, evidently sensing that its position is shaky because of the lack of any serious arguments in favor of severing relations with the union, was quick to preclude by unconstitutional actions any possibility of dialogue and decided to "burn its bridges." The decision was adopted hastily: literally overnight. The current Lithuanian leaders, knowing that the country's political leadership is in principle opposed to using force, chose a not very proper path.

Okay, so they violated the rights of the union and the rights of the republics, but there are rights of a higher kind. Human rights.

And how have the democrats in Lithuania treated human rights? If a person goes to bed at night in the Soviet Union and wakes up in the morning and hears on the radio that he is now abroad, in another state. What is this? It's fine if it coincides with his wishes. But what about those who do not want to lose USSR citizenship? Are they supposed to beat it? Leaving their homes and their work, leaving their lives in ruins. Apparently, this person has had his rights taken away from him. Now this is a case of arbitrariness by authority against people.

These people may be a minority in the republic—though I would point out that no one has properly counted them. This does not change the crux of the matter. What we have here is arbitrariness and lawlessness.

If we are going to have civilized relations, there is only one solution. And it is simple enough. Implement point one of the congress decision. Defer the hasty secession that violates above all human rights, the rights of many citizens. A law has now been adopted on the secession procedure. The main purpose of it is that everyone should have time to choose and have guarantees of observance of all their rights and interests—from political to property rights. There is no other way.

But what worries me, as internal affairs minister, is that because of the reluctance of the government of the Lithuanian Republic to follow this path, the only possible path in the circumstances, tension is beginning to mount, to grow, bit by bit, little by little.

[PRAVDA] And the law and order situation could get out of hand?

[Bakatin] The union MVD and the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic militia are trying to prevent this. But evidently some people have other ideas. The adventurist, inflammatory actions are surprising. Certain hotheads believe they can use strongarm methods of resolving questions. The appeals from various political niches and even from deputies' groups are alarming. I am surprised by these democrats. They have restructured themselves rather quickly. Can so-called state "freedom" be decided by ignoring freedom of choice, even on the part of one person? Every "defender of rights" has always said that it cannot. And I believe that it cannot. One must start the process of calmly resolving the crisis.

[PRAVDA] Finally, there is, in our view, a very interesting question in many letters: Is the minister confident that we are capable in the foreseeable future of breaking the back of the monster of crime?

[Bakatin] I am sure of it—we are stronger than it. But it will not happen quickly. It requires effort by society and the state and the pooling of many resources. One must not underestimate the great complexity of the task. First of all we must stem the rising tide of crime. I believe that this immediate task is a realistic one.

Trade Union Congress To Convene 23 Oct

904F0135A Moscow TRUD in Russian 18 Apr 90 p 1

[Resolution of the Eighth AUCCTU Plenum: "On Convocation of the 19th USSR Trade Union Congress"]

[Text] The AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] Plenum resolves:

1. To convene the 19th USSR Trade Union Congress on 23 October 1990 in Moscow at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

2. To introduce the following matters for examination by the Congress:

(1) The AUCCTU report of operations during the period following the 18th USSR Trade Union Congress and of tasks associated with radically renewing the country's trade union movement.

(2) The report of the Central Auditing Commission of USSR Trade Unions.

(3) Adoption of principal congress documents.

(4) Organizational matters.

3. To establish the representational norm for the 19th USSR Trade Union Congress—one delegate per 60,000 trade union members.

4. For the Drafting Commission to develop, taking this plenum's discussion into account, the proposals introduced by the AUCCTU Presidium on procedure for electing delegates to the 19th USSR Trade Union Congress, and on procedure for forming the Trade Union Center of the Confederation (Federation) of Soviet Trade Unions; to draw up a draft Declaration on Forming the Confederation (Federation) of Soviet Trade Unions, and the draft Fundamental Organizational Principles and Operational Procedures for the Confederation (Federation) of Soviet Trade Unions. To submit these within five days to AUCCTU members and candidate members, to members of the Central Auditing Commission of USSR Trade Unions, and to central committees and trade union councils for discussion in the primary organizations, among trade union employees and the active membership.

5. To instruct the AUCCTU Presidium to summarize the proposals and observations made during the course of discussions of the draft documents related to preparation for and conduct of the 19th USSR Trade Union Congress, and introduce these at the next session of the Eighth AUCCTU Plenum, 14 May 1990.

Association of Soviet Publishers Formed

LD1704214390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1350 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Summary] Moscow, 17 apr (TASS)—The inaugural congress of the Association of Soviet Publishers was held in Moscow today. Representatives of 254 publishing houses participated. Marat Shishigin, formerly working in the USSR State Committee on Pubishing, was elected chairman of the governing body.

Poll Shows Government Support, Party Nonsupport

LD2004123890 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 20 Apr 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] Most Soviet people place their hopes on the president, the Supreme Soviet, and government if there is a crisis situation in the country. This was shown by the results of a routine poll conducted by the Center for the

Study of Public Opinion. Mikhail Gorbachev is ahead in this rating by a huge margin. The same poll also showed, however, that a crisis would not add anything to the authority of the CPSU. In the eyes of the population, the head of state does not identify as much with the party as he embodies the policy of perestroyka and the processes of the democratic renewal of society. In the opinion of those who took part in the poll, the CPSU continues to lag behind seriously.

Library Exhibit Features Works by Trotskiy, Others

LD1804052490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] At the State Public History Library, a book exhibition is opening today. This exposition is devoted to the 120th anniversary of Vladimir Ilich Lenin's birth. At it is exhibited literature formerly kept in special vaults—about 200 editions published soon after the death of Vladimir Ilich. Among them are the memoirs of Raskolnikov, Radek, and (Osinskiy) in collections published in 1924. Of special interest are the memoirs of Bukharin, Zinovyev, and Kamenev. Of indubitable value are the testimonies about Vladimir Ilich of Trotskiy himself. That is to say, written by Trotskiy. Also a photograph album of 100 photographs of Lenin will attract visitors' attention.

Economic

Gorbachev Aide Sees Prejudices to Economic Reform

LD2404084990 Moscow TASS in English 0826 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS—The current economic crisis denies the Soviet leadership the right to continue using half measures, Nikolay Petrakov, economic assistant of the Soviet president, told the RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA newapaper today.

At the same time, the economist warned against the "shock therapy"—tough market measures now taken by the Mazowiecki government in Poland.

The political aspect of the shock therapy must be soberly considered, primary to the economic aspect, Petrakov said. The Polish political situation differs greatly from that in the Soviet Union.

"There are too many figures on the political scene that used the wave of populism to come to the Supreme Soviet and the forthcoming congress of Russian people's deputies," he said.

"The populist policy of our stagnated trade unions is also very loud. All this complicates the political context of economic reforms," Petrakov added.

In contrast to Poles, who prefer high prices to empty shops, Soviet people will agree to rationing and long queues rather than higher prices, Petrakov believes.

Prejudice against market relations is so deeply-rooted, that it affects even attitudes towards cooperatives. The government imposes limitations on the cooperative movement under pressure of the population, which, due to its ignorance, does not accept this market orientation.

According to Petrakov, this political, social and psychological background and the power of prejudice should be soberly estimated. "The 'a la Mazowiecki' transition to the market is not very hopeful. Let's not tempt fate," he added.

Although Petrakov does not consider joint stock a "panacea", he thinks that a law or a presidential decree must be adopted as soon as possible to transfer Soviet state industry to a joint stock basis.

He is also sure that the adoption of a "package" of radical measures to develop market relations will not abolish the regulating role of the state.

"There is no easy way towards the normalisation of the economy," Petrakov said. "Taking a resolute step, one should thoroughly consider the situation—public opinion, economic parameters and lots of foreign economic factors—to avoid making a fatal mistake."

Miners Complaints to Government Noted

904F0123A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 31 Mar 90 p 2

[Report on interview with Anatoliy Fomin, member of the workers' committee and "drifter" at Vorgashorskaya mine, by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA special correspondent V. Somov; date and place not given: "A Lull at Vorgashorskaya?.."]

[Text] For 38 days the bristling lines of messages from Vorgashorskaya Mine resembled communiques from the front. For 38 days the strike paralysis grated on the nerves of the economy, which was sick to begin with. The miners were in no mood to yield to either the local bosses or the government. Meanwhile, messages came en masse from the cities and villages: Think again—the children are cold, the blast furnaces are being extinguished, the country is choking without your coal. On 1 December the drifters returned to the stopes. What is the current situation? I addressed this question to a member of the workers' committee of Vorgashorskaya mine, drifter Anatoliy Fomin.

The miner responded immediately: "Disgusting. The situation has worsened again. After the strike we immediately picked up the needed pace. However, by now the shipping of coal has become a stumbling block. Almost 270,000 tons have accumulated in the heaps. By mid-March, the mine fulfilled the loading plan by only 71 percent. The coal is deteriorating and losing its valuable properties, and we will not be able to sell it at full price. The coal may catch fire any day. The situation is critical.

Incidentally, as far as I know, this was discussed two days ago at the extraordinary congress of the trade union of coal workers.

To tell you the truth, the miners are bewildered: Four moths ago, during the strike, the country could not do without our coal; but at present it appears that nobody wants it. Nobody is cold, nobody is suffering, and the coke-oven batteries are not being closed down because of the shortage of Vorkuta coal. Meanwhile, our mine does not have money even to pay wages. To be sure, we can get a bank loan, but the interest rate is such that we could easily be reduced to poverty later.

[Somov] However, the cars are not abundant in other coal-mining areas either. For example, your colleagues from Ekibastuz have asked the editorial office to intercede with Minister N. Konarev. Have you tried to establish direct contacts with the consumers? Could it be that they are capable of making their own arrangements for loading?

[Fomin] I do not doubt that they would be capable of it. However, we are not authorized to establish direct contacts. Also, we are not allowed to sell our coal ourselves. As far as the shortage of cars is concerned, we are, of course, aware of it. However, this is surprising: The Vorkutaugol Association is even overfulfilling the assignment for product loading, whereas Vorgashorskaya mine is the only one in arrears. The workers' committee and the management sent their representatives to the Ministry of the Coal Industry and the Ministry of Railways in order to clarify this paradox. They explained it to us in plain language and proved that all the cars allocated for Vorkuta do arrive there. The managers of the association, and General Director A. Oreshkin personally, deliberately fail to allocate them to our mine. We consider this to be sabotage!

[Somov] Wait a minute, Anatoliy Stepanovich! Could it be by oversight or because of a lack of organization somewhere? What sense does it make for the general director to throw a monkey wrench into the workings of his largest mine, which accounts for one-third of the output of the entire association?

[Fomin] Essentially, we have left the association. Giving the mine economic independence was one of the main demands of the fall strike. It sticks in Comrade Oreshkin's craw, as is, incidentally, the case with many other powers that be who are guarding the pillars of the administrative-command system and state monopoly in the economy. The most surprising thing is that, as it turns out, they still fail to understand why the miners strike. It looks as though the management of the association is doing everything in order to prove: Look, they wanted independence, they got it, and they failed miserably. The machinactions with the cars confirm this. After all, Vorgashorskaya mine and the association are now given separate plans. The quotas for cars are likewise separate; however, at the Mulda station where they arrive the Vorkutaugol is in charge of them.

[Somov] However, the collective did manage to taste the independence it had longed for, did it not?

[Fomin] No way! Over here, they know how to cut off the oxygen supply to all those who intend to get at least a whiff of economic freedom. Besides, we did not demand anything supernatural or special. By independence we meant only the rights of the labor collective envisaged by the Law on State Enterprises. Even for that we had to fight for 38 days. Minister M. Shchadov steadfastly refused to accept the statute of the mine, the provisions of which did not transcend the framework of the above law. What rights have we secured? We may manage the mine's economic funds and resolve the issues of housing construction ourselves. (Previously, strange things happened: Last year, we invested several million rubles in building homes, but the association did not allocate a single apartment to us.) The collective has an opportunity to dispose of five percent of planned output at its discretion. We may even find a foreign buyer. Recently, the Ministry of the Coal Industry gave the go-ahead for selling 300,000 tons of coal abroad on a barter basis.

[Somov] So, the branch bosses made concessions, didn't they?

[Fomin] In theory. However, in order to be entitled to sell five percent of the coal mined, we must fulfill the state order by 95 percent. Meanwhile, let me repeat that we are fulfilling the plan by 71 percent through the efforts of Comrade Oreshkin. This means: Kiss our direct contacts, barter transactions, and financial incentives funds goodbye, as well as everything else we counted on in our drive for independence.

[Somov] This is a natural question: What do the miners intend to do?

[Fomin] It is impossible to predict what happens next. The situation is charged. The workers' committee waited tensely for calls from Moscow from the envoys to the Ministry of the Coal Industry and the Ministry of Railways. The mine could have come to a halt at any minute. At the ministries, they assured us that they would take care of the car situation. We will see. However, I want to say unequivocally on behalf of my comrades: We do not need a strike. We understand the kind of destructive force it is and how bitterness comes to the extreme limit. However, this time the miners will fight to the end. Neither I nor anyone else knows what kind of an end it is going to be.

I think the danger of a chain reaction exists. It is good that this did not come about in the fall, otherwise, the entire industry would have gone on strike. Now, once again one spark would be enough. My feeling is that they are deliberately provoking us. Who? Those who dislike the desire of the working man to assert his dignity and become master of his life. Meanwhile, the miners from other regions who visit us are hinting: "The grass will turn green soon." Supposedly, the strike may be started again. This is the mood of the people. This is dangerous.

After all, all miners, to a man, know that the government has not met many of their demands so far.

[Somov] Is the strike committee active currently at Vorgashorskaya mine?

[Fomin] The strike committee as such does not exist. It has been transformed into the workers' committee of the "Democratic Workers' Movement." This is a permanent organ with complete legal rights because it has been registered by the settlement soviet. To be sure, this involved a lot of hardship. Bureaucratic carping seemed endless: Sometimes, the local authorities were not happy with our statute and at other times with our program. It struck us that the settlement soviet proceeded in the process from a 1932 legislative act.

[Somov] What is the relationship between the workers' committee and the council of the labor collective, the trade unions? Do friction and power struggles develop?

[Fomin] As far as the council of the labor collective is concerned, we have nothing to fight about. We have regular, businesslike relations and complete mutual understanding. The council handles primarily production issues and the distribution of merchandise. The workers' committee is a politicized organization, and it represents the collective outside the mine.

As far as the trade unions are concerned, we cannot find common ground. We inherited this structure from the administrative-command system; the structure was a part of it. This is why, in essence, the trade unions do not support the miners' demands. Let us look, for example, at the position of our territorial committee on the issue of furnishing cars for Vorgashorskaya mine. The trade union committee does Oreshkin's bidding. We intend to leave the present system of the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions]. To my mind, it is useless to restructure it.

[Somov] What are the contact points of the "Democratic Workers' Movement" and the local party organs?

[Fomin] We do not want a confrontation, and we do not cause it deliberately; however, relations with the party apparatus are strained. At a recent citywide report-and-election conference, miner delegates left the auditorium in protest when juggling was discovered in the election of the new first secretary.

There are virtually no contacts with functionaries of party organs. We are aware of their unequivocally negative attitude toward the strikes. They consider the existence of the workers' committee to be the main evil. However, the functionaries should ponder, for example, why the communists of the mine support our demands.

[Somov] What have been the consequences of the decisions of the court organs which ruled that the fall strike was illegal? After all, sanctions must follow such rulings.

[Fomin] Indeed, the Supreme Court of the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and subsequently that of the Russian Federation, pronounced the strike unlawful. The Supreme Court of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic treated our appeal pro-forma, failing to heed the argument that the Law on Labor Disputes applies to conflicts between a collective and the management whereas we were making demands on the government. The well-known USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 608 also admitted that the summer strike was merely suspended, and in the event the demands are not met on time the miners have the right to resume it, which is what we proceeded to do. The court organs ignored all of this. When the cases against other collectives went to trial in Vorkuta, the strike flared up anew.

As far as the decisions of the court echelons are concerned, they were put on the back burner, as if nothing had ever happened. The government assured the miners that there will be no sanctions; and in our rule-of-law state, such instructions turned out to be enough for the court rulings to be archived. It looks as if it is favorable for us. However, believe me, the procedure for revoking sanctions depresses me.

[Somov] Of course, you are aware that the miners are frequently rebuked for supposedly wanting a larger share of the pie. There is an economic crisis in the country; meanwhile, the miners demand higher wages, improved supplies of foodstuffs, and comfortable living conditions.

[Fomin] We do not want to be on top at the expense of others. I remember this cartoon in a newspaper: A round-faced miner is pushing a trolley from which sausages are falling. That is nonsense! We work under extreme conditions, and many of us live in barracks and slums. The government has acknowledged our demands as justified. We understand that all of the painful problems cannot be solved at once. Time and money are required. However, we are not claiming a larger piece of the pie. In fighting for our economic and social rights, we do not claim preferences for miners only; we refer to all the inhabitants of Vorkuta and the Polar area. When we were told that our demands associated with northern preferences would be met, but for miners only, we refused to accept this. After all, this is clearly unfair. Next to us, teachers and physicians work in the same environment. How are they worse than we are?

[Somov] Indeed, these are serious and acute issues. However, it looks like they are not getting you down. What is your prediction of the turn of events in the future?

[Fomin] Any person's resources for optimism are finite. The light at the end of the tunnel which did appear at one point, when the mine gained independence, has now been blocked by the administrative boulder. We wanted to show how free people can toil. So, what has happened? This has happened before. Hope barely emerges and is extinguished right away. For example, the Law on State Enterprise says that the collective resolves the issues of remuneration for labor on its own. We attempted to actually do this. In particular, we decided to cancel piecework, which has outlived its usefulness, and replace it with payments for meeting targets. In the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems they listened to us and put a stack of instructions on the desk: It cannot be done, it is not the way, it is unlawful.

We are going to blaze the trail to independence through leasing. The economists are already looking for approaches; we are following the experience of Raspadskaya mine in the Kuzbass, where they are mastering leasing arrangements. Our ultimate goal is to become genuine masters. Incidentally, the attitude of lessees and cooperative members toward strikes differs from that of the employees of state enterprises. Who can you threaten with a strike in this instance? Yourself?

We have a tremendous desire to really work efficiently. We want nothing else. So, they should not interfere with us!

Scientific

Academy of Sciences Meeting Opens in Moscow 23 Apr

Marchuk Outlines Tasks

LD2304163890 Moscow TASS in English 1542 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 23 TASS—A general meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences opened in Moscow today. It will discuss a report on the academy's work and will elect its new leadership.

"The current crisis in Soviet science, when research is making slow progress and it is practically impossible to make substantial advances in principal areas, is marked by a sharp decrease of the number of scientific personnel (by more than 90 per cent in some areas) and diminishing allocations for scientific purposes," President of the Academy Guriy Marchuk said. "As a result of this, the academy's fixed assets have shrunk, while the technical equipment of Soviet research is now 75-80 per cent lower then in many industrially advanced countries."

According to Academician Marchuk, less attention is being paid to the development of fundamental science and no efforts are made to accelerate scientific and technical progress. He believes it is necessary to revise the organisational, financial, technical and social policy in the sphere of science.

The academician recalled that the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences had elaborated a concept for restructuring fundamental science and had started its stage-by-stage realisation. These reforms boil down to the creation of organisational, legal and material scientific schools, for broader scientific debates, effective protection of the creative endeavours of scientists and scientific collectives.

"Perestroyka processes", Academician Marchuk noted, "have allowed us to revise our international scientific and technological policy. Expansion of international scientific contacts and more active interaction with the world scientific community are among the most important factors contributing to new scientific research efforts and to the accumulation of new knowledge."

Marchuk Reelected Academy President

LD2304182190 Moscow TASS in English 1658 GMT 23 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondents Veronika Romanenkova and Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Guriy Marchuk, 64, was reelected president of the USSR Academy of Sciences for another five years today by 192 votes out of 247.

The five other candidates—Academicians Yuriy Osipyan, Nikolay Basov, Zhores Alferov, Andrey Gapanov-Grekhov and Stanislav Shatalin—withdrew their candidacies.

Marchuk is internationally known as a leading expert in computer mathematics and the use of digital methods in ecology, immunology and nuclear power engineering.

Marchuk is the honorary member of the national academies of sciences of several European countries.

He continues his scientific work despite his organisational activities in the academy, his duties as a USSR people's deputy and his work at the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

"The next few years will not be easy for the academy. The president and the new presidium will have to carry out many changes in Soviet science, they must develop scientific research, build Soviet scientific potential, retool the material basis of Soviet science and resolve social problems of scientific collectives," Marchuk said.

Marchuk said that he would continue supporting priority areas of scientific research, such as living matter, microcosm and macrocosm, the scientific basics of power engineering, machine-building, information science, the development of new materials and the ecology.

In addition, Marchuk wants to renew the academy and admit younger members, particularly to its leading bodies. He also favours democratisation in academic collectives.

The general meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences continues its work.

Minister Interviewed on Future Space Initiatives

907Q0076A Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Apr 90 pp 1, 4

[Report on interview with USSR Minister of General Machine Building O.N. Shishkin by V. Golovachev, TRUD political columnist: "Plants Beyond Earth, Settlement on the Moon... USSR Minister of General Machine Building O.N. Shishkin Talks About the Development of Cosmonautics and Related Critical Problems"]

[Text] **Twenty-nine years ago today—12 April—Yuriy Gagarin completed a flight into outer space for the first time in the history of mankind. I remember very well the general rejoicing, the mass processions of singing and smiling people in the streets, and the homemade placards... But today the conquest of space evokes far less romantic enthusiasm, and people are more and more interested in the practical aspect: appropriations for space exploration and the benefits to be gained. And this, in general, is understandable. This is the kind of questions that readers ask in their letters: With 40 million people living on the edge of poverty in this country, is it appropriate to spend many billions for space? And, overall, where is cosmonautics going, and what are the objectives and priorities here?**

We turned with these and other questions to the USSR minister of general machine building, O.N. Shishkin. This is the minister's first interview. Until recently, the profile of the ministry was considered top secret: Enterprises of this branch produce the country's rocket equipment (both for the military and for space exploration). A very complicated electronic panel next to the minister's desk makes it possible to make instantaneous contact over special communications lines with any missile plant and other installations..

"Let us depart from the traditional victory celebration interview on the occasion of Cosmonautics Day," Oleg Nikolayevich proposed. "Ask the most pointed questions, and I will try to answer them. This will be more interesting and useful to the matter at hand."

Indeed, the beginning of the interview was unexpected and very promising...

[Golovachev] Well then, the most pointed question—about expenditures and income. Will our cosmonautics ever pay for itself?

[Shishkin] It is known that basic research paves society's way to the future, that it can bring the most fantastic discoveries—including new technologies in which, according to the overall level of development of cosmonautics, we are today on a par with the United States (and not long ago we were behind)—that we occupy a leading position in the world, and that this priceless potential is very important for our economy. All of this is very real. But today, under conditions of a serious economic crisis, it is not strategy and not the prospects that trouble people, but purely pragmatic considerations: Will there be a profit from cosmonautics in the end? I do not want to criticize such a simplified approach, it is understandable in human terms, and, therefore, I will switch to the language of figures. The current space flight of Solovyev and Balandin will not only compensate for all current expenditures for this expedition, but it will also make a profit of R25 million (from the alloys, crystals, biological materials, unique medicines, photos of the earth's surface, information for fishermen, etc., obtained in outer space).

But if you take all of the expenditures on cosmonautics, then it will not be able to pay for itself this year. (Although, for example, each ruble invested in the creation of a native system of optic-photographic surveillance from outer space already brings a profit of R8.) But in 1992 cosmonautics will have the kind of an economic effect that will not only fully cover all annual expenses but will also bring a profit. Thus, we are coming out onto a level of complete cost recovery. And this is without even taking into account the commercial projects of Glavkosmos [Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Scientific Research].

[Golovachev] What projects do you have in mind? The sale of launch vehicles?

[Shishkin] Yes, that too. Today, for the time being, only our country offers the world market such a wide range of reliable launch vehicles: lift capabilities of five, seven, 12, 10, and 100 tons. We are prepared for any forms of cooperation: build space vehicle launching facilities for a customer in any place he chooses, sell our launch vehicles, launch satellites and other objects of the customer from our space launch facilities, and organize joint enterprises...

As is known, restrictions adopted by the United States currently hinder commercial activity that would be beneficial to each side. For example, the delivery of foreign satellites to our launch facilities is not allowed, if the satellites use new American equipment, even though we guarantee the inviolability of apparatuses and even offer to allow foreign specialists to watch over them up to the very launch of the delivery vehicle.

[Golovachev] Perhaps a greater role is played here by commercial considerations and efforts not to permit competition than by questions of secrecy or political considerations?

[Shishkin] It is entirely possible. But third countries definitely lose in this economic plan.

[Golovachev] And if, as some businessmen propose, space vehicle launching facilities are built in some third country?

[Shishkin] Yes, this is an interesting variant. And such negotiations currently are being conducted with Australia. The idea is simple: Build a space vehicle launching site in Australia according to our design and with our participation. But its operation, servicing, and all launches are conducted by the Australians. We only sell them our launch vehicles, but they themselves find customers, conclude contracts, conduct commercial activity, and so forth. The idea is alluring, and it has promise. And this was asserted by both sides in the negotiations.

[Golovachev] Let us compare this class of launch vehicles that not only we but also other countries have. Whose vehicles are cheaper: ours or, let us say, the American vehicles?

[Shishkin] Ours, and by quite a bit. For example, a rocket of our "Proton" class and its launch costs $75 million in the United States; in our country it is many times cheaper. It was possible to achieve this because of technology, quantity production, and a number of other factors, so that we are not afraid of competition, and here we hold strong positions.

[Golovachev] But one also has to be able to trade...

[Shishkin] Here you hit the nail on the head, and this is our weak spot. We still have not mastered the art and science of commerce. This is a very difficult matter, but we do not have either the experience or the tradition. We have to learn by doing.

[Golovachev] Nonetheless, something is being done here. For example, English journals reported on negotiations between Glavkosmos and British firms concerning the sale of satellite information receiving stations. Other publications talk about the fact that Glavkosmos is offering Soviet satellite communications channels of the "Gorizont" type.

[Shishkin] Yes, this is true. With the help of Soviet stations, British firms would be able to take and sell (on contract with us, of course) various information that is received from on board Soviet satellites. Requirements for photos of one or another area would have to be submitted by customers not less than two days before. Control of the vehicles will remain with the Soviet Union. I want to note an important detail that many Western specialists emphasize: In Soviet space photos, objects can be distinguished that have dimensions of five to 10 meters, and the resolution capability of the equipment of the American "Landsat" satellites is 30 meters, and of the French "Spot" satellites, 10-12 meters.

Great possibilities are also being opened up by the use of communications channels of our current and prospective outer space apparatuses: for example, the future Soviet direct television relay satellite "Gelikon" (launch is planned for next year).

There are also commercial contracts with a West German firm, in addition to other foreign partners.

[Golovachev] It is said that we also sold the "Mir" station scale model—an analog that remained on earth. Is that true?

[Shishkin] But what is special here? We will not need this station anymore in the future. A Japanese firm bought it. Foreign specialists engaged in the exploration of outer space will study the station with great interest. In any case, the sale of a large-scale model of the "Mir" station is a symbol of the development of international cooperation and will contribute to the idea of cooperation in the field of space research between the USSR and Japan.

[Golovachev] The question of broad international cooperation in the exploration of outer space today is especially urgent. What are the prospects here?

[Shishkin] Historically, it turned out that cosmonautics developed under conditions of the opposition of two great powers. And the concept was built on this: Peace could be preserved only through opposition, by increasing the nuclear missile potential. The whole country gave the best that it had to assure parity.

Rivalry clearly manifested itself in space research as well. Prestige considerations demanded getting ahead of the Americans here and there, and wherever it was possible; and, at the same time, the same tasks were placed before the Americans. But one asks: Why under conditions of peaceful coexistence and the development of cooperation should each country go its own way, developing one and the same design and resolving one and the same task in parallel? More and more countries are now joining in the exploration of outer space. Must they also repeat this path, expending gigantic resources? Is it not more advisable to cooperate, to divide the tasks, and, afterwards, to exchange the obtained results? The benefit of this to humanity is apparent. And, today, in the epoch of the new political thinking, such collaboration and cooperation can, in my opinion, become a reality. This can be advantageous to everyone, including the United States. Because in a number of positions, we are surpassing America—this is the unique experience of long flights, the development of designs of orbital stations (which specialists from the United States who visited us recently became convinced of), and so forth. But the main thing is that it is necessary to eliminate duplication, which will give a tremendous economy of resources. For example, we could participate in the establishment of a lunar settlement, which is necessary for the further exploration of outer space (this task is being discussed in the United States, Japan, and in a number of other countries).

We and NASA are now readying important proposals on collaboration and cooperation. It is entirely possible that this will become a subject of discussions during the forthcoming meeting between USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and U.S. President G. Bush.

[Golovachev] One immediately desires to pose a specific question. Work is being done both here and in the United States on the development of large (on the order of 100 meters) orbital stations. The cost of each is measured in many billions of rubles and dollars. Are you prepared to consider the question of the development of a joint large station?

[Shishkin] The question, I will say frankly, is unexpected. You see, these stations have to be serviced by satellites, including military satellites as well. Well then, I do not know about the American side, but I would be ready to discuss this question, although it seems fantastic today.

[Golovachev] Since we are discussing stations of the next generation, could you not talk a little about "Mir-2"?

[Shishkin] This station, whose launch, I think, will be feasible in the years 1997-1998, should be working in the next century. For the time being, "Mir-2" is visualized as a large composite construction with many ports. Communications, weather, ecological, and repair observation satellites could be delivered here (which is much cheaper than conducting new launches); and various research modules and outer space plants for the production of unique medicines, alloys, crystals, etc. will be docked at the ports.

Very strict demands are being made on the design. For example, a 100-meter truss can have a warp at the ends of only several millimeters. This is in space flight, and under the impact, figuratively speaking, of from 100 degrees of heat to 100 degrees of cold. Not very long ago this seemed unachievable...

Our scientists successfully resolved the problems of welding such designs in outer space. Incidentally, such experiments were conducted by Savitskaya during her space flight.

Well, it is too early to speak more specifically about the station, because a lot depends on those orders and contracts that will be concluded on a commercial basis and on those appropriations the USSR Supreme Soviet will allocate.

[Golovachev] Here we are coming to the question of a program for exploiting outer space. This is the opinion of General V. Shatalov: "Cosmonautics does not have a real 'boss'. The main efforts of the originators of outer space equipment are directed at endlessly perfecting the equipment. The USSR Academy of Sciences and other departments are not showing concern about its payoff..." Is it not time that we set up an organ like NASA in the United States?

[Shishkin] This question requires additional discussion. But it is clear that not everything here in our country is all right. At least I am firmly convinced that customers should not be individual scientists and academicians (as is frequently the case now), but an independent organization. And, of course, not our ministry.

[Golovachev] I want to quote General V. Shatalov once more. He ascertains bitterly that "many of the instruments on the station are 'crude,' that half of the scientific equipment does not work. The crews spend a lot of time on technical repair work." This really is wasteful. A serious charge against your department.

[Shishkin] What can I say? Criticism has to be answered with action. The question was put properly. And we are now undertaking serious measures to correct the situation.

[Golovachev] You are not offended by criticism?

[Shishkin] I think that we are still not being criticized a lot.

[Golovachev] Well, then, here is this question. Academician V.P. Mishin (in the past, Deputy S.P. Korolev, and after his death, the chief designer) and a number of other specialists believe that the development in our country of the "Energiya-Buran" system marked a repetition of all of the American mistakes, but in an even more serious form. The employment of a reusable spacecraft is much more expensive than one-time launches. The development of the "shuttle" was a mistake and a miscalculation by the Americans, and we repeated this mistake. The time did not come for "Buran," and we do not need it... What is your opinion?

[Shishkin] Perhaps you will be surprised, but when the question of the development of "Buran" was being discussed, I was against it. But afterwards—that is the way it turned out—it was I in the ministry who answered for the development of a reusable spacecraft. Today, analyzing the situation, I must admit that I was not right when I objected to "Buran." And the birth of the "shuttle" was not a mistake, and our reusable spacecraft in the near future will find application in the return of valuable cargoes from outer space to earth and in servicing orbiting complexes, outer space plants, etc. I am not even talking about the fact that in the process of work on the "Energiya" rocket and the "Buran" reusable spacecraft, new technologies, technical innovations, and a modern scientific-production infrastructure were established, that is, that work which was already done that assures the development of branches and industries on the whole for many years into the future.

In addition, in contrast to the Americans, we are able to inject large (up to 100 tons or more) payloads at the price of an expendable rocket. And this is several times cheaper.

[Golovachev] When will the next flight of "Buran" be?

[Shishkin] In 1991. The second copy of the reusable spacecraft, which is now being tested at Baykonur, will be sent on an unmanned trip. "Buran" will dock with "Mir," more correctly with the "Kristal" module, which will be launched toward the orbital complex. The cosmonauts will move into the reusable spacecraft, they will work in it, and they will conduct tests with the manipulator. Later, in an unmanned mode, "Buran" will move away from "Mir" and the next stage of tests will begin. The "Soyuz" spacecraft, with a crew on board, will dock at the reusable spacecraft. A joint flight will be executed, after which "Buran" will return to earth and the crew of the "Soyuz" will depart for "Mir"... So "Buran" will not be flying in an unmanned mode all of the time.

[Golovachev] Is the question of the future development of aerospace aircraft, which can fly from Moscow to New York in one and a half hours being studied in our country?

[Shishkin] This is an interesting question. Yes, research is being conducted now on possible variants of aerospace aircraft. For the time being, this is work of a general nature, concept definition. A search is going on for an aircraft configuration and the most efficient areas for its application are being studied. A very important point lies ahead: to select the principal variant. Incidentally, the development of "Buran" is a very important and necessary step on the way to an aerospace aircraft. As for feasible flights, I think they will begin in the next century.

[Golovachev] And the last question—about conversion. It is known that its scales in your branch are not great. For example, all kinds of modern equipment for the agro-industrial complex will be developed in plants of the Ministry of General Machine Building. But I ask you to talk about only one "narrow" and extremely important sphere: manufacturing prosthetic appliances and medical equipment.

[Shishkin] I do not know what can be more grave on a moral plane than the state of prosthetic appliance manufacture in our country. I was really embarrassed when I became familiar with the production of prosthetic appliances. How can a society consider itself humane which treats its invalids this way? Imagine: A shop with a dirt floor (this is in our day!), and only linden wood, aluminum, and straps are used for the manufacture of prosthetic appliances. The caveman century, it is simply a disgrace...

We began to work on the problem immediately. Already 20,000 prosthetic appliances of a modern standard—as good as in the FRG—will be manufactured this year. A Soviet invalid child was sent to the United States to a competition, and she got through 42 km...

We will continue to raise the production of these prosthetic devices until the middle of 1992, and then we will shift to the production of bio-prosthetic appliances. They will operate on the biocurrents of remaining muscles or even on biocurrents of the brain. Everyone is treating the fulfillment of these tasks with great attention, which is our sacred duty to the invalids. And, in conclusion, about a very serious problem: the production of disposable syringes. This year our ministry alone produced 250 million of them and about a billion needles. Next year—a billion syringes and 3 billion needles. I believe the problem will be resolved very soon.

Military

Gen Lizichev Interviewed on Anti-Army Sentiments

PM1904131190 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 18 Apr 90 pp 1,2

[Interview with Army General A.D. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, by V. Andriyanov and V. Zots; date and place of interview not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "Serving the Fatherland. Army General A.D. Lizichev, Chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate Answers RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA's Questions"]

[Text] Army General A.D. Lizichev has devoted exactly 44 years to the service. When he changed his desk diary at the end of last year, he noticed that several pages were empty. He thought with alarm: Are there really days in his service with nothing to fill them, like pages in his diary. Were there really days in his army career that he might regret today?

[Correspondents] Our mailbag contains many letters which express disquiet for the Soviet Army. Strange as this may seem, it has of late been really defamed both in the press and on television. Does the Army itself now need defense?

[Lizichev] Yes, it is the defamation and unprecedented pressure that are affecting the Army. It is a rare thing now for a rally to do without irate attacks on the "men with guns," particularly officers and generals. We are not of course equating malicious defamation with objective criticism of the shortcomings that do exist within the Army. This criticism helps improve the Army organism, strengthen the Army, and boost its prestige within society.

It is another matter when people persistently seek out "compromising material," distort individual facts, and present them as an ailment that pervades all the Armed Forces. The aim is different here—to set the Army against society and undermine their unity in order to thus make it easy for antisocialist forces to gain access to power. These people are trying to play the army card in the political struggle. It is impressed upon mothers that the Army presents a threat to their sons' lives and health; the wretched idea that the Army is worse than jail, limits their freedom and dignity, and maims them physically and morally is palmed off on young people; attempts are made to convince representatives of the indigenous nationalities that the Army is a gendarme ready to forcibly suppress their desire for national rebirth and independence on the orders of "apparatchiks"; the intelligentsia are assured that the Army is a hotbed of boorishness and a most conservative organization and attempts are made to prove to working people that the Army "has a ball" at the people's expense and that the military budget weighs heavy on their standard of living.

All this explains to some extent why people sometimes succumb to anti-Army propaganda, why they keep silent when, say, the driver of a scheduled bus in Moscow forces officers to get out or else he won't drive any further; that is why they do not interfere when hooligan riffraff beat and sometimes kill servicemen virtually before their very eyes. The seeds of the anti-Army campaign are already sending up their foul shoots; not only is the Army coming under fire from newspapers and journals, but it is also not blanks that are being fired.

[Correspondents] It is well known that 60 officers died last year—not at their posts, moreover, but mainly at the hands of criminals. How do you regard this sorry statistic?

[Lizichev] These were generally our best officers. Lieutenant I. Kholost, Major S. Komissarov, Lieutenant Captain S. Zadoyan, Lieutenant Colonel V. Bazhanov... Unfortunately, even when an attack on a servicemen ends in a fatality, vigorous steps are by no means always taken to hunt down and punish the criminal. A clause must be introduced into criminal legislation as a matter of urgency whereby the murder of an officer constitutes an aggravating circumstance.

Someone said that the strangulation of any civilization commences with the obscuring of national morals. We must learn to respect our sacred objects, remember our history, and elevate the title of defender of the fatherland. It is obvious that it is acutely necessary to enhance an officer's social status and defend his human dignity. It is finally time to realize that an officer can be criticized, punished, or even discharged into the reserve, but he must not be humiliated—he defends the fatherland!

Let us ponder together the following question: In whose interests is it to weaken the Army's combat might when military danger has by no means disappeared as yet for us? In whose interests is it to depict the Army as an occupier in conditions when our peoples' national self-awareness has risen sharply and interethnic clashes have worsened? In whose interests is it to distract working people from the true reasons for the crisis we are experiencing, by focusing public opinion on the "Army"?

I believe that all this is above all in the interests of those people who see the Army as an obstacle to their separatist aspirations, who would like to conceal their own sins beneath "anti-Army" slogans, afraid of the people's wrath, those people who are now living according to the following principle: The worse it is for them, the better it is for us.

But will it be better if we lose our defense capability? Every honest man and patriot must ask himself this question today. I believe that every one of us has pondered the CPSU Central Committee open letter "For Consolidation on a Principled Basis." The unity of everyone who values the fate and security of the country and the ideals of humane and democratic socialism is acquiring particular significance now.

[Correspondents] Patronage ties have increased recently between certain republics and those troop units and ships where their fellow countrymen serve. But there are also other kinds of contact. Emissaries from informal movements and organizations have made their way to units and subunits. They seek out their countrymen; foist pamphlets and dubious broadsheets on them; and propose that they shirk the service, strike, go on hunger strike, and flee home. Does the Army need this kind of "patron"?

[Lizichev] The Soviet Army and our fleet have always had strong ties with the people. Let us recall just one Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee circular dated 12 January 1921. I think that RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA readers will be interested to learn how V.I. Lenin put the question of ties between the working people and the Red Army. He said that all-around concern for the Red Barracks is a totally urgent and imperative task for the party. Any lack of attention, any indifference to the Army's spiritual and material requirements and needs constitutes an irreparable mistake.

We would like to do our utmost to develop the traditions of this patronage. Thus, at Gorkiy's "Krasnoye Sormovo" plant predraft young people annually compete for the right to serve in the eponymous company of a Belorussian Military District unit. The Voronezh tire plant has sponsored the Northern Fleet's "Okrylennyy" destroyer for more than 32 years. There are a considerable number of dynasties at the plant who have served on this vessel. The plant workers annually allocate 10 travel vouchers for stays at sanatoriums and rest homes for officers and ensigns and also tickets for their children to attend Pioneer camps.

I think the main thing now is for patronage ties to be fleshed out with lively specific work, which should be conducted on a regular basis and not merely to mark various holidays. In my view, it is particularly important for there to be direct contacts between subunits and labor collectives. As for the forms these contacts should take, the will is there, as they say, but in each specific case life itself will suggest how best to build these relations. For instance, I see no reason not to hold regular open days at troop units. But the visitors should not bring disorganization and chaos. Such contacts are designed to strengthen the unity between the Army and the people. The people's love for their Army is a sacred feeling which has always given the Army new strength.

[Correspondents] We have gotten accustomed to seeing this unity at military parades. But there is also the submerged, invisible part of the iceberg. We are speaking about the work of the large army of defense industry workers and specialists.

[Lizichev] The provisioning of the troops and naval forces with high-quality combat hardware is one of the most important conditions for maintaining the country's defense capability. The labor of defense industry workers, engineering and technical personnel, and designers and military and civilian scientists must above all be evaluated with account being taken of this. They have made a tremendous contribution to the attainment of military-strategic parity, which would have been inconceivable without a qualitative leap forward in arms development and production.

Many pieces of military hardware currently in the Army and Navy arsenal are equal to their foreign counterparts.

Certain state-of-the-art developments in military hardware, for instance the MiG-29 and Su-27 aircraft, have already been described in the press and shown on television. The exceptional complexity of these combat systems, the servicing of which requires supreme vocational training, was stressed.

I will say one more thing. The time has come to revise our attitude toward "servicing." Our technical servicing and support base often cannot stand up to criticism. We have 21st century technology at sea, while on land the situation is virtually as antediluvian as at the time of Peter the Great's vetures in naval architecture.

We see it as our task to maintain the appropriate level of training for servicing personnel and ensure that they comply most rigorously with the requirements of operating and servicing documents and safety equipment regulations. There must be no trifles here, because we are talking about people. Their safety is the criterion by which we evaluate the work of designers, military instructors, workers, and the organizers of the combat training process among the troops.

[Correspondents] There is a remarkable poetic sentence: "...Commissars in dusty helmets lean over me in silence..." What would you say about commissars these days? Perhaps they're no longer needed?

[Lizichev] The social portrait of a modern commissar is shaped by the sum total of the demands made on him by the practical work of military building. Political workers share with the personnel all the hardships and privations of combat service and alert duty. They cannot escape long ocean voyages, test flights way above the clouds, field exercises in the freezing cold, or an unsettled domestic life.

Anyone who has ever worked with personnel knows that a political worker has never had an easy life. It is still hard now. The calls to abandon the institution of political worker sound all the more absurd. I am sure that the overwhelming majority of my colleagues would be able to organize their lives under any conditions—even if they swap their army greatcoats for civvies. But I am even more convinced that there should still be commissars within the Armed Forces. What is more, given the restructuring of the Army and Navy on the basis of democratization, glasnost, and the humanization of military service, the role of political workers is increasing because of a substantial increase in servicemen's exactingness with regard to the guaranteeing of their social protection, the need to overcome a certain degree of alienation in relations with local party and soviet bodies, and, lastly, to the extraordinary exacerbation of interethnic relations.

[Correspondents] Readiness to defend the motherland was always one of the most remarkable characteristics of the young generation at various stages of our history. How is the current spring draft into the Army faring?

[Lizichev] I am profoundly convinced that most Soviet young people are well aware of their patriotic duty. This is confirmed by many things. For instance, we recently conducted a sociological study among a large group of conscripts in Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Vladivostok, and Kamchatka; in Voronezh, the Transcarpathian, and Grodno Oblasts; and in the Georgian, Tajik, and Uzbek Republics. Attention was drawn to the fact that almost one in two draftees consider themselves prepared for service in the Army in every respect, one-third want to serve exclusively in the airborne assault or border troops, and one in five draftees would like to enter a military school and become an officer.

But we must now talk about the sorry picture of moral impoverishment among a certain section of the younger generation. You feel heavyhearted when you learn that no 10th-grader from three schools in the capital of one union republic could name just three heroes of the Soviet Union; and of 100 young senior students who had just been subjected to military registration, only one recalled who Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya [Soviet World War II partisan] was.

Sociological studies conducted in the Moscow, North Caucasian, and Baltic Military Districts showed that just 24.2 percent of draftees are morally prepared for military service. More than 25 percent of Moscow's draftees consider Army service an anachronism, and many people believe that the danger of war has long since passed... A quite dangerous misconception.

[Correspondents] According to THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, chief of U.S. Naval Intelligence, recently said: "Glasnost has enabled us to obtain the kind of invaluable information... about the Soviet Union that we would have had to spend millions of dollars (using traditional intelligence methods) and a long time gathering." Should we rank such opinions as positive aspects of glasnost?

[Lizichev] Until recently, everything, or almost everything, relating to defense was secret in our country. But can the Army remain a closed book now that the country is becoming an open society? People have learned a great deal in a short time about the kind of things of which they couldn't even have dreamed before. Openness is to some extent disarming and restraining the potential enemy.

At the same time, one cannot fail to see that articles in the open press and the broadcasting of information regarding the status of the Soviet Armed Forces which is indeed unknown to the enemy and which the latter cannot obtain using traditional methods are, of course, doing our state a "disservice." I think that we must understand where glasnost ends and elementary betrayal of national interests begins.

[Correspondents] If the Army needs to be defended, what could ideologists and political workers do in this context?

[Lizichev] I absolutely agree that in the current complex political situation a joint quest for new approaches is extremely necessary in ideological work. Radical steps are needed here. We are clearly making insufficient use of joint efforts in shaping social consciousness.

Hence the joint defense of socialist values seems to be our first and main point of contact with the problem. It is no secret that some people are impatient to give this very idea a rapid burial. It is the duty of propaganda workers to help every member of our society to believe in the abiding values of humane, democratic socialism.

Some people are indeed trying to gear public opinion so that the Army may seem to the uninitiated to be an unnecessary attribute for the state. But the world has not, after all, capsized overnight and we still obviously cannot do without quite powerful Armed Forces for a long time. The nature of the Armed Forces at present and in the future is another matter... One thing is clear: The task of training the defenders of the motherland and raising patriots has not only not been struck off the agenda, it is growing still more complicated because of the effect of those destructive forces that I have mentioned.

The third area to which we should apply our joint efforts is history. In the past V. Sukhomlinskiy said that all the problems with our training stem from the fact that we urge children to follow a banner which no one is carrying. Our social scientists and ideologists seem to have become carried away by the negative past to the detriment of the heroic elements in it and to the detriment of the future. People are saying that history must be analyzed. But how are they analyzing it? Take the history of the Great Patriotic War. Many items and speeches present it as an continuous chain of senseless tragedies, unwarranted bloodshed, and criminal blunders by military chiefs. Attempts are being made to morally equate the victor and the aggressor, put fascist and socialist ideologists on the same footing, and humiliate the millions of Soviet people whose devotion to Leninist ideas and their socialist choice did not falter even during the gravest, most tragic days of the war.

Take other pages in our history... Everything is being debased. That should not be the case, the truth must be complete. We must not settle scores with history but put our difficult, tragic, and yet great history at the service of the people and the young generation.

And what about the untapped opportunities? In my view, they consist of the fact that civil and military ideological workers have poor connections with one another and therefore the left hand does not know what the right is doing.

[Correspondents] A big holiday lies ahead—the 45th anniversary of the victory. What would you like to say to the frontline soldiers, the sons, and grandsons of the victory?

[Lizichev] I wish everyone well and wish them good health and unity in the name of the socialist Motherland, just as during the years of the Great Patriotic War. The victory of perestroyka is impossible without the people's unity, without friendship and fraternity among all nations and ethnic groups.

In order to worthily carry on the cause of October, in upholding whose ideals more than 20 million Soviet people lost their lives in the battle against fascism, we must bring the work begun in April 1985 to its victorious conclusion.,

Let me say a special word about the frontline soldiers themselves. The years are taking their toll. There are increasingly few of them in combat ranks. The veterans' wounds ache, but the indifference and conceit which they encounter these days are even more disturbing. I would like to address Soviet people from the workers' newspaper: Let us overcome our lack of cordiality toward the participants in the war and the workers in the rear services. Society is eternally indebted to them. Our party, state, and all of us must do everything we can in the current economic situation to improve their material and domestic conditions, including providing them with housing, medical services, and medication. The ancients rightly said: As you judge, so will you be judged.

Army Officer on Separation of Military, Politics

90UF0003A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 12, 24-30 Mar 90 p 34

[Interview with Colonel General B. Gromov, Kiev Military District commander of forces and former commander of the Soviet forces contingent in Afghanistan, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY parliament correspondents A. Uglapov and V. Romanenko; date and place of interview not specified: "The Army and Politics"]

[Text] [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] How do you regard the pullout of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe?

[Gromov] Insofar as we have admitted that our sending of troops to Hungary and Czechoslovakia was in essence an unconstitutional act, this was going to happen sooner or later. I am not talking about the GDR in this regard—this is an entirely different situation.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Doesn't this provide evidence of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact?

[Gromov] No. I think the Warsaw Pact must be preserved. I am looking at this process from two aspects—political and purely military. If the international climate has become a little warmer, it is only natural to see a process of abatement in the military confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The easing of political tensions must be reinforced with specific measures in the military sphere.

Without a doubt there are many complications here as well. From a military point of view it creates certain difficulties for us. Additionally, we don't have firm knowledge as to what the military doctrine of some of the East European countries will be, since it will be the job of their future political structures to determine this.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Do you think reduction of our armed forces is necessary?

[Gromov] Yes. That is my personal opinion. But it is another question entirely as to how this should look with respect to time and scale. We cannot forget that this political step will give rise to a great many social problems. If we are talking about a reduction of 500,000 men, in actuality this will affect a significantly greater number of people, the families of the servicemen.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] What do you think about one republic or another leaving the USSR?

[Gromov] I am in favor of preserving our federation. However, I believe it is necessary to reexamine the political and economic side of interrelationships of the republics. I would like to stress one thing—no one can deny any people the right to determine their own destiny. But prior to making such decisions, everything must be carefully considered, comprehensively weighed. Action cannot be taken in the heat of the moment.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Many ARGUMENTY I FAKTY readers are asking about the possibility of using the army in future crisis situations within the country.

[Gromov] I am categorically against this if the situation is related to interethnic relations. Everyone should mind his own business.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Should the minister of defense be a member of the CPSU Central Committee, a member or candidate member of the Politburo?

[Gromov] If you consider the fact that the Ministry of Defense is the mainstay of sorts of the country's defensive might, this would be appropriate.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Even after repeal of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, under conditions of a multiparty system?

[Gromov] When such a system has conclusively taken shape—that will be the time to talk about it.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] A great deal is presently being said about the necessity to change the structure of the armed forces, in particular about a professional armed forces, the creation of republic units, a national guard...

[Gromov] Over five years of perestroyka we have fixed a position to some degree with respect to domestic and foreign policy. We have tackled the economy in a serious way. As far as the armed forces are concerned, considerably less attention has been devoted here, especially when we are discussing new concepts of military organization. Various authors today, not always competent, have therefore proposed all kinds of "not-quite-ripe," let us say, variants. It seems to me that we must first determine precisely where we are going and what we want. And only after this is it logical to change something.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] What do you want?

[Gromov] I want the armed forces to remain as they are. I am talking about procedures for bringing forces up to strength, extraterritorial service, etc. Secondly, we must carefully analyze all proposals "from below" and strengthen the country's defensive capability, firmly establishing it at a new qualitative level.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] There has been widespread discussion recently regarding the question of depoliticization, deideologization of the armed forces, of eliminating the institution of political officer.

[Gromov] Going back to the time of Peter I we have had, as in the majority of the armies of other countries, special organs to promote the policy of the forces governing the state. What they were called is another matter. The army cannot lie outside of politics. I believe the political organs today should remain.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Well, whose policies will they promote?

[Gromov] Those of the ruling party. I think and hope that the CPSU will remain the ruling party.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] A final question. We live in a time of rumors. The most frightening of these—other than the world coming to an end—concerns the possibility of a military coup. As a combat officer, you enjoy deserved prestige in the military—and in our society as well, it seems to us. Isn't it strange that your name has come up (in the rumors) as a member of the military capable of heading such a coup?

[Gromov] I have heard about this, and I think these rumors are being spread by people who are not very intelligent. No less than others—more perhaps—I love my native land and my people. I know the real cost of the blood of our soldiers, of any person. What kind of coup can people be talking about? I will repeat once again—this is absolutely groundless stupidity and might also be a policy promoted by certain circles for whom the armed forces under conditions of perestroyka stick in their craw.

Baltic Republics

Vilnius Radio Carries 23 Apr Council Session

Draft Budget Presented

LD2304112390

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0800 GMT on 23 April begins carrying a live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council proceedings at the Supreme Council Palace in Vilnius.

Aleksandras Abisalas takes the chair for the session.

At 0803 GMT Deputy Aloizas Sakalas takes the floor. On the initiative of Deputy Malkevicius, fund raising to help people in the conditions of the economic blockade has now began in the Supreme Council.

Following this, a letter signed by several hundred Siauliai construction workers is read out. It expresses full support for the decisions of the Supreme Council and of the democratically elected government of the republic of Lithuania.

At 0808 GMT the first item on the agenda—changing the status of the USSR people's deputies is agreed. The agenda also includes the first reading of the draft composition of the budget of the republic of Lithuania. Antiblockade measures will also be discussed at this point. Deputy Sabutis submits a report on this. He says that the prime minister is on her way home and is expected to be back tonight. She would like to have a day for the preparation of her report; therefore, on Wednesday general issues concerning the economy and antiblockade measures will be discussed. A. Brazauskas will report on the draft law on enterprises while K. Prunskiene will report on her trip abroad. Following this, joint discussion on how to overcome the blockade will be discussed.

Discussion of the first item on the agenda then begins. Some deputies are of the opinion that the changed status of the USSR people's deputies from Lithuania restricts their possibilities to work for Lithuania. The USSR people's deputies have asked to have their rights increased, such as to have the right to sit in the republican parliament and to have an advisory vote.

At 0844 GMT questions and debate on the above issue continue. Deputy Lionginas Sepetys says that the very fact that the house is discussing this issue will give the electors the impression that the delegates are out of touch with the reality.

Deputies' Status Debated

LD2304122790

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0848 GMT on 23 April continues its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council proceedings in Vilnius. Egidijus Klumbys submits his final report on the issue of changing of the status of the USSR people's deputies. The deputies arrived at the conclusion that this draft amendment to the law on the status of the USSR people's deputies should be improved.

At 0904 GMT a report on the draft regulation of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania is made by Deputy Aurimas Kondrotas.

At 0915 GMT questions to Kundrotas are submitted.

At 0925 GMT an unidentified representative of the Azerbaijan people's front took the floor to make an address in Russian to the people of Lithuania.

At 0935 GMT a message of sympathy is read for Zigmas Vaisvila who is in hospital after the injury he sustained when he was attacked by servicemen in the Press Palace on 22 April. The message says:

"We believe that physical violence used against you, a deputy of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania, will strengthen the resolution of the Lithuanian deputies at all levels as well as other officials of Lithuania to defend the independence of Lithuania unanimously."

At 0938 GMT Vytautas Landsbergis makes a report.

At 1015 GMT Landsbergis concludes his report. Deputy Vilkas protests against giving the floor to A. Terleckas, chairman of the Lithuanian League of Liberty. After a vote Terleckas is allowed to speak.

He says that some deputies are working against the decisions of the Supreme Council and attempting to damage the authority of the chairman of the Supreme Council.

The debate on the issue becomes heated with Deputy Antanaitis accusing A. Terleckas of starting a witchhunt. He says that this will damage the cause.

At 1027 GMT Doctor Butkevicius reports on his visit to the hospital to see Z. Vaisvila, who has a concussion and injuries to the body. He will have to stay in hospital for about three or four weeks. Criminal proceedings have been instituted. There are witnesses who saw how this happened.

At 1033 GMT the session is adjourned until 1200 GMT.

Draft Budget Debated

LD2304144890

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1200 GMT on 23 April resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council proceedings in Vilnius.

A. Abisalas reminded the house that the following items will be discussed during the afternoon: composition of the budget, draft law on compensation for repressed persons under the Soviet regime, and setting up an antiblockade commission.

Following this a statement made by the Vilnius City Self-Governing Council giving its full support to the present government and to its decisions.

At 1205 GMT Deputy Audrius Rudys begins his report on the draft composition of the republic's budget.

At 1212 GMT debates of the draft begins. Deputies speak about the possible sources of revenue for the budget, and the principles of taxation. The debates last until 1310 GMT. Following this, the draft decision of the Supreme Council on persons repressed by the Soviet regime is presented.

At 1421 GMT the first reading of both documents is concluded. A vote is taken on the first readings. It is decided to use these documents as a basis and that commissions will carry on working on them.

The schedule for the 24 April session is announced: At 1200 GMT a short plenary session will be held. On 25 April a plenary session on the economic blockade will start at 0700 GMT.

At 1425 GMT the session ends.

Supreme Council Views USSR Deputies' Role

LD2304175390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1636 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius, 23 Apr—TASS correspondent reports:

The session of the Lithuanian Supreme Council has continued its work in the republican capital.

During stormy debates the deputies discussed the new status of the USSR people's deputies from Lithuania who have set aside their authority. In the view of members of the parliament, they cannot now work in the supreme legislative organ of "a neighboring state." There were many proposals. Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania, proposed defining former USSR people's deputies as advisers to the Lithuanian Supreme Council. However, the deputies did not adopt a final decision. Examination of this matter was postponed for an indefinite period.

Draft standing orders for the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania were submitted for examination by the members of the Supreme Council. It specifies general provisions on the nature of the work of the Lithuanian Supreme Council and defines the functions of its structures.

The draft of a law of the Lithuanian republic "on restoring the rights of individuals subjected to repression for resisting occupation regimes" was also examined. According to this document resisting "occupation regimes" is a menifestation of the people's will.

Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, delivered a roundup of information on the situation in Lithuania.

The session continued its work.

Prunskiene Views Scandanavian Aid-Seeking Trip

LD2404084590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0754 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius, 24 Apr (TASS)—Kazimiera Prunskiene, chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, said today that one of the main aims of her trip abroad was to obtain aid from other countries and to have them define "a strict and precise position with regard to the USSR."

Back in Lithuania from her trip to Norway, Denmark, and Sweden; Kazimiera Prunskiene addressed a press conference in Vilnius last night. She told journalists of the "immense interest" which greeted her abroad and of the readiness of foreign countries to provide Lithuania with political and economic aid. In doing so Kazimiera Prunskiene said that "the Lithuanian problem is a test for the whole world."

The head of the Lithuanian government noted that during her trip she considered different versions of cooperation with other countries. At the same time she stubbornly declined to answer questions related to specific possibilities for obtaining aid from abroad, citing "commercial, business and political confidentiality."

In essence, the only form of possible cooperation named by the premier was an offer by one country to help in training specialists.

In reply to a question on the possibility of using the gold placed in foreign banks by the Lithuanian government before the establishment of Soviet power in the republic to purchase oil, Prunskiene said, "that is too specific a matter and one that needs to mature."

She again voiced a readiness for talks with Moscow.

More on Trip

LD2304224390 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] The visit of Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene and Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas to the Scandinavian countries has ended today. A press conference was arranged at the International Sheremetyevo Airport immediately after the plane from Stockholm landed in Moscow.

Late this evening Kazimiera Prunskiene and Algirdas Saudargas met with journalists in Vilnius. Kazimiera Prunskiene assessed their visit to the Scandinavian countries as successful during which the possibility to purchase oil and other raw materials from private firms was discussed. Mrs. Prunskiene said that a bank account had been opened abroad for Lithuania's cause of independence. The first to make a generous $100,000 donation was the European Investment Bank.

Mrs. Prunskiene also accused the Soviet Government for putting up various obstacles in Lithuania's contacts with the West. Soviet authorities have refused to issue exit visas to several official figures of Lithuania for a planned visit to the United States and Canada. It is highly probable that this visit will take place only after the superpower meeting at the end of May, said Lithuanian Prime Minister Mrs. Kazimiera Prunskiene.

Prunskiene Interviewed on Negotiation for Oil

PM2304091290 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 19 Apr 90 p 14

[Report on 18 April interview with Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene by Torbjorn Faerovik: ""We Will Not Be Cowed""]

[Text] Stockholm—"We stand firm. There can be no suggestion of entering into negotiations about our independence with the Soviet Union," Lithuania's woman prime minister, Kazimiera Prunskiene, told ARBEIDERBLADET.

Yesterday evening Prime Minister Prunskiene and Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas began a four-day unofficial visit to Norway. The two Lithuanian representatives took off from Moscow after taking part in the debate earlier in the day in the Lithuanian national assembly on the crisis in relations with the Soviet leadership.

"We are optimists and will not be cowed. Time is on our side, not on that of the Soviet leadership. In the final analysis the Soviet leadership's problems are at least as great as ours," Prunskiene said.

According to Prunskiene, the ball is now in the Soviet Union's court, after the Lithuanian government and national assembly declared Monday that they are willing to begin negotiations on some of the Soviet demands. The Lithuanians have said, for example, that they are willing to negotiate on the continued participation of Lithuanian soldiers in the Soviet Army and to postpone plans to take over the Soviet enterprises in the republic.

The prime minister said that there is now a possibility of a real democratization in the Soviet Union, which could also lead to the Kremlin's recognizing Lithuania as an independent state. She pointed out that in July the CPSU will hold an important—possibly crucial—congress. It is well known that the mass of Communist Party members are pulling in several directions, and there is no guarantee that the party will survive the congress as a united monolithic party.

Foreign Minister Saudargas told ARBEIDERBLADET that Lithuania wants to send a delegation to Moscow as soon as possible to negotiate with the Soviet leadership. "Even though we have not yet received a reply to this offer, we are confident that they will accept it in the end," he said.

Prunskiene and Saudargas have been invited to Norway by the three government parties, who want to form a clearer picture of the situation in Lithuania since the republic's declaration of independence last month.

"We value this invitation greatly and are looking forward to getting to know Norwegian parliamentarians and government members better," the Lithuanian prime minister said. "I dare not say anything about what concrete results the visit could produce. But we gained the impression that the Norwegian authorities and oil companies could be willing to negotiate with us on the sale of oil. In the situation in which we now find ourselves, possible future oil deliveries from Norway would be a very great help."

Prunskiene does not think that the Soviet authorities would try to stop possible future Norwegian oil supplies. "The Soviet leadership also needs stability in the Baltic region, not least because of the important naval base in Kaliningrad," she said.

The Lithuanian prime minister does not entirely rule out the possibility that the Soviet leadership will introduce a state of emergency in the republic. But she regards the possibility as very small. "I believe that the Soviet leaders will, first and foremost, try to fight us using economic, not military, means," she said. She pointed to the fact that, despite isolated minor shows of strength, Soviet soldiers in Lithuania have taken no action. Nor are there any signs that new Soviet troops are on their way to Lithuania. [passage omitted]

Commission for Coordinating Supplies on Blockade

Delays in Payment Viewed

LD2304143990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1107 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Excerpt] [Presenter] Now I shall ask Bronius Buinevicius, secretary of the republican commission for coordinating the supply of fuel and other economic resources, to give a fuller picture of the situation.

[Buinevicius] According to our information, a total blockade on the supply of goods—all goods—to the republic is in effect. This applies to all goods, food products, materials, raw materials, and so on. We have already discussed at government level measures to be taken by the republic. These measures cannot be described as retaliatory. But they are motivated by the following circumstances. Goods are not being delivered to the republic. We are not being paid for goods which our enterprises have already supplied under contract to customers in other Union republics. Furthermore, all our bills and invoices are now being handled centrally by the Union. The correspondence goes to the USSR State Bank, which is not settling the accounts. Maybe—

clearly, they are deliberately blocking these accounts. It is taking between four to six weeks, even, for consignors to receive payment for goods which we have received. And we are not being paid either. These delays in payment also affect the dispatch of goods to customers.

Therefore, we have already been compelled to stop sending goods to our customers because financial settlement for these goods is not subsequently being made.

Evidently, you know that yesterday the republic's government sent a telegram to esteemed Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. The telegram says that since the Soviet side has reduced supplies of natural gas and stopped supplying oil, other feedstock and materials, the government of the republic of Lithuania was obliged put the national economy on a special footing, as of 19 April 1990. The further continuation of the economic blockade will inevitably lead very soon to a complete halting of work at a substantial proportion of industrial enterprises in the republic and, therefore, to a complete halt in the delivery of a whole range of goods and articles produced by them. [passage omitted]

Rationing of Gas Viewed

LD2304184790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1107 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Excerpts] [Unidentified correspondent] Let us return to the economic situation in Lithuania. The republican commission coordinating the supply of fuel and other economic resources held another meeting this morning.

I met two advisers, Bronislavas Virgauskas and Bronius Buinevicius. So, let us hear about the latest economic sanctions.

[Begin recording] [Virgauskas] [passage omitted] Today, for example, we learned for the first time that apatites have not been loaded for the Kedainiai chemical factory for the last three days.

[Correspondent] From the Kola peninsula?

[Virgauskas] From the Kola peninsula. The suppliers are willing. Relations between the partners are good. But the railways are not accepting the goods. Either they do not accept the goods or the goods bypass us, on their way to other destinations. This applies to various products, including import products. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] What specific steps are being taken? I, for example, know that somehow or other one of the military units based at Karmelava is managing to take gas without authorization. Serious complaints are being made to the Panevezys screens plant, which is also consuming gas. Generally speaking, there are substantially more instances of this today.

[Virgauskas] The gas question is very serious. Gas is being rationed. As the press reported, we are receiving only 16 percent of our normal daily gas supply. Just imagine. This 16 percent is the minimum level at which the gas pipeline can operate. Gas supply workers have been instructed to cut off the supply to those who violate regulations. [passage omitted]

I wish to stress once again that the offenders, those who draw off more gas than they should, are committing very, well, I would even say, perhaps, that they are committing sabotage. The fact is that the whole system could break down as a result of this behavior. Therefore, very strict control is being exercised. Those who draw off more than they should will have their supply cut off altogether.

[Correspondent] I have the following obvious question. What about the population? The people need food. People are now buying large quantities of produce of various kinds. Are their actions justified?

[Virgauskas] I do not think so. At the moment we are not yet experiencing any complications in the supply of foodstuffs. All the enterprises are working. We are tackling the question of energy supplies and the supply of other resources. Therefore, I think those who are buying up are making a mistake. It will be very difficult to preserve this produce. The republic's government is now seeking a political solution to this problem. After all, it cannot go on forever. Everything is being done to ensure the population does not suffer. As you know, certain restrictions have been introduced on gasoline, but I do not think that the situation here is particularly acute. One can say the food industry enterprises are working normally at the moment. [end recording]

Lithuanian Officials Interviewed on Oil Cut

LD1904215590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1700 GMT on 19 April in its "Vremya" newscast carries a three-minute video report by correspondent A. Shashkov from Lithuania.

Shashkov begins: "Yesterday the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet adopted a reply and decisions regarding the letter from the president and prime minister of the USSR. The main demands contained in that letter have not been met; and today it became known in Lithuania that deliveries of oil to Mazeikiai Oil Refinery have been stopped and gas deliveries cut to 15 percent of previous levels."

Shashkov continues stating that there are lines at petrol pumps. He notes that Prunskiene is away in Denmark and the other leaders were all at the Council of Ministers session, so none of the economic leaders were available for interview. Strict limits on domestic heating have been proposed.

Shashkov then interviews three other Lithuanian figures, identified by screen captions.

His first interview is with Academician E. Eduardov, Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputy and member of the Independent Communist Party of Lithuania. Eduardov says that it can be expected that "the economy will be destroyed to a large extent." First to be hit will be branches such as the chemical industry and building materials, where power consumption is high. These are Union industries, and "certain political difficulties" are likely to follow.

Shashkov then interviews V.N. Shved, second secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee, who says that the problem of changing economic relations is not new: "In fact, during Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to Lithuania in January, this very thing was discussed—namely, the fact that if Lithuania secedes from the Union, then naturally the character of economic relations will change."

Lastly Shashkov interviews Professor A. Kazimeras, Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputy and member of the Sejm of Sajudis. He expresses the hope that friendly contacts with the other republics can expand, but on a mutually beneficial basis.

At the end of the "Vremya" newscast the following correction is announced: "We must apologize for the fact that, because of poor audibility, there were mistakes in the subtitles of the first item from Lithuania. Our correspondent's first interview was with Vilkas; the second was with Shved, and the third with Antonjavicius."

USSR Deputy Interviewed on Economic Blockade

AU2104173990 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 18 Apr 90 pp 1,9

[PRAVDA correspondent Vladimir Jancura report on an interview with Nikolay Medvedev, USSR people's deputy from Lithuania, in Moscow on 17 April: "Vilnius Is Uncertain About Its Own Situation"]

[Excerpts] Vladimir Jancura, our Moscow correspondent, spoke yesterday to Nikolay Medvedev, USSR people's deputy, who is one of the few official representatives of Lithuania to still remain in the Soviet capital—in the interest of maintaining political contacts between Vilnius and Moscow.

N. Medvedev believes that "the USSR president does not have capable advisers on ethnic problems. Otherwise, it would not be possible," he continued, "for the president to send a message to the Lithuanian parliament and government containing an ultimatum on the eve of Easter holidays. It could not but evoke public indignation in our republic."

Even the Lithuanian leadership were caught unawares by this action. They expected that the warning of an economic blockade would be preceded by discussions about new prices of fuel, raw materials, and other materials supplied by the other union republics. The [Lithuanian] government finds numerous details of the message to be very obscure. What will the economic sanctions actually pertain to? After all, anything from matches to airplanes can be sold for freely convertible currency. Therefore, a telegram signed by the Lithuanian premier contains a suggestion to Moscow to immediately open talks on these specific issues. In this telegram Kazimiera Prunskiene draws the attention of the highest Soviet representatives to the fact that stopping important supplies to Lithuania may threaten the interests of the entire USSR. After all, gasoline, plastic materials, and fertilizers produced in Lithuania from Soviet oil, gas, and other raw materials are exported not only to the whole Soviet Union, but abroad as well.

What would such a suspension of supplies mean to Lithuania itself? There is enough fuel to last the farmers for 60 to 70 days, gasoline for individual motorists would suffice for a month at the most. An interruption in the supply of gas would cause the chemical industry to suspend production within a few days. Several Lithuanian power stations will be threatened by the cessation of the mazut supply. This, however, would reflect on the power supply system of the entire northwest USSR.

Vilnius ordered all Lithuanian companies to fulfill all their contractual obligations until the situation is clarified. No economic consequences of a blockade are being felt so far. Still last night the parliament was unable to agree on the final text of the response to the USSR president and premier. Some deputies suggested giving up certain legislative decisions adopted after 11 March of this year, others consider this to be a surrender.

According to N. Medvedev, the official answer from Vilnius to Moscow will not arrive before today. [passage omitted]

N. Medvedev confirmed yesterday [17 April] to the CTK correspondent that since yesterday the relevant Soviet organizations have been sharply reducing supplies of natural gas to Lithuania. The Lithuanian government will attempt to deal with this situation by lowering the consumption of gas in the republic. "Lithuania will not suffer alone, the neighboring republics will bear the consequences as well," indicated the Lithuanian representative. He recalled that the Lithuanian companies processing raw materials from the USSR supply Latvia, Estonia, and Belorussia with their products as well as exporting them. Reduction in their production will be reflected in the total trade balance of the USSR. This concerns mostly products made from oil, fertilizers, and plastics. [passage omitted]

Sajudis Delegate Appeals for 'Blockade Fund'

LD2404093990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1239 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Remarks by delegate Stasys Malkevicius at Second Sajudis Congress in the Sports Palace, Vilnius—live relay]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Of course, if the supply of fuel and raw materials is blocked for a prolonged period of time there will be thousands of unemployed in Lithuania. This is dangerous. But more than 1 million people will continue working. I think that for us, for those who will have employment, it will not be too difficult to give up a certain percent of our earnings to the blockade fund, which parliament intends to set up, so that people who do not work will also have wages. I donate my first salary as a deputy to this fund and will give 10 percent of my monthly salary for this purpose. [applause]

I ask everyone to join me, each according to his ability. [passage omitted]

Western Comment on Lithuania Cutoff Viewed

PM2104170390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA Press Service report: "Situation in Lithuania Continues to Evoke Widespread Response in World"]

[Text] At a joint Florida press conference with French President F. Mitterrand, U.S. President George Bush stated his "profound concern about recent Soviet statements and actions on Lithuania." He stressed that the problem must be resolved through dialogue in order to ensure the realization of the Lithuanian people's right to self-determination.

Danish Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen, speaking in Copenhagen, also touched on the Soviet-Lithuanian conflict. "We are all interested," he said, "in continuing the political and economic rapprochement between the USSR and the EEC. However, if the Soviet Union seriously carries out its threats against Lithuania, this rapprochement will not happen."

AFP reports from Stockholm that Dmitriy Vasilyev, Soviet charge d'affaires in Sweden, has been summoned to the Swedish Foreign Ministry. A ministry spokesman stated that his country is opposed to economic sanctions and other discriminatory measures being imposed on Lithuania by Moscow. He also expressed regret over the Soviet authorities' refusal to issue a Swedish cultural delegation with entry visas to Lithuania.

It has become known that it is planned to hold an emergency session of the Swedish Parliament's International Affairs Committee Friday on the Lithuania situation. After consulting with the opposition parties Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson has sent Kazimiera Prunskiene, head of the Lithuanian Government, an invitation to visit Sweden.

Meanwhile, Prunskiene, together with Lithuanian Foreign Minister A. Saudargas, is in Norway at the invitation of the three government coalition parties. In Prunskiene's words, one of the main aims of the visit is to study the opportunities for Lithuania to purchase Norwegian oil. REUTERS reports that a representative of the Norwegian state company Statoil announced Friday morning that it was prepared to supply the Baltic republic with oil, but only at market prices.

Local observers believe that there should be no political complications with Moscow in this instance. Justifying this opinion, Norway's NTB agency cites the statement by Aleksandr Teterin, Soviet ambassador in Oslo. As he put it, the Soviet Government will not prevent the Baltic republics from obtaining oil or gas from abroad: "The economic reform under way in the country stipulates that each republic is entitled to solve its economic problems independently."

Assessing the possible results of an economic blockade, Britain's THE INDEPENDENT newspaper notes that "in the event of oil and gas shipments to Lithuania being stopped, Kaliningrad—which is part of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] but separated from it by Lithuanian territory—would suffer too. The city would be a kind of territorial hostage in a conflict between Vilnius and Moscow."

The GDR press is devoting great attention to the situation in Lithuania. It seems that the time for verbal battles is over and that gloomy prospects lie ahead for Lithuanian industry, since its enterprises can last no more than two weeks on existing stocks of oil, gas, metals, and timber, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND writes.

DER MORGEN notes that "the current development of events does not accord with previous statements from the Soviet president, who has always advocated detente instead of confrontation. An escalation of the conflict could have serious consequences. The Lithuanian issue is already casting a shadow over the Soviet-U.S. summit. A deterioration in East-West relations because of Lithuania would be too high a price to pay. On this basis, people are expecting good sense and realism from the Lithuanian leadership. The Estonians and Latvians are setting their neighbors an example and adopting a calmer tone toward Moscow."

A detailed UPI commentary is devoted to the economic aspects of the problem: "As power industry specialists have noted, the Soviet Union has made a careful decision to cut off supplies to Lithuania of indispensable Soviet natural gas, rather than just oil—which can be imported from the West. Since the gas pipelines run from East to West, the West can do little. Natural gas is the only type of fuel that cannot be replaced by resources from outside."

"There is still a possible way out of the crisis," an editorial in THE WASHINGTON POST notes. "Despite their tough talking, the Lithuanian leaders and President Gorbachev are trying to find ways to settle their differences. And President Bush is continuing, insofar as he can, to encourage them to seek a political solution."

USSR Blocks Delegation's Entry Into Lithuania

LD2104205890 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2000 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Report by Moscow reporter Gabor Izbeki]

[Text] Let us turn to the Sajudis Congress, to which several Hungarian parliamentary parties have been sent, or to be more exact, would like to have been sent delegations. We know about the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Federation of Young Democrats [Fidesz]. Viktor Orban, leader of the Fidesz delegation, told our Moscow reporter Gabor Izbeki how he did not get to Lithuania: [Begin recording] [Orban] The Fidesz parliamentary faction received an invitation from the Sajudis people's front movement to take part in this weekend's Sajudis congress. In accordance with this, we announced our intention to do this at the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, and we asked to be informed in writing if we could go. We were informed that we could go, but that they were not the ones to issue the permit relating to this. Since we would be there as the delegation of an official parliamentary faction—as a consequence we have the right to travel—we would have to have our letter of invitation endorsed by the leading official of the National Assembly. This was done, so our papers were in order.

In Moscow, when we arrived at Sheremetevo Airport, border guards first of all wanted to put us unceremoniously back on the plane. We did not give way, and said we would be willing to return only if they set it out in writing that we are being expelled from the territory of the Soviet Union. This they were not willing to do.

After this, by virtue of the mediation of Malev [Hungarian airlines] officials, we were able to get in touch with the ambassador, and the ambasador was able to get an official reply to the effect that since a presidential decree bans entry into Lithuania's territory, we may by no means travel there. However, as guests of the embassy, we may stay here for one day if the ambassador undertakes that we will not travel on to Lithuania's territory.

[Izbeki] Did the Soviet side say anything else in connection with the refusal? In other words, does this refusal apply to the Fidesz delegation, or did they say that one can not go to Vilnius now at all?

[Orban] The Soviet side officialy informed us that entry has been prohibited by presidential decree. The personal effect of the presidential decree extends to every delegation. They particularly asked that we not regard this measure as an unfriendly step aimed against Hungary because they are not allowing any delegation of any nation into Lithuania. [end recording]

Landsbergis Interviewed on USSR Relations

TA2004130990 Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew 20 Apr 90 p 9

["Special" interview with Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis by Yitzhaq Mars; date and place not given]

[Text] [Mars] Does Lithuania have a contingency or austerity plan?

[Landsbergis] Certainly, though I would not like to go into detail right now. In the long term, we would like to establish direct relations with USSR republics and cities.

[Mars] Has anyone shown initiative in this direction?

[Landsbergis] Only yesterday a delegation from Leningrad arrived. The Leningrad Soviet has set up a special committee for ties with Lithuania. We are very interested in contacts with the West.

[Mars] Could you establish direct relations with Azerbaijan and purchase oil from it?

[Landsbergis] The government of Azerbaijan has not yet opened such talks with us because elections have not yet been held there. But the local popular front supports Lithuania.

[Mars] Is it true that Norway has offered you oil?

[Landsbergis] Yes, but other elements did as well. We hope we can obtain credit to purchase oil.

[Mars] Has the supply of oil been cut off?

[Landsbergis] Two days ago at night. The Soviet Union is also hurting itself because its economy is closely tied to Lithuania's. Lithuanian oil products reach Latvia and other places and our electrical grid is connected to the Baltic states and Belorussia. Our industry manufactures many items required in plants throughout the USSR. If we do not produce, they too will be affected.

[Mars] Has the Lithuanian parliament passed a resolution on Gorbachev and Ryzhkov's ultimatum?

[Landsbergis] Yes, we sent them a cable.

[Mars] What is the mood in the streets?

[Landsbergis] People call and send letters, entreating us not to surrender. The Soviets simply want to starve us to death. We feel like a fortress under siege. Moscow wants an internal conflict—political and social—to start here, so that people will begin to say that we should have gone back to abide by the master's wish.

[Mars] Are you doing anything to bring your positions and Moscow's closer?

[Landsbergis] The Lithuanian parliament has passed a resolution that no new legislation will be promulgated in Lithuania until 1 May. We are also discussing the possibility of going back to the 1939 agreement (regarding an independent Lithuania with Red Army bases on its soil). We would like a delegation headed by my deputy to be received in Moscow for preliminary discussions.

Nordic Ministers Urge Moscow-Vilnius Talks

LD2304102190 Moscow TASS in English 1013 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Copenhagen April 23 TASS—The foreign ministers of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and two foreign ministry directors from Finland and Iceland had an unofficial meeting in the Danish capital on Sunday to discuss Lithuania.

The idea to hold such a meeting was proposed by Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen who deemed it necessary to exchange views in the light of the Lithuanian government delegation's talks in Norway and Denmark and the discussion of the Lithuanian situation at the European Community meeting in Dublin.

At a post-meeting news conference Ellemann-Jensen said participants did not have time to prepare a joint political statement owing to various perceptions of world developments.

Nevertheless, he emphasized, a number of basic principles were coordinated. He said everyone follows developments in Lithuania with deep concern and urged the start of talks between Moscow and Vilnius as soon as possible.

Such talks would make it possible to grant independence to Lithuania in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki final act. Any threats or violence may only aggravate the situation. The use of threats or violence should be renounced, Ellemann-Jensen said.

The question of launching talks between Lithuania and the Soviet Union as soon as possible concerns not only the situation in and around Lithuania. It would be also an important guarantee of the continuation of the positive development of East-West relations, he added.

"We did not discuss deliveries or attempts to break the blockade or the application of sanctions against the Soviet Union," Ellemann- Jensen said.

"This was not requested by the Lithuanians. They are irritated by reports that they want oil and immediate assistance in breaking the blockade.

"It turns out that they cannot receive this, since this is practically impossible to do. This is made use of by Moscow to give the impression they are being refused assistance.

"Therefore we discussed our actions as of the day when the situation comes back to normal, and considered directions of our assistance in creating a pluralistic market-oriented society."

Azeri Front Backs Lithuania's Struggle

LD2304113190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0925 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Address by unidentified member of the Azerbaijan People's Front to the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius; in Russian—live]

[Excerpts] Esteemed deputies of the parliament of independent Lithuania, I am happy that I have been given the opportunity to greet you on behalf of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan, and on behalf of the entire Azerbaijani people on the occasion of the restoration of the state of independence of Lithuania. I consider—and this is the view of the entire Azerbaijani people—that this event is of extraordinary political and historical significance for the fates of all peoples of our empire which is living through its last days, for all peoples who have embarked on the path of achieving their independence. The state independence of Lithuania is the first stone which has succeeded in breaking lose from the crumbling foundations of that empire, and we wish you, the pioneers of that movement, courage in your struggle, and we hope that despite all the difficulties, you will emerge with honour from that struggle. [passage omitted]

The Popular Front of Azerbaijan has prepared a whole package of demands concerning Lithuania for the next session of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic. These demands are, first, to recognise the state independence of the Lithuanian Republic and immediately start negotiations with independent Lithuania for signing mutually advantageous economic and political treaties. Second, to issue an address and an appropriate decision of the Supreme Soviet to the effect that Azerbaijan does not have any political or economic demands or claims against independent Lithuania. Also, the Popular Front of Azerbaijan has decided on a preliminary agreement to organize—in principle we have agreed to organize—state representation at the level of public organizations with independent Lithuania, that is, there will be representation in Baku, and there will be representation of Azerbaijan in Lithuania.

Apart from that, the Popular Front of Azerbaijan has adopted an address to citizens of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic who are serving in the Soviet Army on the territory of Lithuania. The address says that the Lithuanian people have been the first fighters for state independence of all the republics of this empire, and therefore we call on our citizens serving in Lithuania not to take part in any actions of violence against the Lithuanian state and the Lithuanian people.

And all this is despite the fact that in Azerbaijan there is now a state of emergency. The Soviet Army is completely on the rampage; in particular their main aim is to destroy the Popular Front of Azerbaijan, which had been ready to take power in Azerbaijan by democratic parliamentary means, by means of elections. Azerbaijan is the only republic where there has still not been a law on elections and where a date for elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic has not been set. The aim is the same, to destroy the Popular Front of Azerbaijan and to suppress the popular movement. But despite such difficult conditions, the Popular Front of Azerbaijan will seek specific methods of helping the Lithuanian people in their struggle in these difficult economic conditions, and I want to hope, and I want to tell you on behalf of the Popular Front that all of us are confident that the Lithuanian people, despite the deprivations and difficulties awaiting them, will emerge as victors with honor and courage from this struggle, and in this struggle we will aid them in all possible ways. As our founder of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan (Nanadamin Rasul-zade) said, the flag of liberty, once raised, is never lowered. I wish you speedy victory in your struggle. [applause]

Gorbachev Popularity Waning in Lithuania Poll

LD2004222190 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2200 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, Apr 20 (TANJUG)—A huge majority of Lithuanians would vote for their republic's independence outside the Soviet Union, and their most popular personality is Vice-Premier Algirdas Brazauskas—say the results published tonight from a public poll that was conducted by the Vilnius Institute for Sociological Studies.

Lithuania's future outside the Soviet Union was seen by 79 per cent of the questioned. The number of Russian population favouring secession was doubled on the previous poll result in February when 14 per cent favoured the said option. There are also Lithuanians who are against secession, but their number amounts to one per cent.

The first three most popular personalities in the poll are: Vice- Premier Brazauskas (93 per cent as against 89 per cent in February), Pope John Paul II, and Parliament Speaker Landsbergis.

Gorbachev now won 24 per cent compared to 70 per cent of the votes in February, going down from the third to the tenth place.

Yeltsin on Lithuania, Strength of Ligachev Group

LD2104223190 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 2200 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] The reformist deputy Boris Yeltsin, who is preparing his candidature for the presidency of the Russian Federation, has said in an interview granted to Television Espanola that a less tough line should have been used regarding Lithuania.

[Second announcer] According to Yeltsin, Lithuania should have given way too and should have annulled several laws in the separatist package. For Yeltsin the situation will cause much suffering among the population. The reformist Yeltsin thinks the orthodox communists of Ligachev's group have recently become stronger. In the same interview the Soviet deputy said that in the USSR between 40 and 50 million inhabitants live below the poverty line.

Lenin Monument Unveiled at Kaunas Enterprise

PM2304093790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Major N. Lapin: "Monument to Leader Unveiled"]

[Text] The day before yesterday a monument to V.I. Lenin was unveiled on the territory of the military repair enterprise in Kaunas. It was in honor of the 120th anniversary of his birth.

The unveiling ceremony was attended by M. Dvarionas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU Platform) Gorkom [City Party Committee], and M. Kachanov, member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Gorkom Bureau and chairman of the city's War and Labor Veterans Council. Party veteran G. Bogatyrev and other comrades spoke.

Flowers presented by teams and shops at the enterprise and by war and labor veterans were laid at the foot of the monument, which has been erected out of the enterprise's own funds.

The unveiling ceremony was attended by workers at the repair enterprise, representatives of the city's public, and local residents.

Report on Lithuanian Trade Union Congress

PM2104165390 Moscow TRUD in Russian 21 Apr 90 p 4

[Special correspondents F. Yemchenko and G. Konchyus report: "Is It Necessary To Be in Such a Hurry? Lithuanian Trade Union Congress"]

[Text] Vilnius—On the eve of the congress the three cochairman of the Lithuanian Trade Union Movement Coordinating Committee held a press conference. Talking about the forthcoming congress' tasks, one of them—L. Radzyavichyus—stressed that it is necessary to shape in an organized fashion the new structures which have emerged as a result of the changes within the trade union movement itself, the state system, and the disposition of political forces in the republic. A confederation must be set up which could include all free trade unions...

It must be said that the nice word "free" has been used quite extensively in all declarations here this year. Although, as we noted, there are a considerable number of people—both ordinary trade union members and congress delegates—who still cannot understand just what trade unions should be free from.

One of the speakers at the plenum asked the presidium directly for an explanation: Just what do free trade unions mean, and does any other kind exist? However, it seems to us that the explanation in this case was superficial. Since the current leaders of the Lithuanian trade union movement are proposing to join the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), they think it necessary for their "home" unions to have this description in their titles.

The congress was opened by A. Kayris, one of the cochairmen of the coordinating committee. Before embarking on procedural questions, he proposed that delegates vote on two points of the future congress resolution. What were these? On the status of a confederation of free Lithuanian trade unions. And on the congress' disbanding the former republic trade union council apparatus.

Attempts by certain delegates to cite the dubious legal grounds for passing such a decision before the congress' working organs have been set up were unsuccessful. Their voices were not heeded. One got the impression that the organizers of the trade union forum were in a great rush to establish that the people in the auditorium from this moment on were representatives of free trade unions, and to legalize the term.

"Yes, the beginning of the congress was rather unusual," A. Kayris agreed. "But we strove to ensure that it was officially recorded that, as of 19 April, the old USSR trade union statutes are no longer in force in the republic."

The discussion on the report by L. Radzyavichyus "On the Concept of a Confederation of Free Lithuanian Trade Unions" showed that not everyone accepted unconditionally the ideas enshrined in it.

Thus, for instance, S. Shermukshnite, a representative of the Medical Workers' Trade Union, drew attention to the fact that the authors of the concept themselves cannot say sufficiently clearly just who would be classed as employers and who as hired workers...

Yesterday's congress proceedings were devoted to a discussion of the program and statutes of confederation. After their ratification the control commission was elected, along with the chairman of the confederation of Lithuanian free trade unions and his two deputies. L. Radzyavichyus, who had previously worked as a senior lecturer at the Vilnius Faculty of the Kaunas Polytechnic Institute, was elected confederation chairman.

Lithuanian Supreme Council Appoints Ministers

Energy Minister

*90UN1449H Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
28 Mar 90 p 2*

[Decree of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania "On the Appointment of a Republic of Lithuania Minister of Energy"]

[Text] The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania **decrees:**

To appoint Leonas Asmonatas minister of power engineering of the republic of Lithuania.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania
Vilnius, 26 March 1990.

Construction Minister

*90UN1449I Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
28 Mar 90 p 2*

[Decree of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania "On the Appointment of a republic of Lithuania Minister of Construction and Urban Planning"]

[Text] The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania **decrees:**

To appoint Algimantas Nasvitis minister of construction and urban planning of the republic of Lithuania.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania
Vilnius, 26 March 1990.

Economics Minister

*90UN1487D Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
4 Apr 90 p 1*

[Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council resolution]

[Text] To appoint Vitas Navitskas minister of the economy of the republic of Lithuania.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council
Vilnius, 2 April 1990

Speaker at Sajudis Congress Censures Party

*LD2404092690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian
1226 GMT 21 Apr 90*

[Remarks by Antanas Terleckas of the Lithuanian League of Freedom, made at the Second Sajudis Congress in the Sports Palace, Vilnius—live relay]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] I have never condemned people who have joined the CPSU in the past. But in view of Moscow's political blackmail every decent member of the Lithuanian Communist Party [LCP] should leave that organization.

The LCP means the betrayal of Lithuania's interests. Many people have for some time urged the communists to give up their party membership cards. I am campaigning for this for the first time. I am campaigning having thoroughly assessed the behavior of many Lithuanian communists in parliament and in the lobby. To cooperate with the Kremlin in organizing intrigues in our parliament is a political crime. [passage omitted] The LCP is an anti-Lithuanian organization. [applause] The Lithuanian Freedom League is not against communists as persons but against the LCP as an aggressive political force. I have been asked more than once: Who today is more dangerous, the LCP or the CPSU organization in Lithuania? I used to reply that it is the LCP. It is more dangerous because, having at its disposal mass disinformation media, it has created a myth around Brazauskas and is now preparing a coup under his banner. [sounds of animation in the hall]

The great danger to the independence of Lithuania demands that this is stated briefly and clearly. Yesterday the USSR Interior Ministry attacked the print works. Those who were beaten up accused Burokevicius and Kuolelis. I think that the LCP leaders are no less guilty. The attitude of Brazauskas, Beriozovas, Stakvilevicius, Morkunas, Vilkas, and others give hope to Gorbachev that he will succeed in bringing the Lithuanian people to its knees. The abovementioned citizens obviously encourage Gorbachev's aggressive actions in Lithuania.

The Sajudis made many mistakes during the last election campaign. Therefore there are people in parliament today who intend to destroy it from the inside. I hope that the Sajudis has learned from its mistakes. Those who wish to help the Sajudis and Lithuania must leave this dishonorable organization, the LCP, an organization which is preparing to commit a terrible crime. People who wish to keep their hands clean must leave the LCP today. Long live the free and democratic Lithuanian republic. [applause]

Delegates Cited on Pro-CPSU Party Congress

LD2304103790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[Interview with V. Maksimovich, V. Dobrolyubov, S. Serzhantovich, and V. Pavlovich, delegates to 21st Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU Platform) Congress, by Captain Second Rank V. Gromak: "Lithuania: What Ideas Have Delegates Brought With Them?"]

[Text] Vilnius, 20 Apr—As already reported by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the 21st Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU Platform) Congress opens 21 April. It has been resolved to hold the congress in three stages. It will resume its work 2 June, after a recess, and then complete it after the 28th CPSU Congress.

At the current session delegates will discuss reports on the political situation in the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the Communist Party's tasks in present conditions, draw up proposals on the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th congress and the draft new party statutes, outline the Lithuanian Communist Party's action program, and elect republic Central Committee leading organs.

What ideas have delegates brought to the congress and what specific decisions do they expect? I put these questions to several delegates.

V. Maksimovich, CPSU member since 1985, until recently a worker, now secretary of the "Elfa" Production Association party committee and a member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Provisional Central Committee:

"The congress should first and foremost offer the people of Lithuania a clear future action program stating, in particular, how interethnic relations in the republic should be. People also expect clear actions to get out of the constitutional crisis. A well considered program should be drawn up on all these problems.

"Communists expect a clarification of their stances. Many of us have lost our way of late. This has been aided and abetted by the lies and slander that daily emanate from the republic press and television screens and by the psychological pressure exerted on enterprises by the administration."

V. Dobrolyubov, CPSU member since 1956 and Great Patriotic War veteran:

"I expect from the congress firm and final decisions aimed at strengthening the Lithuanian Communist Party and will be fighting to achieve this. Clear, well founded party documents reflecting the Lithuanian Communist Party's position at the upcoming 28th CPSU Congress are essential. I think that party organizations' main attention should now be concentrated on work in labor collectives and on fostering friendship among people of different nationalities."

S. Serzhantovich, CPSU member since 1967 and machine operator on Vilnyusskiy Rayon's "Pyargale" Kolkhoz:

"We are faced with a host of difficulties and unsolved problems. The most acute problem is unity of ranks. Not all party organizations have managed yet to recover from the state of shock caused by the split in the Lithuanian Communist Party. Many Communists have lost hope in the force of the party's word and see no way out of the current state of crisis. It is not difficult to guess the outcome. There were 54 Communists in our primary party organization. Eight have recently left the party and several more are intending to hand in their resignations.

"How are negative trends to be halted? The party should become an organizing force capable of uniting all the republic's progressive forces in a single movement."

V. Pavlovich, CPSU member since 1965 and fitter at the "Vilma" production association:

"I hope that after the congress our Central Committee will finally cease to be provisional. We need to show to the republic those who have remained true to the Leninist party's traditions and ideals and those who are using the term communist as a kind of cover. I am thinking here of our opponents from the independent Lithuanian Communist Party.

"Communists' strength has always lain in their unity and ability to find sensible decisions that are mutually acceptable to all people."

Party Congress Criticizes Separatist Moves

PM2304103390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[TASS report: "For a Humane Socialist Society"]

[Text] Vilnius, 22 Apr—The Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU Platform) Congress began its work here Saturday [21 April]. M. Burokevicius, first secretary of the Provisional Central Committee, delivered a report at the forum.

The speaker said that the congress, held in the year of the 120th anniversary of Lenin's birth, is proceeding in complex conditions: A split has developed within the ranks of communists, the sociopolitical situation has been exacerbated, and there is a threat to the socialist orientation of the republic's development.

In order to overcome the crisis situation in Lithuania, in the opinion of congress participants, it is necessary to solve the question of satisfying the daily needs of the republic's population and supplying people with housing and consumer goods. This, in its turn, requires primarily the preservation and strengthening of Soviet power in the republic, of the socialist statehood of Lithuania and of the entire Soviet Union as a federal state. This is actually the most important and paramount task of the republic's communists.

Addressing the congress, A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, noted that the CPSU Central Committee is well aware of the conditions in which Lithuania's communists, who have remained loyal to the CPSU's ideals and principles, have to operate. He dwelled especially on the question of Lithuania's sovereignty and independence. This is a crucial question today, it has penetrated all spheres of social and individual awareness, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee noted. The party, he said, by taking a resolute stand against all attempts to destroy the Union and split the CPSU along nationality lines, affirms its commitment to the nations' right to self-determination.

Calls for the resignation of V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet, and of K. Prunskiene, chairman of the Council of Ministers, were issued from the congress rostrum. Speaking about the way out of the prevailing crisis, many deputies advocated the introduction of presidential rule in the republic.

The resolution "On the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress" specifically says that the separatist and splittist activity by leaders of the reorganized Lithuanian Communist Party has presented a real threat to the very existence of a Leninist-type Communist Party in Lithuania.

The congress resolutely condemned the stand of those who are sliding toward nationalism beneath the banner of patriotism and are actually turning the party's reorganization into its liquidation, and it categorically rejected attempts to charge communists with betrayal of the Lithuanian people's interests.

The congress also adopted a resolution "On the Political Situation in the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]." It notes in particular that tension in the sociopolitical situation in the republic has reached a point beyond which the processes occurring within society could get out of control. The unilateral anticonstitutional actions by the republic's present leadership, aimed at Lithuania's break away from the USSR, preconditioned a profound political crisis. The USSR Constitution and the Lithuanian SSR Constitution have been repealed in the republic.

The leadership of the reorganized Lithuanian Communist Party has no desire to uphold the people's genuine interests and their social gains. In essence, it is promoting the incipient revival of the capitalist order in Lithuania today.

The congress declared on behalf of Lithuania's Leninist Communist Party that the people's interests are its interests, and it will continue to struggle by all possible means against those who are prepared to exploit the Lithuanian people's trust for the sake of their nationalist-careerist goals.

With a view to an extrication from the crisis situation, the congress deems it necessary to channel communists' efforts toward strengthening the positions of Soviet power, preserving the Lithuanian people's socialist statehood, and achieving real sovereignty for the republic on the basis of a new Union Treaty. The party demands respect for our people's democratic traditions, it shares and supports the protest by voters who did not empower the republic's Supreme Soviet to make decisions ruining the future of millions of people.

The congress approved the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies resolution on the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet decisions, and supported the address by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev to the people of the Lithuanian SSR and the republic's Supreme Soviet demanding rigorous compliance with the USSR Constitution. The congress calls on communists to use their influence in the Supreme Soviet, in local soviets, and in public organizations to strive for a repeal of unlawful legislative and other normative acts.

The congress drew a clear dividing line between the leaders of the reorganized Lithuanian Communist Party who have switched to separatist positions and its numerous rank-and-file members who have remained loyal to the socialist ideals, and called on all communists in the republic to pool their efforts along the main avenue, overcoming existing differences by means of dialogue.

The Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU Platform) Congress, which ended late last night, changed the party's name. Its name is now Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU). Forum participants justified this decision by the fact that, being the heir of the Lithuanian Communist Party which was formed in 1918, the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) remains loyal to the Marxist-Leninist ideas.

A plenum of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) was held following the conclusion of the congress. A Central Committee Bureau was elected in the presence of delegates entitled to vote at the plenum. M. Burokevicius, a 63-years old historian, became first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee.

"Lithuania has the right to secede from the USSR, but this can happen only by lawful means," A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, declared at today's press conference on the results of the first stage of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) Congress. A.N. Girenko noted that the congress completed the self-determination of Lithuania's communists. The secretary of the CPSU Central Committee also declared that the CPSU Central Committee intends to cooperate with the independent Lithuanian Communist Party, just like with other parties. But the question of its representatives attending the 28th CPSU Congress has not yet been finally decided.

Supreme Council Sends Message on Militia Action

LD2304151490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1107 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania has adopted an appeal addressed to the interregional group of the USSR people's deputies. It reads:

At about 1230-1300 on 20 April 1990, internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, wielding guns and rubber batons, used crude force to expel officially posted volunteer guards from a publishing house in Vilnius, where magazine offices and a printing press are located. During this brutal action, 20 volunteer guards and employees of the publishing house were beaten. They included Zigmas Vaisvila, a deputy in the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania and a former USSR people's deputy whose membership has not been suspended by the Soviet parliament.

In view of this we declare that the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs violated the deputy's parliamentary immunity. Furthermore, we draw attention to the fact that the Soviet president's assurances that military force would not be used in Lithuania are not being observed. Furthermore, by imposing a tough economic blockade against the people of Lithuania, the USSR is breaking its own laws and the humanitarian principles which are generally recognized in the civilized world.
From the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

Lithuania Calls for Evidence Against Troops

LD2304143690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1107 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Let us return to the events on Maironis Street in Vilnius. Here is what ELTA reports on this today:

On 20 April 1990 the grounds and premises of the Lithuanian publishing house Spauda were invaded by officers and men belonging to a military unit of the Soviet Armed Forces, who then beat up the volunteer guards and other persons on the premises. The procuratorate of the republic of Lithuania has initiated criminal proceedings in connection with this. If those who used violence are to be punished, evidence must be gathered. Therefore, all persons who were injured during the attack or else witnessed the beatings are asked to get in touch urgently with the Procuratorate of the republic of Lithuania. [passage omitted] Otherwise they can get in touch with the Vilnius city procuratorate. [passage omitted]

Legal Proceedings Begin

LD2404114390 Vilnius International Service in English 2200 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Excerpt] The Lithuanian Procurator's Office has started legal proceedings against a Soviet military unit which took part in last Friday's incident at a printing house in Vilnius, where brutal force was used against the workers and journalists. [passage omitted]

Further Reporting on 20 Apr Press House Incident

Report by Vilnius Internal Troops

LD2204162290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] You will no doubt recall reports in the mass media about the incident in Vilnius at the building of the old publishing house of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania. Well, our correspondent requested the Command of the Internal Troops of Vilnius to provide an explanation. This is what he was told.

On 20 April, a group of people made an attempt to penetrate the premises of the publishing house. Evidently, an employee of the printing house opened the emergency exit and let a total of about 50 people on to the premises that were being guarded in accordance with a decision of the USSR Council of Ministers. As it emerged, this group was led by Vaisvila, chairman of the Standing Commission for National Defense and Internal Affairs of the Republic.

They responded to demands by the chief of the guards to leave the premises of the publishing house by refusing to do so and began to drive the servicemen away from the control post. A short while later, a reserve subunit of internal troops was summoned to the establishment to reinforce the guard. The offenders did not respond to the numerous appeals and demands to halt the disturbance and leave the premises of the publishing house. After this, the personnel of the internal troops drove the offenders out of the establishment. Weapons, rubber truncheons, and special means were not used. This is particularly stressed. The Command of Unit No. 75/74 sent special information to Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania, and Prunskiene, chairwoman of the Council of Ministers. It stated, in part, that the nature of the event, the presence of television and photo reporters, and also the instigatory calls on republic radio for citizens to come to the building of the publishing house testify to a previously planned and prepared act. The document contains a categorical protest by representatives of the Internal Troops of the USSR about such actions.

Military Paper Views Incident

PM2204180390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by special correspondent Lieutenant Colonel O. Falichev: "Provocation"]

[Text] Vilnius, 20 Apr—"At 1400 on 20 April armed men in soldiers' uniforms seized the printing works building on Mayronis Street. There have been casualties..."—that was the alarming report carried on Lithuanian radio. It mentioned men and women being beaten up by the troops.

Just what really happened? We were told at the political department of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs internal troops formation that, in accordance with the USSR Council of Ministers resolution, the building concern had been placed under guard back on 30 March since it was CPSU property. But then a group of individuals of Lithuanian nationality had opened the emergency exit and infiltrated 27 "Sajudis" representatives into the building, headed by Z. Vayshvila, Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputy and chairman of the area protection commission.

In response to the guard's demand that they leave the building they stated that they would guard it themselves. According to the guard commander's report, Colonel N. Mironenko, internal forces unit commander Lieutenant Colonel Fedorov, and a reinforced guard unit then arrived at the printing works. The demand that the building be cleared was repeated, but the violators refused point-blank to go along with it. The guard personnel and the reserve backup then ejected the violators from the premises. No weapons, nightsticks, or special means were used.

At the same time, an appeal was carried on Lithuanian radio that all who valued the republic's freedom should urgently come to give assistance. Around 2,000 people gathered around the building. But their help was not needed. The latest crude provocation had been a flash in the pan.

Officer Says Conditions in Vilnius 'Intolerable'

LD2304151190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1410 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Report by TASS special correspondent]

[Text] Vilnius, 23 Apr (TASS)—Observers are noting that servicemen are taking an increasingly active part in the sociopolitical life of Lithuania. In recent days they have been increasingly frequently coming to meetings and taking the microphone. What has given rise to this? In the opinion of Lt-Col Vladimir Smokarev, political deputy to the head of the Vilnius garrison, this is due to the fact that "the local authorities are doing everything to create intolerable living and service conditions for military men".

In conversation with the TASS correspondent, Smokarev recalled that servicemen "have been deprived of electoral rights. The ranks were excluded straightway, whilst officers and the members of their families have been put in an ambiguous situation. In order to obtain the right to vote, one has to be a citizen of Lithuania, but in order to become a citizen of Lithuania, one must have housing and a residence permit. However, one in three officers and warrant officers in our formation has no apartment. Many do not know the Lithuanian language. Without a residence permit and knowledge of the Lithuanian language, neither officers' wives nor retired officers can get jobs. The town authorities are not allocating a single square meter of housing to the military." Smokarev pointed out that the decision on handing in weapons is not being carried out on the territory of the republic either. In shooting galleries, shooting clubs, schools, and other organizations, he says, "thousands of guns are being stored. There are also quite a lot of hunting weapons in the hands of private individuals." Having underlined that at "present all over the republic volunteers are signing up in local defense groups," Smokarev pointed out the danger of setting up such groups. "Nobody can guarantee, that extremist elements will not use weapons for provocative purposes," he stated.

Paper Urges Lithuania To Enter Dialogue

90UN1504A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 14 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by A. Morgun under the rubric "Notes of an Observer": "Lithuania: What Is the Way Out of the Impasse?"]

[Text] Among the reproaches addressed by the Supreme Council of Lithuania at the center there are, of course, those that have an entirely legitimate basis. Especially those directed at the distant and not-so-distant past. But on one issue it is necessary to side with the center, whether one wishes to or not: At the special USSR Congress of People's Deputies which took place in March, the representatives of Lithuania, not with any malicious intent but exclusively at their own initiative, declared that they could attend the event only in the capacity of "observers."

Was this not a little early? More and more often one finds, not only in the central press but also in the local press, including openly pro-Sajudis publications, statements that it is a very great distance from proclaimed independence to real independence. Incidentally, even V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, does not deny this in one of his last telegrams to the president of the USSR.

In addition, it is true, it is usually emphasized that the Lithuanian people are unanimous on the question of reestablishing their independence. Again, we will try to take their word for it. But then a puzzling question becomes that much more obvious: In that case why was all this forced, hurried law-making at the republic level necessary in general when another completely civilized alternative was available: to take part in the development of a law that is acceptable for Lithuania concerning a system for resolving questions related to secession of a union republic from the USSR; and, finally, to make its own contribution to a draft bill providing for the renewal of a union treaty. When the final choice must be made, do the Lithuanian people not have the right—if the talk about their welfare is genuinely serious—to have in front of them another clearly designated alternative besides the prospect of a break with the USSR: life in a renewed federation of Soviet republics?

I understand that in certain "Sajudis" circles such a reproach will perhaps elicit an ironic smile: They will say, "What do we need all that for? The deed is done: We have been authorized by the people and we speak in their name."

As opposed to many of my colleagues from the central press, I will not try at all to raise doubts about the authority of Lithuania's present body of deputies. It is a hopeless occupation to scrupulously calculate the percentage of voters who voted for the "Sajudis" candidates and make far-reaching conclusions on that basis. A fact is a fact: In the contest for seats in the parliament, "Sajudis" won an undeniable victory. But I am speaking about something else: Can one, having received a mandate of the voters' trust, affirm in advance that the people unanimously support **any** of the parliament's decisions?

The practice of other quite civilized states shows that, alas, it is not always so. As a matter of fact, the very first steps that the republic's parliament took clearly confirmed this. In particular, many voters were completely puzzled by the news of the election by the deputies of V. Landsbergis to the post of chairman of the Supreme Council instead of A. Brazauskas, leader of the independent Communist Party. It is not difficult to guess what would have been the results of a referendum on that subject, which, by the way, hundreds of thousands of Lithuanian residents demanded. A referendum did not take place only because the idea of conducting one was taken off the agenda by A. Brazauskas himself. So it is probably not very correct to speak of complete unanimity and of universal approval of any of the decisions made by the Supreme Council of Lithuania.

I will cite only a few excerpts from Lithuanian newspapers which hardly consider themselves "procommunist." On the contrary, neither the publishers nor the editor could possibly be accused of sympathy for the center. However, even for them not everything is so indisputable when it is a question of the first practical steps of the new Lithuanian parliament.

A. Yuozaytis, philosopher: "Quite a lot is in the hands of the new Supreme Council. But, having made the first step, it no longer considers the will of its voters in everything that it might. It will be bad if it does not take the voters into consideration: The majority of its decisions will be discounted..." (LETUVOS RITAS, 15 March).

R. Granauskas, writer: "Now that it has won in the elections, why has 'Sajudis,' which was itself at one time in the opposition, forgotten that it too now has an opposition? Would it lose so much if, from the very beginning, from the very first sessions, it conducted itself as befits a serious movement whose goal is democracy?" (RESPUBLIKA, No. 55).

Finally, the point of view of L. Koyalis, former official of the U.S. Senate, former special assistant to President Reagan for public relations, and today the owner of a trade firm: "I see people in the Supreme Council of Lithuania who do not have any experience of participation in the democratic processes. I have worked in the Senate and I see how much they still have to learn.

"And in general, some people understand democracy in narrow terms and some understand it in broad terms; however, in those countries where there is a democratic tradition, a certain balance of opinions has been created. It will take 5-10 years for this tradition to take form in Lithuania. I had the opportunity to drive around Lithuania with A. Dyagutis, deputy of the Supreme Council of Lithuania, and we met with leaders of kolkhozes [collective farms]. I received the impression that this process might take even longer in the area of agriculture." (ATGIMIMAS, "Sajudis" press, No. 11).

I could continue to quote more, but in general it is already clear that without visible nationwide support the most principled decisions of the Supreme Council of Lithuania touching upon the vitally important interests of literally each of Lithuania's citizens (the break with the USSR is obviously one of these)—and the degree of that support can only be determined with the aid of a referendum—will one way or another still bear the stamp of imperfection.

The people of Lithuania—whoever or whatever speaks in their name—have always distinguished themselves by their thirst for a realistic perception of reality. It was not for nothing that the aforementioned guest from America rather restrainedly evaluated the degree of the politicization of rural Lithuania. Declarations are good as far as they go, but the peasant, trained from time immemorial to listen to reason and not emotions and to weigh all the "pros and cons," wishes to know: What will the political and economic realities be in an independent Lithuania? Will it be better for the working man? And in general, would it not be wiser to look first and make the leap afterwards?

Here is what reader A.R. (the editor specially notes that she knows the author's name and address) writes on this theme in the 15 March issue of VALETECHYU LAYKRASHTIS ("Peasant Newspaper"):

"I really wish that qualified people would examine these issues, which concern all the people of Lithuania, in the pages of the newspaper. Precisely how many and what kinds of food goods do we need at a minimum to satisfy the demands of Lithuania, and how many of these goods will we be able to buy? Where will we get the currency to buy oil, gas, metals, and cotton? What will compel our neighbor to the east to sit down and negotiate with us? Are those three percent which make up our production on the scale of the union a sufficient basis for this? Which of the countries preparing to negotiate can hold out longer without negotiations? With which foreign countries has Lithuania concluded treaties in case it does not succeed in coming to agreement with its eastern neighbor? Under what conditions could we receive foreign credits? How do we live if Lithuanian agriculture is overtaken by a natural disaster? When will the lit become a convertible currency?"

A similar quantity of questions torments the mind not only of this one reader, but of the entire Lithuanian peasantry: Independence is good, of course, but how and upon what is one to live once it is achieved? Would it not be preferable to make basic preparations for it without getting into dead-end conflicts with one's "eastern neighbor" and rashly—practically as an ultimatum—presenting the USSR with an accomplished fact?

Alas, the "qualified people" remain silent or are not in a hurry to answer. One can only sympathize with them with all one's heart: What, in essence, can they answer when all the figures are displayed for all to see. And the most basic of these figures proves that at today's prices imports of goods into the republic exceeds exports by approximately R1.5 billion rubles.

I have a specific reason for directing attention at today's prices: In Lithuania—and I sensed this especially distinctly this January during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the republic—the illusion is stubbornly maintained that economic contacts will be maintained under their previous conditions even after political ties have been broken.

In this instance the Lithuanian parliament is clearly keeping back something and is not giving full information to its fellow citizens. Why? On the one hand, it is understandable: When the republic's economy begins to suffer, it will be possible to ascribe all problems to an intractable and spiteful "eastern neighbor." On the other hand...but what, in fact, will you say here? Only very naive people (and such will not be found in today's politicized Lithuania!) could seriously cherish the hope that a "foreign government," which has its hands full with its own problems, will make the tremendous financial injections into the economy free of charge as before. It is impossible not to be aware that if the Lithuanian parliament maintains its present course, then the transition to reciprocal payments at world prices in hard currency is unavoidable.

And that means that a metric ton of oil will no longer cost R30 but $110-120; a cubic meter of gas will not be R26 but $62; and a metric ton of diesel fuel will not be R68 but $130. On the other hand, whatever the republic imports from abroad—meat, milk, fish, and knitted and other light industry goods—for the time being all of that will cost more on the domestic market than it does on the world market. According to the calculations of economists, Lithuania's negative balance would constitute more than 3.5 billion foreign-currency rubles.

However, the calculations of union economists are not held in esteem in Lithuania. From the rostrum of the republic's Supreme Council to the local press all these statistical calculations are negated by the same—if you take into account the heightened emotional mood of the people—"invincible" argument: They wish to frighten Lithuania and bring it to its knees. And for the time being this argument is still making the rounds. But what is surprising is not that fact, but something else: It is pardonable when a man of art, let us say the professor of a conservatory, judges the possible consequences for a people somewhat amateurishly. But it is more difficult to understand when a prominent economist such as K. Prunskiene, the current prime minister of Lithuania, avoids any serious conversation with her fellow citizens on this crucial topic. Here is a short excerpt from her speech at the 17 March session of the Lithuanian Supreme Council:

"When you hear the statements of Yu. Maslyukov, chairman of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], and his colleagues, it becomes clear that we will have to have available not only current accounts, but also historical accounts."

And what conclusion does the respected prime minister draw from all of this? Here it is:

"Almost daily we receive opinions from the inhabitants of Lithuania on how to evaluate this or that loss we suffered during our period in the USSR."

The mirage of a fundamental improvement in matters after the "break with Moscow" is still maintained among the people due to the fact that the meat and milk counters at stores are now full as never before. The reason? Here it is: Last year's plan for Lithuanian meat deliveries to the union fund was not fulfilled—which means that more remained at the local level. The plan for the first quarter of that year originally constituted almost 42,000 metric tons of meat. After adjustment it was lowered to 38,000 metric tons. Does this mean that thanks to the decisive actions of the republic's leadership, the abundance of meat and milk will acquire the right of permanent residence? Alas, such a conclusion would be premature. The problem is that for each metric ton of meat the republic does not deliver to the union fund, the republic correspondingly does not receive 10 metric tons of concentrated feed. Thus one observes a simple formula here: Less meat means less grain, and the level of production decreases. In a word, the prospects are not very happy here either.

And nonetheless... In Lithuania they are counting on resolving these and other problems in the course of future negotiations with the leadership of the union. They await the beginning of negotiations with unconcealed impatience. Practically any event occurring with the participation of officials visiting from Moscow is interpreted there as the beginning of the long-awaited negotiations. Here are the headlines which roam the pages of the republic's newspapers from day to day: "In Expectation of Negotiations," and "Perhaps This Is the Beginning of Negotiations..."

A dialogue, of course, is possible. Moreover, it is simply necessary. In the end it would even be unnatural if our peoples, who have lived side by side in one family for 50 years, could not peacefully and with deliberation discuss problems which arise. The question is only whether, in this complex situation, the Lithuanian parliament will be able to take a step which will not injure its authority but increase it instead: to acknowledge that the declaration of Lithuanian independence has gotten ahead of the natural course of today's political processes.

Of course, this step demands great courage. How much easier it is to openly state one's unwillingness to act according to principles and to publicly express the hope that "they will help us from abroad..." Nonetheless, one should first and foremost count on oneself and on the collective wisdom of the people. Then one will not have to expend great effort building castles in the air which, as opposed to the castle of the Lithuanian prince Gedeminas—a historical landmark of the Lithuanian capital—will hardly stand up to the test of time.

Comparison—Gorbachev Cautions Latvian Leaders

LD2004163390

Riga International Service in Latvian at 1730 GMT on 19 April broadcasts a report on the telephone interview with Latvian Supreme Soviet Chairman Gorbunovs on the talks he and his delegation had in Moscow with USSR President Gorbachev. The Riga International version has been compared with the translation of the Riga Domestic Latvian version published in the 20 April Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, beginning on page 89, revealing the following variations:

Page 89, column two, paragraph one, only sentence, Riga International reads...the firm stand about restoring state independence to Latvia (deleting phrase)

Page 89, column two, paragraph three, only sentence, to paragraph four, only sentence, Riga International reads...USSR and Latvia. In this connection, he informed us that Silayev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, has been authorized to lead the USSR group of experts. Well, this was at the beginning of our talks. [new paragraph] It must also...(adding sentences)

Page 89, column two, paragraph six, second sentence, Riga International reads...to be decided. They emphasized this particularly, both he and Comrade Ryzhkov, chairman of the ministers. Second, if Latvia...(adding sentence)

Page 89, column two, paragraph 14 to paragraph 17 Riga International reads: sentence one, make read///occasions when meeting both Gorbachev and Ryzhkov.

[Interviewer] Did a separate talk take place with Estonia, or were you all together?

[Gorbunovs] Well, it must be said that it took place rather peculiarly. We were invited together, but talks took place with our delegation, first of all, and then with the Estonians. I would only like to relate, perhaps, what we agreed on then, and what we will do in the future.

[Interviewer] Yes, of course.

[Gorbunovs] Well, as you youselves understand, the standpoints are different....(adding passage, rewording passage).

Comparison—Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Session

PM2204181790

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 21 April 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page 2 a TASS report on the 20 April Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session. Comparison of the PRAVDA item, entitled "At the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Session," with the translation of the Moscow TASS International Russian version reveals the following variations:

Page 70, column two, paragraph two, last sentence, PRAVDA reads...government of Lithuania and expressed the...(deleting "to coordinate questions of providing the republic's economy with gas and other energy resources");

Page 70, third paragraph, penultimate sentence, PRAVDA reads...to seek compromises." The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet has adopted a resolution to set up a state commission "to coordinate antiblockade activity." (adding sentence, deleting final sentence).

Estonia To Continue Supplies To Lithuania

LD2404102690 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Excerpts] A session of the Estonian government took place today. [passage omitted] In the opinion of Tiit Vahi, minister of transport, Estonia does not suffer [words indistinct] from a fuel crisis because there are reserves. The amount of fuel not arriving from Lithuania has been promised from other sources. It was decided not to endorse the embargo against Lithuania, and to continue to dispatch all consignments to Lithuania according to previously concluded agreements. [passage omitted]

Estonian Supreme Soviet Hears Ryuytel Report

LD2304202490 Moscow TASS in English 2012 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Tallinn April 23 TASS—The Estonian Supreme Soviet met in a regular session in Tallinn today.

Its agenda includes a report of president of the Estonian Supreme Soviet Arnold Ryuytel on talks in Moscow, the first reading of a law on state control of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, the appointment of new government members, general political discussion on events in Lithuania as well as the approval of a decree of the presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet on partial depolitisation of the Estonian law enforcement bodies.

Depolitisation is expected to cover courts, public prosecutor's offices, Interior Ministry and state security bodies. No structural party divisions, sociopolitical organisations or public movements can be established at these bodies. Political departments at the Estonian Interior Ministry should be abolished within a month after the law's entry in force.

In selecting the personnel for the law enforcement bodies, preference should be given to persons who are not members of political parties, sociopolitical organisations or governing bodies of public movements.

The session will continue its work on Tuesday.

Official Explains Opposition to Estonian Laws

PM2004080590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[TASS correspondent A. Kharchenko report: "We've Made Our Choice"]

[Text] Tallinn—"The Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] law on labor service in the Estonian SSR shall be deemed invalid and shall not be fulfilled on the administrative territory of the Kokhtla-Yarve City Soviet on the grounds that it contravenes a number of articles of the USSR and Estonian SSR Constitutions as well as the USSR Law on Universal Military Service.

"The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet resolution 'On the State Status of Estonia' shall be deemed invalid and shall not be fulfilled on the city soviet's administrative territory..."

That was how residents of Estonia's mining capital reacted to the first steps taken by the new Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

We were forced to take retaliatory measures to protect our constitutional rights, your TASS correspondent was told by Nikolay Zakharov, Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet deputy and first secretary of Kokhtla-Yarve Party Gorkom [city committee]. If you look at the economic map of Estonia, you will see that there is a powerful industrial complex in the northeast of the republic—where the cities of Kokhtla-Yarve, Sillamyae, and Narva are located. In the postwar years the country's power industry required the development of new capacities to supply Leningrad and the Baltic republics. Former servicemen from the Estonian Rifle Corps as well as citizens from throughout the country who came here to resurrect Estonia's war-torn economy took part in sinking pits to mine a very cheap fuel—shale. That is why for the past few decades a demographically international collective with good traditions has grown up in Kokhtla-Yarve. This largely determines the townspeople's position in resolving questions of current policy in determining Estonia's sovereignty and status.

Questions of ensuring the republic's sovereignty have long been discussed, N. Zakharov said. Our city's inhabitants see them as a long and gradual process aimed at expanding the republic's economic and political autonomy, but within a renewed Union federation.

I see the resolution on state status as a constitutional conflict, since the "Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet considers the state power of the USSR in Estonia from the moment of its establishment to be illegal." However, the basic laws of the Union and the republic, which regulate social and political life, were adopted on a legal basis and are legally competent. That is what the people of Sillamyae believe. For the umpteenth time we are being put in the position where we have to choose whether to break the country's Constitution or laws passed by the republic's Supreme Soviet. We made our choice at the city soviet session.

During the discussion, which lasted more than an hour, deputies expressed their attitude to the prevailing situation. To be blunt, the situation is such that, whether we like it or not, the introduction of the republic's new status will destroy the ties between Kokhtla-Yarve people and their great motherland. And two-thirds of inhabitants of our city are from the Russian-speaking community.

The current position in the republic, particularly in its southern and southwestern regions, is largely predetermined by sentiments at the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, which, on the basis of an unambiguous and little studied aspect of the events of the forties, accepted by a mechanical vote that Estonia had been occupied by the Soviet Union. At last year's December session a deputation from the northeast submitted a number of documents to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet which adequately refuted the conclusions drawn by the commission on annexation and occupation, but these were not heeded.

The inhabitants of the northeast of the republic believe that in order to draw definitive conclusions help is needed from highly qualified historians and lawyers from the center and from foreign countries. Only the conclusions of such a commission can be relied upon.

Just what is the republic's Supreme Soviet guided by today? The answer is simple. On the basis of the occupation concept it is possible to secure secession from the USSR by the most advantageous economic means. The Estonians have been repeatedly told this by Reyn Tagapere, a U.S. political scientist, in his broadcasts on European radio stations. After all, if we assume that the international public recognizes that Estonia was occupied, then it can leave the Union without any economic or political obligations to the USSR. As if it had never been part of it.

Currently the deputies at the Supreme Soviet session are discussing unemployment quite easily. I am sure that after the change in the state system in Estonia ordinary workers will not be hoping to become unemployed. That is another reason why the majority of inhabitants of Kokhtla-Yarve, Sillamyae, and Narva advocate maintaining the existing state system, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet deputy said.

Baltic Market Created; To Be Located in Riga

PM1904151590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Irina Litvinova report: "Baltic Market Set Up"]

[Text] Riga—The Baltic Market Cooperation Council and Executive Commission will be located in Riga. This decision has been made within the framework of the economic cooperation agreement signed by the heads of government of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

The communique on the meeting between the government leaders—K. Prunskiene, V. Bresis, and E. Savisaar—mentions the historical common political and economic interests of the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and the need to develop all-around economic integration between them on the basis of equality and mutual advantage. The agreement defines common areas for developing economic cooperation, including the gradual creation of a Baltic Market.

It is envisaged that the agreement will operate until the year 2000. It includes the creation of an integrated information network and proposes solving the problems of commodity exchange, the introduction of national currencies, customs regulations, and other problems.

Commenting on the document that was signed Lithuanian Premier K. Prunskiene noted that a special Baltic Market fund envisages special aid in emergency situations—during a blockade by the Soviet Union, for instance.

Economic Blockade Affects Latvian Aviation

LD1904222490 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] The economic blockade of Lithuania also essentially effects the work of Latvia's aviators. As Yevgeniy Aleksandrov, chief economist of the Latvian Civil Aviation Administration, told our correspondent, the aviators receive the greater part of fuel from the Mazeikiai oil processing works, and stopping it threatens them with an essential reduction in their work. Ways are being sought to obtain aviation fuel from other sources.

People's Front Leader Affirms 'Baltic Course'

LD2304141290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Our daily anxiety, our concern, and pain, are centered on developments in Lithuania and the other Baltic republics. [passage omitted] In Latvia one segment is represented by the republican People's Front. Its leader, journalist Dainis Ivans, has spoken to our correspondent Kirill Shakhnovich:

[Begin recording] [passage omitted] [Shakhnovich] The first session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet will be held soon, on 3 May. Sessions like this have already been held in Lithuania, and the one in Estonia is curently under way; it is coming to an end. What is your forecast for it in light of the other sessions in the Baltic republics?

[Ivans] We shall continue our Baltic course. Our tactical decisions at the Latvian Supreme Soviet session might differ from the decisions of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and the Estonian Supreme Soviet, but strategically it will be the same thing. As far as our general principles for building our independence are concerned, a platform has been drawn up and we intend to resolve matters related to the rights and opportunities of the non-Latvian population and Latvia's ethnic groups, including the rights of citizens of other states and citizens of the Soviet Union. This is because when it comes to Latvian citizenship, there can naturally be no differences on an ethnic basis. All citizens are equal, as is the case in all civilized countries. With regard to the people who won't want to adopt the citizenship of the Latvian republic, one can be guided by international procedure. This will be done. People who are not citizens of a particular state or republic have absolutely the same economic and social rights, and so on. We realize full well that normal life will be impossible in Latvia unless all of Latvia's ethnic groups, even the smallest, feel everything is normal.

[Shakhnovich] Do you intend in the future to avoid Lithuania's tactical mistakes, considering the very grave situation that has now come about in Lithuania?

[Ivans] We are adopting an article on a transitional period and declaring that Latvia, from the moment of the adoption of the declaration, is embarking on a road toward restoration of its state independence. And a large part of this declaration will deal with talks with the Soviet Union. We have in fact discussed our documents and main principles a great deal, and we believe that we can discuss and seek compromise on all issues save one—our independence and freedom. I think this would also be to the Soviet Union's advantage. We do not intend to sever any economic links with it, as we shall always be neighbors. Latvia cannot be shifted somewhere to the other side of the ocean. We must always have normal friendly political contacts, but only on a basis of equality. [end recording]

That, as I said, is one point of view. The other point of view was expressed on Sunday by the organizers of a new association called "Soyuz". Its founding congress in Riga was attended by 307 holders of mandates to soviets of different levels. They stand for the priority of general human values over ethnic and class values. It was stressed at the congress that the republic's immediate withdrawal from the USSR would lead to a sharp drop in people's living standards and an exacerbation of interethnic conflicts. The idea of proclaiming independence at the forthcoming first session of parliament, it was said at the session, was not backed by a sensible economic program, and evidence to back this was provided by the Lithuanian experience. Latvian independence is not hindered by a lack of powers, but a shortage of determination, skill, and experience. This was stressed by economist Sergey Dimanis, head of the Latvian Communist Party group and its supporters in parliament. Evidently it will not be a simple matter to reach agreement here either.

Latvian Military Commissar on Spring Conscription

PM2004135990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Major General Ya. Duda, Latvian military commissar, by Lieutenant Colonel M. Ziyeminsh, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA permanent correspondent for the Baltic Military District, date unspecified; in Latvia under the rubric "Direct Line": "Counting on Impunity"; first paragraph is an introduction]

[Text] In line with USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 305 of 29 March 1990, the latest conscription of young men into the Soviet Armed Forces is being held across the country. Our permanent correspondent for the Baltic Military District talked about its progress with Major General Ya. Duda, the republic's military commissar.

[Ziyeminsh] Yanis Boleslavovich, the public is paying heightened attention to the current army conscription and many people—not only in our republic—for some reason believe that the conscription may not go ahead.

[Duda] There is the USSR Law on Universal Military Service, which no one has abolished or amended. So any talk of whether the spring conscription will go ahead or not comes from the realm of commonplace demagoguery. This is my own personal view and also the view of people who work in our military commissariats. Conscription commissions everywhere are working and going about their normal business, despite the fact that on 31 March 1990 the Latvian People's Front Duma adopted an appeal in which it suggests that young Latvians of conscription age evade conscription into Soviet Army service, refuse to complete or sign the documents on conscription into active military service, refuse to present themselves at the military commissariats, and so forth... Similar, clearly irresponsible statements have also been made by the mass media and some USSR and Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputies. But the majority of young people of conscription age and their parents have got their measure, as the saying goes, and have rejected these provocative appeals.

[Ziyeminsh] Nevertheless, there are some extremely worrying facts and statistics: To date, 336 young people in the republic have officially refused to do service in the Soviet Armed Forces, 772 have surrendered their military service cards, and the training of specialists for the Armed Forces is really shoddy at enterprises and economic units in a whole number of regions.

[Duda] Unfortunately, that too is a reality. Supporters of the conscription campaign boycott, who conceal forces blinded by the idea of separatism, are totally blatant about their actions and count on impunity. Take, for example, the "Ugunskrusts" ("Cross of Fire") youth organization which recently made its appearance in the political arena. It has a small following (some 170 people) and grandly refers to itself as the Latvian League for the Protection of Young People's Rights. According to its aktiv members, the organization's activity is pacifist. It gives "assistance to young people who refuse to be conscripted into the Soviet Army on the ground of their ideological, political, and moral beliefs."

[Ziyeminsh] This prompts me to ask: Just how principled are the people's courts in their approach to hearing the cases of "refuseniks"?

[Duda] I am not empowered to assess the activity of people's courts and specific judges. I will just give you a statistic as illustration. Last year 193 "refusenik" cases were brought before law enforcement bodies. The courts passed verdict on only three. And even they were given suspended sentences.

Gorbachev Sends Greeting to Latvian Communist

*PM2204194390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2*

[M. Gorbachev greetings message: "To Marta Martynovna Krustynson"]

[Text] Dear Marta Martynovna! Please accept sincere congratulations on your birthday. Your entire conscious life has been bound up with the Communist Party and the socialist revolution. As a CPSU member since 1912, you have done a great deal in fostering the political education of the masses. You, like many Latvians, did not escape the fate of imprisonment in Stalin's camps. However, this could not break your spirit and profound faith in Leninist ideals and the gains of Soviet power.

I wish you, Marta Martynovna, good health and successes in your social activity for the sake of a bright future for the Latvian people.
[Signed] M. Gorbachev

RSFSR

Popov's Convictions, Moscow Plans Questioned

*PM1804104190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 12 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3*

[Article by A. Golovenko, member of the USSR Union of Journalists, and Doctor of Economic Sciences D. Moskvin: "Polemical Notes on a Peculiar Interpretation of Democracy: Who Will He Be When He Wakes Up Tomorrow"]

[Text] Current social life truly abounds in all kinds of twists and turns. This is borne out once again by a letter received at the editorial office from Moscow City Soviet Deputy Professor Yu. Pospelov, for instance.

"Today, at a time when the concept of 'new thinking' has become established in our vocabulary," he writes, "I have discovered that for many people's representatives this concept is but an eloquent phrase to cover a multitude of promises which are in no way binding. You get the impression that what is of paramount importance to them are not the specific problems of the capital and its inhabitants, but political issues, with the question of power first and foremost. The majority of these deputies belong to the 'Democratic Russia' bloc. For the ideological leaders of this bloc in the Moscow City Soviet, USSR People's Deputies G. Popov and S. Stankevich, democracy has already become redundant, judging by appearances: It has done its job and can now be disposed of. They want to implement their policy with an 'iron fist.'

"On 25 March Gavriil Popov warned his potential enemies from the rostrum that sabotage of the planned measures would be suppressed with a firm hand. All the saboteurs and members of their families would be evicted from Moscow without pardon.

"So there you have it! However, who is to define what constitutes sabotage? At another session, 29 March, when deputies' instructions to the organizational committee were discussed, G. Popov abruptly interrupted the debate by announcing that, if there were people who disagreed, who wanted to sabotage the measures, the voting machinery would have to be applied, and he reminded everyone present that the 'Democratic Russia' bloc had the overwhelming majority. Conclusion: 'Sabotage' means having an opinion which differs from the opinion of the ideologists of the 'Democratic Russia' bloc. Inevitably, you start feeling uneasy."

Naturally, time will tell what attitude Muscovites adopt to the innovations in store for them. Many of them are aware that they are in the offing. Furthermore, on 5 April a working group on urgent measures set up by "Democratic Russia" bloc deputies completed the compilation of draft resolutions to be submitted to a session of the new Moscow City Soviet. We will dwell on some of them later; for the moment let us cite a number of passages from the newspaper KOMMERSANT, which has taken on the task of popularizing the ideas of the bloc's leaders: "Since the 'Democratic Russia' bloc has a majority in the new Moscow City Soviet, the proposed measures can be viewed as a realistic prospect. If they materialize, it will mean that the decisions adopted by the Moscow City Soviet will be ahead of the central authorities' decisions, and Moscow will become a touchstone of the economic reform in the country." We are quite accustomed to being used as a proving ground, but another passage, also cited in the press organ of the Union of the United Cooperatives of the USSR, puts us on our guard: "Special importance attaches to the new Moscow City Soviet leadership's intention to repeal all legally enforceable departmental enactments on Moscow City territory and henceforth be guided solely by existing laws. Many of these laws have been adopted during the perestroyka years but have become 'overgrown' during the same period with various kinds of amplifications, clarifications, and additions. A surgical intervention to remove these 'subsequent accretions' will help us to realize the powerful reforming potential inherent in the new legislation."

We do not know about others, but we have to admit that this article, under the intriguing headline "Democrats in the Moscow City Soviet: A Free Market in an Individual City," sounds rather ominous to us. First, let us recall how many quivers of arrows the "radicals" themselves have loosed at the building of socialism in one area. And second, we know what a scalpel can do in the hands of a surgeon from whom anything can be expected. And since G. Popov is today Moscow City Soviet's chief economic surgeon, we want to make it clear what kind of hands this surgical instrument could end up in.

The doctor of sciences and chief editor of VOPROSY EKONOMIKI cannot be reproached with a lack of toughness and resolve. At the organizational meeting of deputies elected from the "Democratic Russia" bloc he behaved as if he already were the ruler of Moscow.

Strident statements, a focus on confrontation. He did not shrink either from peppering his speech with remarks on the lines of "the whole country loathes Moscow." So what is the city of white stone being blamed for? It is being blamed for passing "all those laws, absurd instructions, and stifling regulations." In general it is "an administrative tumor on the country's body." And we already know what is to be done with tumors. And as for "saboteurs," everything is clear too. But what will happen to democracy?

The platform of this pretender to the post of the capital's mayor goes a long way to explain his views. In answer to the question: "What do you regard as most important in a candidate?" he replied a year ago: "His skill as a political fighter. A deputy is not a theoretician or a writer. He must spearhead the struggle. I interpret the concept 'fighter' in the broad sense of the word, to include toughness, an ability to rouse people and maintain contact with the voters, to make speeches, to lead people from the front, and much else." We must admit that G. Popov possesses all this in abundance. However, why does the deputy not mention such qualities as principle and firm conviction? Are they perhaps not the main qualities which a deputy should possess? After all, it is possible to go to the scaffold or be burned at the stake defending one's ideas, but it is also possible to assert one thing today, and on waking up tomorrow assert something else, and the day after tomorrow yet another thing...

What ideas was Prof. G. Popov propagating among the masses prior to 1985? This can easily be ascertained by acquainting ourselves with his works of the previous 20 years—tirelessly, he tried to prove the advantages of centralized leadership, directive planning, and so forth. His prolific creativity astounded many people.

"The will of the center is always paramount," this aphorism invented by Popov could be used as an epigraph for most of his scientific research during the times of stagnation. In his monograph "The System of Management Methods of Socialist Social Production" (1973) he argues: "In the conditions of socialism, pressure stemming from the authority imparted by ownership has been raised to state level, engulfed the whole economy, and accords with the interests of all masters of socialist production, that is of every member of our society." Can you see with what cogency the author argued then in favor of "stifling regulations and instructions"? And this is what he claims today: "The entire historical experience of both our country and the other socialist countries indicates that the root cause of all our economic difficulties and of the low level of efficiency of our economies, which is totally out of proportion with their scale, is the total nationalization of all the means of production."

The G. Popov of the past and the G. Popov of the present are equally at loggerheads also on another issue: "Leninist ideas have enabled the party and the state to create an exceptionally effective mechanism for the management for building the socialist economy." And on the other hand: "The price paid for the willful nationalization of the means of production was the removal, the alienation of the working people from these means. The result was administrative socialism. Therefore the most important means against the crisis is denationalization."

We are not trying to claim that G. Popov fell asleep one night as an orthodox "conservative" and woke up the next day as an out-and-out radical. There was a transitional period in his scientific work. Bringing out a new edition of his book "Effective Management" in 1985, he very skillfully managed to combine in it eulogies on the development of socialism with extracts from the materials of the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum, which had just ended. The following revelations sound very persuasive: "Under any system of economic management administrative and economic methods are equally necessary. To some extent they will persist also in the system of communist self-management (after the withering away of the state)." Is this perhaps not a hymn in praise of "stifling instructions"?

Then times began to change rapidly. More and more new people, frequently little-known people—construction team leaders, miners, surgeons, and kolkhoz [collective farm] chairmen—began to spearhead perestroyka, while scientist G. Popov languished in anonymity. He had to leave his post as dean of the Moscow State University Economic Faculty in connection with an investigation into his personal conduct, he failed to make academician, and during the nomination of delegates to the 19th Party Conference his candidacy was rejected. As someone used to being at the focus of public attention, he found this hard to accept. The idea of running for people's deputy suggested itself automatically.

He probably saw in the deputyship a chance to avenge past defeats. And therefore Popov the tribune, the fighter, the agitator totally drowned the voice of Popov the economist. When reading his election program, you cannot help musing: Whose brainchild is this? Has it been conceived by a doctor of economic sciences or a starry-eyed Manilov [idle dreamer, character from Gogol's "Dead Souls"]? What do you think of this: "All people who are dismissed or made redundant will be paid their former wages at the expense of the state for a period of one year. The state will also organize resettlement in other jobs." Not bad, eh? The problem is that the candidate does not specify where the R50 billion needed, according to our estimates, to translate this wishful thinking into reality are to come from. He knows in advance that, given the current massive budget deficit, this money is simply not available. But it sounds good!

Or take the following passage: "Women with children should be paid monthly wages by the state until the children reach the age of ten." What mother would not vote for this kind of benefit? Only she does not know that the state has no money for this either. These allowances would cost some R130 billion to R140 billion. However, the author goes on. He promises another form of assistance: "Young families will be granted interest-free credit on the birth of their first child to buy a plot of land and build their own house." And although the candidate is well aware that this is unrealistic too, he has meanwhile managed to win the sympathies of all newly-weds.

The following promise also smacks of the Manilov approach: "Plots of up to 0.25 of a hectare of suitable agricultural land within half an hour's drive from the city are to be made freely available for leasing." We must disillusion readers: Neither suitable nor unsuitable land is available for leasing in Moscow Oblast either along the Kazan or the Kiev highway. The promised plots multiplied by the number of families living in Moscow City and Oblast add up to the entire arable land of Moscow Oblast kolkhozes and sovkhozes [state farm], subsidiary plots, and so forth.

There is no evidence that People's Deputy G. Popov is striving for the implementation of, for example, the aforementioned points of his program. Today it is again the economist in him who is talking. But what kind of an economist? A totally restructured one! Today G. Popov is a savage critic of the administrative system, a herald of the model of the new society which he described so intelligibly in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of 4 October last year in an article with the noteworthy title "On the Advantages of Inequality." In this society "activities such as middle-man operations, buying and selling, and money investment will become highly lucrative." "The most substantial change," the people's representative admits openly, "will be the emergence of income from past labor without any current physical or intellectual exertion." How come? Who cares: Those who can will reap dividends from capital earned in the past, be it legally or illegally. The others will live off coupons providing them "with a guaranteed minimum of essential food products and consumer goods." And, of course, they will have democracy. Democracy, the expert argues, "is a boon in itself, in exchange for which it is possible to become reconciled to increased economic inequality." In short, it will be as V. Mayakovskiy said: Some people get the doughnut, and some get the hole in the middle—that's what a democratic republic means.

However, the professor warns, "the new system cannot be introduced except as a result of the defeat of the apparatus of bureaucratic socialism. And this is impossible without reliance on the masses, without an all-out, active struggle of the masses. At the same time, what is in store for the masses under the new system is a differentiation of incomes. They are expected to fight to make it possible for one section of society to earn ten times more than another.

The architect of the "new society" is well aware that the masses may not agree to this. Hence his increasingly impatient appeals, even demands, to the government to accelerate the introduction of the market economy as he understands it. The reaction to this kind of appeal by one of the deputies at the second congress is indicative. If we introduce the market overnight, he said, without first consulting the people, they may rise up with such fury that none of us will be left here...

Naturally, G. Popov could not fail to realize this too. That is why this convinced radical frequently resorts to pressure methods. However, these are restructured methods too, entirely in keeping with the spirit of the times. So for instance, jointly with Yu. Afanasyev, V. Tikhonov, and other deputies he signed an appeal to the country's working people urging them to hold a two-hour political general strike. For what purpose? To get the second congress to follow their, "interregional," agenda.

We are by no means trying to claim that G. Popov's proposals include no constructive ideas. Of course they do. He has been asked more than once to join in the elaboration of an effective economic policy. However, he seems to believe that he has more to gain from remaining a "member of the opposition."

For some time now Prof. G. Popov has featured in rally presidiums. However, these were not rallies in support of the working people, large families, or people on low incomes. Most often they were rallies which rang with calls to "storm the Lubyanka"...

However, a place on a rally presidium, though it may be located high up, does not carry much power. And even then it is power over a limited number of people and for a very short period of time. This is in no way comparable to the presidium of the Moscow City Soviet. We do not know exactly when this idea came to Prof. G. Popov, but he determined to get to the head of the Moscow City Soviet and stepped out confidently in this direction, putting himself forward as a candidate.

Newspapers did cover the election campaign of the "Democratic Russia" bloc of which G. Popov is part. They reported how specially hired kids disseminated the candidates' election programs, and what methods were used against opponents. We have also heard that the chief editor of VOPROSY EKONOMIKI placed his portrait on the election leaflet of his deputy S. Krasavchenko. But the capital's public knew practically nothing about the election platform of candidate deputy for the Moscow City Soviet G. Popov himself. There were no loud promises of orchard plots, or credits or benefits for newly-weds...

After the "democrats'" 25 March session the picture began to get clearer, thank goodness. Snippets of information also appeared in the press. The aforementioned KOMMERSANT makes no secret of the plans of this bloc, which already sees itself in its dreams at the helm of the Moscow City Soviet. The capital is in for a powerful onslaught of radical reforms. What kind of reforms? Naturally, the introduction of "irreversible market relations." First and foremost the abolition of the Moscow City Soviet's hateful decision aimed at establishing order in the city's cooperative system. So that the last, not very solid barriers in the way of money grubbing will be swept away. And, of course, the city gates will be flung wide open to foreign capital, which has already developed a taste for our cheap scarce resources and our manpower.

The dream of buying-and-selling cooperatives will finally come true: They will be able to introduce free prices on agricultural produce. In short, a proving ground is a proving ground. It is true that the KOMMERSANT makes no mention of what is in store for all those Muscovites who live on wages or pensions.

It dawns on you that by "irreversible market relations" our "democrats" do not mean the planned market economy mentioned in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform, but something entirely different.

Incidentally, they have already declared that the capital will have to comply obediently with the new order. And by the way, the present Moscow City Soviet personnel are, it seems, regarded as being at fault just by dint of the fact that they sympathized with the former leadership and even implemented its decisions.

However, the "democrat" G. Popov has announced in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI that not all is lost as far as they are concerned. It is planned to draw on "the experience of penal battalions—if you have committed a crime, you will be given a chance to rehabilitate yourself. We must assign the most difficult areas in the city to the apparatchiks who remain in the Moscow City Soviet. If they manage to cope with the assigned tasks, they will have rehabilitated themselves. However, we must avoid all-out war against the entire previous system on the lines of 1917." You will agree that this is a curious analogy...

G. Popov has warned in the press about the possible danger of the emergence of a "new administrative dictatorship." Whether it be popular, revolutionary, or populist, "it is doomed to travel the path with which we were familiar between 1917 and 1937." What a warning!

However, "democrat" G. Popov's revelations about "saboteurs," about their eviction, about "penal battalions" for functionaries whose guilt need not be proven, and similar pronouncements inevitably give rise to the thought: Could this be another transfiguration of the former singer of praises of the administrative system and current radical? This time as prophet of that self-same "new administrative dictatorship?" Could it happen that the scalpel which the "democrats" intend using to remove the malignant "tumors" from the economy will turn into a destructive blade weapon? Well, let us hope that it will not come to that. By no means all the "democratic" bloc deputies subscribe to Prof. G. Popov's "correctional labor" philosophy. It is a long time since he was dean, and they are not a group of docile first-year students. Nor are they likely to agree to being silent executors of the designs of newly-baked helmsmen.

More on Moscow Soviet Election Results

PM2404082690 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Apr 90 p 1

[D. Sabov and S. Sokolov report: "Moscow 'by Blocs'"]

[Text] G. Popov, candidate from the "Democratic Russia" bloc, has been elected chairman of Moscow City Soviet. He received the votes of 280 of the 442 deputies.

In the sixth April of perestroyka, when the waiting lines for "McDonalds" have finally crowded out all kinds of rallies and pickets from Pushkin Square, it is not necessary to prove further to Muscovites that no formulas for democracy can remove the issue of daily bread. The very results of the elections in the capital were an awful warning to those who triumphed in them: More than 40 percent of the capital's residents abstained from the vote, giving grounds to think that no fundamental solutions are expected from the change of city government. The new Moscow City Soviet's stock of trust is measured not in years, nor even in months—it is no accident that from the very first day of the work of the current session, the capital's press and the deputies themselves began to look for those who "deliberately" spin out debates on points of order.

Is it any wonder that in the face of such suspiciousness the session did not begin to decide anything until its fourth day? It would have been strange if such slowness had not irritated the voters, but at our own risk we will say nonetheless that this was natural. It was even essential, because deputies must find out for themselves how much "parliamentary indecisiveness" is worth today, and see for whom it is an aberration, and for whom a calculation.

The problem of power—this is evidently how the main point on the agenda for Moscow City Soviet's first session may be defined. Yesterday we could have decided this question in a day, because it did not strictly speaking arise at all. Today's Moscow City Soviet is well aware that a diarchy is impossible. The resolution of the question of power means not only a political choice, but also resolution of arguments about bread and meat, which, depending on this choice, will or will not go up in price.

"G.Kh. Popov was one of the main candidates for the post of Moscow City Soviet chairman, as became known even before the session," Deputy Anpilov told us, explaining the position of the "Moscow" bloc. "He made no secret of his views either during the election campaign or in interviews. It is difficult to say what results Gavriil Kharitonovich's recommendations will produce, but neither he nor the other advocates of market relations (including those who are members of the Presidential Council) are concealing the fact that we must prepare for difficulties. My opinion is this: Economics scholars are promising us corn with a dozen cobs, but up to now they have not even conducted any experiments into its cultivation. A scientific study of the question is missing. In these circumstances it is essential that Muscovites themselves share responsibility for future changes in the economic and social life of the city with the deputies..."

Deputy Anpilov did not express this opinion just in lobbies. He was author of a proposal to carry out the election of the Moscow City Soviet chairman not at the session, but by direct suffrage of all Muscovites. But herein lies a paradox: It is indisputable that this democratic demand was almost deadlocked by the democratic majority at the session. Progress again came to a standstill: Members of the conciliation commission made up of members of all political groups and blocs maintained that the proposal did not conform to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Constitution. In the upshot it was decided to take the appropriate legislative initiative to the Russian parliament.

All the same, it is very difficult at times to agree with the logic of blocs; too often it turns out that the tactics of factional battle contradict the deputies' actual sympathies and antipathies. I believe that "Moscow" group representative Deputy Iyevlev was sincere in nominating for the post of Moscow City Soviet, Chairman Sergey Stankevich... one of the leaders of the "Democratic Russia" bloc. Choosing between the two possible candidates from this bloc (Popov and Stankevich), and understanding that the chances of its own candidates are small, the "apparatus" is ready to accept Sergey Borisovich sooner than Gavriil Kharitonovich. The reason has nothing whatever to do with differences of program: Their reform programs are exactly alike. Evidently "Moscow" finds it simpler to accept a representative of the galaxy of young politicians.

It did not work. Stankevich withdrew his own candidacy. And only subsequent events will show us whether he was farsighted in following the factional interest.

And so the die is cast—both literally and metaphorically. G. Popov became the sole candidate from "Democratic Russia." He won "by the fall of the dice" the right to read his program first. The "Moscow" group, at a closed session which excluded not only journalists but also deputies belonging to other groups (the doors were guarded by Deputy Danilov, a militia captain), nominated A. Bryachikhin, first secretary of Sevastopolskiy Party Raykom [rayon committee], as an alternative to Popov. It was also clear to those present that the remaining three candidates—engineer N. Kaburneyev ("Independents") and lecturer O. Kachalin and Professor I. Preobrazhenskiy ("Moscow") were nominated for purely procedural reasons.

We will not begin to expound the deputies' programs in detail, especially since the central idea of each was the recognition of the planned market economy and the urgent necessity of setting up a reliable mechanism of social protection from it for the citizens. It seems that, just as in the election campaign, differences lay not so much in the substance of the slogans as in the style of their presentation. And in the pace of the projected reforms.

The results of the vote speak for themselves. But the essence of the choice made yesterday was summed up by USSR Peoples' Deputy N. Travkin in a speech to the Moscow City Soviet deputies before the vote:

"Moscow is the region into which it is impossible to send tanks. The Moscow City Soviet session projects itself onto all the other soviets, and if the country sees that the victory of democratic forces is possible in Moscow, an entirely new situation will arise. But if such a victory does not occur here in the Moscow City Soviet, then all democracy in the whole country will be buried..."

Vlasov on RSFSR Economic, Political Issues

PM2304160090 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with A. Vlasov, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Council of Ministers, by Yu. Nikolayev; date, place of interview not stated: "Reality of Renewal"]

[Text] [Nikolayev] I would have preferred not to begin our conversation today, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, with the notorious attack by Professor A.A. Sobchak at the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies, but circumstances, as the saying goes, dictate this. At a SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA "roundtable" meeting with Siberian deputies in Irkutsk, one participant suddenly stated that the leaders of our Russian Federation have compromised themselves merely by running as candidate RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] deputies in outlying national districts...

[Vlasov] By the way, I too have not the slightest desire to go back to that congress incident, still less to enter into any kind of polemics, because then it would be impossible to avoid touching on some sensitive points, including moral and personal aspects. But circumstances really prompt me to make this matter quite clear. Especially if you take into account the intensive campaign to whip up passions around the "apparatchiks," and especially the present leaders, which is being deliberately pursued more or less everywhere. One of the ploys used is this. They have deliberately taken refuge, it is said, in the remote provinces in search of easy votes from the "silent majority." And they are running "not where they live and work and where they are well known, but a long way away, in the sticks," as Comrade Sobchak again asserted after the congress in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY. But it is reasonable to ask: Where does the Council of Ministers chairman work? Is it not more logical for him to run specifically in the provinces, so as to form a better idea of what they need?

And also, I myself decided that since I had won a seat as a Union deputy from a Russian oblast (Rostov), I would run as an RSFSR deputy in one of the autonomous republics: Buryatia, where I was born; Chechen-Ingushetia, where I worked for nine years; or Yakutia, from where I received the largest number of telegrams in support of my candidacy. We are often slow to tackle urgent problems in the autonomous formations, and this not infrequently leads to the growth of social tension, and sometimes interethnic friction, if not actually conflict. I saw a deputy's seat in one of these formations as a real opportunity to gain a fuller, more vivid sense of the grievances and hopes of our national formations and take account of their aspirations better and more comprehensively in practical activity.

As for "Vlasov the Yakut"... Yes, I was born in Buryatia, but it was Yakutia that became my second home, and to this day thousands of threads of friendship bind me to it. It was from Yakutsk, in 1942, that my father went to war, where he burned himself out. Later I myself worked side by side with the Yakuts for seven years. Yakutia made me a man and a citizen, so I have a moral duty to it. Incidentally, I was chosen from four alternative candidates.

[Nikolayev] I remember I myself was gripped by curiosity at the congress: Why did the well-known lawyer not have any questions for those USSR people's deputies who first of all failed in the election struggle in the capital, and then rushed off to collect those very "votes"—one to the Moscow region, another to Kherson or Kharkov, anything to secure the longed-for seat? It seems that one present-day Muscovite can run in Kharkov or Magadan, while another must not set foot outside his own house. Why this double standard? Or is it all a matter of one's attitude to leaders and "apparatchiks"? It is customary to heap the blame wholesale onto them, rather than anyone else, for all our troubles. And perhaps onto the "partocracy" too...

[Vlasov] That is exactly it, wholesale, indiscriminately, without trying in any way to analyze the actions of a particular apparatus or worker...

[Nikolayev] But could it be that you yourself provide food for all kinds of conjectures and slanders simply by not keeping people well informed about your practical work? To clarify my meaning, I will explain what I am talking about, in relation, if you will forgive me, to your own personal activity, both in the past and in the present. Any objection?

[Vlasov] Please do! I would find it interesting...

[Nikolayev] Fine! Ask any passerby in the street today who started the implacable struggle against the mafia in our country. And he will mention two or three investigators. Because their names are on everyone's lips. And hardly anyone will remember, for instance, A.V. Vlasov, although there appears to be every justification for this. I myself probably only remember this because I arrived in Rostov when you were party obkom [oblast committee] first secretary there and were beginning the battle against the corruption that had permeated every pore of the soviet, economic, and even—in part—the party apparatus...

[Vlasov] But party committees were doing the same thing all over the country.

And obviously you cannot say that no one knows about those things. There were some well-publicized trials in our oblast too. And to be frank, glasnost was our most powerful ally at that time. Without it the brick wall of mutual cover-ups, nepotism, and staggering falsifications and pilfering could not be broken down.

[Nikolayev] And it took character...

[Vlasov] Probably the most difficult thing was not knowing who to believe... When we seriously set about tackling the corrupt elements, they really did emerge from every pore. Even five chiefs of oblast administrations were sent to the dock.

[Nikolayev] As far as I recall (and I saw it at the time!) by no means everyone liked the drastic measures.

[Vlasov] Certainly not! Leaders who had overstepped the mark had to be relieved of their posts. Many people felt aggrieved.

[Nikolayev] Nonetheless, later you risked running as a candidate USSR people's deputy in Rostov Oblast...

[Vlasov] What kind of a risk was that? I firmly believed that there were far more honest people than people who were exploiting the mentality of stagnation for self-seeking purposes. And if I myself had contributed to some degree to enabling the vast bulk of Rostov's people to believe in the very possibility of social justice, that would not be forgotten. And so it turned out, in fact. This is all the more pleasing in that I had not done very much work in Rostov. Basically we were only just beginning to put our plans into practice.

[Nikolayev] I was warned, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, that you do not like talking about your past work...

[Vlasov] Whether I like it or not is beside the point. I do indeed feel uncomfortable about it, but for another reason. I really do not like casting aspersions on my predecessor or showing him up in a disadvantageous light. After all, how does it look? As if, before you came, people were doing nothing but screwing up, but then you "came, saw, and conquered," put things straight, and changed things for the better.

[Nikolayev] All the same, I will ask you to tell us, if only in brief, about your work in the post of USSR minister of internal affairs. This is necessary in order to enable the reader to form a fuller picture of the man who now heads the government and apparently intends to continue to occupy that post.

[Vlasov] When I was appointed minister, I was warned: You are taking on a ship that has holes in both sides. One was made by Shchelokov through his lack of principle, the other by the cadre shakeup that followed and all the innocent victims. And the consequent confusion among the people who were left, the loss of professionalism. It was necessary to heal the wounds. My former habits of political work came in very useful there. There was plenty of tension, but it was interesting: Perestroyka was beginning, and we all felt a charge. Crime was also on the decline.

Fomerly, the ministry was in a top secret zone, closed to criticism. It was necessary to learn to operate, as the saying goes, in the light of glasnost and heightened public attention. To tear down the curtains of secrecy. This openness did not come easily. After all, I myself formerly believed sincerely that not all information should be given to everyone.

Then there were new worries. Under the 1987 amnesty 600,000 people came out of prison, and society was not at all prepared for that. And in the conditions of a shortage economy and the development of the cooperative movement, which was not always well thought out, the social base of crime began to widen...

[Nikolayev] But then you were called to account for something else, for negligence in the activity of the RSFSR Government.

[Vlasov] First and foremost because it is said to be lagging behind events, bringing up the rear. In terms of the development of economic autonomy, Russia, they say, is behind virtually all the Union republics.

[Nikolayev] And is that not true?

[Vlasov] I would tend to avoid categorical assessments. And you cannot compare what is not comparable. The Baltic republics, for instance, are one thing, and the vast Russian Federation, which is inhabited by a great many peoples, large and small, with completely different regional conditions and development levels, is another.

People reproach us: Why are you delaying even with regional self-financing? Why not transfer autonomous republics, krays, and oblasts to this sytem, if they so wish. But it is not that simple. I think it will suffice to say that of our 73 territories, in 25 expenditure exceeds income. Two-thirds of the RSFSR's territory belongs to the regions of the Far North and equivalent regions with particularly complex and sometimes extreme conditions for economic activity. Putting them all on self-financing just like that, indiscriminately, would smack of adventurism.

Especially since at the moment only 12 percent of profit from Union industry enters the RSFSR budget. I could cite other depressing figures too. Such as the fact that our prices for raw material resources are too low and should be at least twice what they are, while prices for heavy industry output in general should be more than 50 percent higher than they are. At the same time consumer goods prices are substantially higher than they should be. For the RSFSR, given a transition to equivalent exchange, this would mean the loss of more than 50 billion rubles a year. Furthermore our economy's specialization in the production of the means of production predetermines a greater degree of capital-intensiveness and labor-intensiveness of output than in other republics. And the federation has to channel into accumulation annually R20-25 billion which, by average Union standards, could be directed into consumption. Furthermore, the opening up and provision of social facilities in regions of the North, Siberia, and the Far East requires increased capital investments.

Nor is the revenue from foreign economic activity equivalent to our contribution.

I could go on complaining about our grievances, but we already have more than enough "mourners for Russia" and destroyers of all that went before; what we lack is enterprising, creative workers. And as for inequality, I can tell you that it is being eliminated, in particular by new legislation.

On all questions connected with economic sovereignty and the republic's switch to self-financing, we have approached the Union organs and intend to defend our positions firmly. It is a question of extending the republic's sphere of influence over enterprises under Union jurisdiction, switching to a regulated and socially protected market system, increasing normative contributions to the republican and local budgets, including currency contributions, and, of course, making substantial changes in wholesale prices for fuel, raw materials, and many other types of output.

We are now watching carefully to see how things develop in the 13 territories that have gone over to the new principles of management. Many hitches have already been encountered during the implementation of the course of self-financing. I recently met with leaders of a number of oblasts where the budget is being formed in a new way. They have funds, but this is "paper" money, not backed up by resources. It cannot be used for social or other purposes. So it is necessary to seek a solution and make adjustments to the established models. Once again resourcefulness, the ability to manage efficiently, and the spirit of socialist enterprise are in demand. And again the question of the transformation of the commodity-money relationship has arisen.

[Nikolayev] All this is logical, of course, but it will hardly save the RSFSR government from criticism at the forthcoming Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies...

[Vlasov] This must be expected, judging by the preparations for the congress in what we could call the radical milieu. For instance, look at the appeal "To Russia's Voters and Deputies at All Levels" in the latest issue of OGONEK. "We are tired of being poor." "We do not need a 'great power' with a hungry, unshod people." That is quite trenchant. It makes an impression. But what lies behind the striking, self-disparaging phrases?

Concrete measures of some kind against poverty, proposals on how prosperity can be achieved? Nothing of the kind! Just noisy slogans whose only purpose is to add fuel to the fire and whip up the atmosphere in society prior to the Congress. But emotions are bad advisers in politics. You need sober, businesslike, profoundly scientific calculation. If any bloc or group of deputies offers that to the congress, there will be something to argue about, some options to consider. And even then, only if hysteria can be avoided.

And there is so much to do, whatever region of the Russian Federation you take. The Nonchernozem, the Far East, Siberia, national autonomous formations, the small peoples, several dozen cities in ecological disaster zones... And the revival of culture, national traditions, and spiritual values requires such efforts. I cannot list it all! And what we need to do today is not to moan and groan, but to seek and without fail to find ways of resolving the urgent problems of Russia's renewal and the radical improvement of its peoples' life. And we must necessarily do this together, all of us.

[Nikolayev] In that document, which as it happens was signed not a day earlier and not a day later, but on 1 April, I have underlined these lines. "Instead of the publicly announced separation of party and state power, party organs are everywhere engaged in taking over the newborn soviets." What can you say about that?

[Vlasov] Only that the authors of the appeal are at odds not only with logic and common sense, but with memory too. As we know, the soviets were born early in the century. The fact that until recently they did not have sufficient powers is another matter. Now the situation is changing for the better. The law "On the General Principles of Local Self-Management and Local Economy in the USSR" was published only a few days ago. It provides some basis for the widening of our soviets' competence, but this alone is patently not enough. We need a corresponding normative base and a new taxes and prices policy. If all these essential conditions are met, then real, guaranteed opportunities will arise for true power for the soviets.

Now, as for the "party organs taking over the soviets." For some reason the anonymous authors of the appeal apparently recognize the right to power only for their own bloc. But what if the deputies of a particular soviet hold a different view? What should be done then? And why should they dictate who is to be elected to what posts in the renewed soviets?

I would prefer not to think this, but the impression is that on the back of the natural dissatisfaction with the difficulties that have arisen in perestroyka, the adherents of the notorious administrative edict system have revived their activity, only with a repainted facade, in a "democratic" aspect, so to speak.

The persistent propagandization of the so-called "nonparty principle" of power is also worrying. It is well known that in revolutionary periods the nonparty principle, as V.I. Lenin put it, is bound to become a fashionable slogan, when the most "commonplace" superficial phenomenon of political life appears to be the nonparty organization, nonparty democratism, the nonparty strike movement, the nonparty revolutionary movement. All this talk about the nonparty principle means nothing but the "deception of the masses by political charlatans."

[Nikolayev] As you know, in parallel with the organizational committee for preparations for the congress, formed in accordance with the law by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, another committee is in operation—that of the so-called "Democratic Russia" bloc. They are already actually sharing out the portfolios...

[Vlasov] It would probably be more expedient for all the initiative committees and groups to operate jointly, or at least in coordination. But I see nothing reprehensible even in separate work. We should value our opponents—they can formulate our shortcomings more accurately than we can. Let them meet, formulate proposals for the agenda, indicate their candidacies... I hope the congress will have the wisdom to choose the most fruitful of all the proposals and ideas. As long as they do not plunge it into futile, empty debates dictated not by concern for the revival of Russian statehood, economic autonomy, and spiritual rebirth, but by political ambition and claims to a monopoly of power.

[Nikolayev] Our readers would certainly be interested to know: How is the Russian government preparing for the first Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies?

[Vlasov] Very seriously, I would venture to assure you. At present the government is completing work, in conjunction with the RSFSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], academy and sector institutes, and experienced economic managers, on the main document to be submitted to the congress—an outline of Russia's economic sovereignty. It will include a whole package of proposals on the methods and peculiarities of the socioeconomic development of the Russian Federation, economic relations with other republics and with the Union, the assimilation of market relations, rational utilization of nature, and so forth.

[Nikolayev] Could you not speak in more detail about this outline and your other "creations" for the congress?

[Vlasov] I think that would be premature, and this is why. At present we—by which I mean the Council of Ministers apparatus, as well as the Gosplan and ministries—are working very intensively with RSFSR people's deputies on finalizing and clarifying the precongress documents. I myself, for instance, have just met with several groups of people's representatives. Members of the government exchanged opinions with deputies representing higher education. Meetings are planned with new deputies from other social groups. And many are approaching us of their own accord—one after another—with practical proposals and advice on the implementation of various plans.

Furthermore a special sociological poll was conducted on questions of the RSFSR's economic sovereignty and the development of our ties with other republics. So we are trying to take different opinions into account as best we can. For the moment, I can assure you firmly of one thing: The whole package of our proposals is aimed at ensuring that people sense real, tangible changes for the better in their lives as quickly as possible. And in very specific spheres: the provision of food, housing, consumer goods. The planned reform of the construction complex is also aimed at benefiting people, as are the ecological program, the large-sclae measures for social restructuring of the countryside...

A special government report is in preparation, which will set forth ideas on the RSFSR's political sovereignty and priorities for today and the long term.

To give you an idea of the scale of the work of developing statehood, I will cite the following fact. In the Russian Federation today, 16 political structures that exist in other republics do not exist at all. So how can we be an equal among equals?

[Nikolayev] If I understand it correctly, you "tried out" some elements in the future report when you addressed the delegates to the congress of Russian trade unions.

[Vlasov] No, that was only a briefing. I admit I was very distressed by the fact that people received it, how shall I put it, coolly.

[Nikolayev] Why?

[Vlasov] Well, you see, it is simpler and more accessible to your audience if you shout "down with poverty!", for instance, or promise a fivefold increase in wages. Naturally, people like that. But how can a politician who respects the people put forward slogans what are not backed up by real potential, on the one hand? And on the other, I now see that my briefing was overburdened with economic calculations and too many statistics, which are not speedily understood by an audience. The fundamental, innovative propositions were not highlighted or honed. The listeners failed to perceive, as they later said from the platform, a self-critical admission that the government is guilty of serious shortcomings on questions of the implementation of economic reform and perestroyka in general in the socioeconomic life of the Russian Federation. These remarks were justified. So I had to learn my lessons and make running adjustments. I did this when I delivered my concluding speech.

I also spoke about objective difficulties and the fact that a new concept of the government's actual work is absolutely necessary. What is the use of the Law on the RSFSR Council of Ministers today? It does not contain a single point saying that the government "decides," everywhere we find either "coordinates" or, in general, "participates." What can you say in any case, when until recently only four percent of the total volume of the Russian Federation's industrial production was under the jurisdiction of the republic government, while all the rest related to the activity of Union ministries and the USSR Government.

[Nikolayev] Is the situation improving now?

[Vlasov] The new RSFSR Supreme Soviet will presumably adopt a legal act on the Council of Ministers under which the government will become an organ with full rights and full powers to ensure Russia's sovereignty.

There have also been real improvements in production. A larger volume of industrial production is under our control now, though not as much as in Moldavia or the Baltic republics.

[Nikolayev] And that, incidentally, is often laid to the account of the Russian government. It failed to insist on equal proportions in the division of Union and republican industrial production, following the example of certain other republics, and thereby restricted the potential for contributions to the Russian Federation's budget, and therefore ultimately for improving living standards for every one of us.

[Vlasov] There is reason in such criticisms. Only here is something that I think must be taken into account. The whole question is that of how we intend to live in future. Within the framework of a Federation of equal republics, a united Union, or within the framework of a confederation? I have been criticized for saying at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies: We do not intend to make claims on any of the republics or present any bills for payment on the grounds that there were formerly distortions in economic development. I had to clarify this: I was talking about all the republics that are in our Union. Accounts will have to be presented to those that secede from it.

Now for proportions. We too are in favor of justice. But we are opposed to the mechanical transfer of Union ministries to the Russian flag. That is tantamount to the replacement of one form of diktat—ministerial—by another—republican or local. The system must be changed.

A simple example. Four Union construction ministries were handed over to the Russian Federation, but did that improve the situation on the construction sites? No way. The central structures were in ruins. Delivery cooperation was disrupted and departmental barriers arose. In many oblasts subunits of three, four, or even more ministries are still in operation and the construction industry base is fragmented. There is no integrated construction strategy or tactics. So who has benefited?

It is quite obvious that obsolete structures, no matter whose jurisdiction you place them under, will not change anything by themselves. Different approaches are needed, with these construction organizations, for instance. On the way to economic sovereignty we will have to create new structures centrally and locally, regional and interregional associations and concerns, and seek forms of management and organization of production and labor that will ensure a breakthrough in the economy, combine the interests of local organs of power and the center, and, most important, make it possible to start up the new mechanism and new economic relations.

[Nikolayev] Yes, there are major, large-scale tasks, and it will doubtless not be easy for the new administrative and executive organs of the Russian Federation to resolve them...

[Vlasov] The matter is further exacerbated by the fact that everything in society has become agitated, painful, and overheated to critical point. The long-awaited change for the better has not happened—in fact, every day the situation is growing worse, in all socioeconomic parameters. Stagnation in industry, construction, and transport; the growing imbalance in the market; declining discipline; the escalation of group and regional egotism; and so forth. It is very important for our soviets, at every level, to pay the most serious attention to this from their very first steps.

One worrying thing is the slackening of the struggle against bureaucracy (it is as if the 19th party conference resolution on this matter had never happened!) and the danger of "emergency measures" becoming ordinary practice, which is fraught with the risk of a return to administrative edict methods, only in a worse, "neo-Stalinist" form. Surely it is obvious that along with joint state-cooperative formations, "neoapparatchiks" and parallel power structures have also sprung up?

In order to overcome all these negative phenomena, a carefully thought out theoretical model for the renewal of socialism is needed. Nor do we yet have a model for market regulation of the economy. The inadequate, half-hearted version of reform that is now being implemented is not healing, but destroying the economy. An extremely businesslike and responsible approach is required of all of us in order to rectify the situation.

It must also be borne in mind that half-hearted economic reform has naturally not resolved (nor could it) the question of new motivations and incentives for increasing discipline and labor productivity. The pursuit of rubles is exacerbated by the rigorously narrow, indifferent approach of group (and now, too, even regional) egotism. Orientation toward short-term advantages is a considerable danger: Less expenditure means greater benefits; the more we sell, the more consumer goods we can buy. Hence—"everything is for sale"; hence the minimal funds for modernization and new technology.

And here you cannot fail to notice the paradox of the "new voluntarism": Instead of strict regulation of absolutely everything from above—total (or almost total) lack of control at the level of sectors, subsectors, and even individual enterprises.

Whereas formerly we believed in the possibility of changing economic laws (and processes) by the will of the party and its Central Committee, now we are planning to substitute juridical laws for economic laws. "Law mania" represents the latest fit of euphoria, this time legal euphoria. Many people think that as soon as we make legal "amendments" to objective ownership relations, then interest and labor, the objectives of production and the means of achieving them, will miraculously come together, and people will begin working miracles of productivity.

Naturally, "destatization" and the eradication of monopolism and overcentralization of the means of production are necessary and useful. But only up to a certain point (once again, determined by the limits of objective economic laws). Otherwise everything will be swamped by egotism and economic separatism and there will be gross ruptures of economic ties... We are in favor of the speediest transition to a regulated market, but against confusion, against price chaos.

It is clear that deformations of the foundations and inconsistency in the implementation of economic reform are causing "underground shocks" and damage to the superstructure too. I think the path we have traveled in the reform of the political system is not adequate to the tasks of improving it. Concerns, consortiums, cooperatives, joint enterprises, contract prices, the elimination of the foreign trade monopoly, and so forth promise us "mountains of gold" and prosperity. But for the time being all this is only leading to a dangerous burgeoning of the universal pursuit of money and the commercialization of human relations, culture, and art.

Perhaps these opinions are not beyond dispute, they may be too categorical that is understandable... But the most important thing is that we must all be ready resolutely to overcome whatever is hampering the improvement of the life of the peoples of the Russian Federation.

Central Asia

Kazakh Plenum Discusses Constitutional Changes

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[Text] Alma-Ata, 23 April (TASS)—Political reform in the republic was discussed at the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee Plenum which opened here today.

The plenum adopted a legislative decision to present, for examination by the first session of the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan of the new convocation, proposals about changing a number of articles in the constitution (basic law) of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] including Article 6, concerning the role and place of the Communist Party in the social structure of the republic. It also advocated the need for adoption at that session of the law of the Kazakh SSR "On the Establishment of the

Post of President of the Kazakh SSR and the Introduction of Changes and Addenda to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Kazakh SSR."

A decision was passed "on making addenda to the agenda of the 27th Kazakh Communist Party Congress." The procedure for forming the leading bodies of the Kazakh Communist Party was endorsed.

Nursultan Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, spoke at the plenum.

The plenum is continuing its work.

Kirghiz Council of Ministers Published

LD2304141890

[Editorial Report] Frunz SOVETSKAYA KIRGHIZIYA in Russian on 15 April 1990 carries on page one a 1,250-word report on the decision of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet on the formation of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers, as follows:

Chairman of Council of Ministers	Dzhumagulov, Apas
First Deputy Chairmen	Aseyinov, Makun Aseyinovich
	Sydykov, Usen Sydykovich
Deputy Chairmen	Tumenbayeva, Zhanyl Tumenbayevna
	Iordan, Andrey Andreyevich
	Fisher, Yan Yefimovich
	Begaliyev, Sopubek Begaliyevich
	Dadabayevich
Foreign Minister	Tumenbayeva, Zhanyl Tumenbayevna
Minister of Internal Affairs	Goncharov, Viktor Vasilyevich
Minister of People's Education	Bazarkulov, Mukash
Minister of Health	Ismailov, Bekmurza Ismailovich
Minister of Culture	Toktosartov, Akun
Minister of Light Industry	Rutskiy, Sergey Borisovich
Minister of Land Reclamation And Water Resources	Sulaymanov, Tashtanbek
Minister of Construction Materials Industry	Nosinov, Mars Umraliyevich
Minister of Communications	Tyurebayev, Vil
	Nadzhimetdinovich
Minister of Trade	Zheleznov, Aleksandr Nikitovich
Minister of Finance	Kunakunov, Kerimzhan
Minister of Justice	Tabaldiyev, Busurmankul
	Berkutovich
Minister of Consumer Services	Aldasheva, Shakira Baygaziyevna
Minister of Housing and Communal Amenities	Vasilchenko, Nikolay
	Nikolayevich
Minister of Local Industry	Abdrayev, Karyke Abdrayevich
Chairman of State Committee Agriculture/Food	Sydykov, Usen Sydykovich
First Deputy Chairman and Minister	Stelmakh, Petr Grigoryevich
State Planning Committee Chairman	Begaliyev, Sopubek Begaliyevich
Chairman of State Committee for Material and Technical Supply	Dadabayev, Khasanzhan
	Dadabayevich
State Construction Committee Chairman	Ablesov, Sydykbek
State Construction Committee	
First Deputy Chairman and Minister	Panasenko, Aleksandr Alekeyevich
Chairman of State Committee for Transport and Roads	Ubyshev, Dzhumakadyr
Chairman of State Committee for Labor and Social Security	Dolmatov, Vladimir
	Konstantinovich
Chairman of State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting	Orozova, Umtul Sheysheyevna
Chairman of State Committee for The Protection of Nature	Muratalin, Iskender Sadykovich
Chairman of State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade	Ryspayev, Barpy Ryspayevich
Chairman of the KGB	Asankulov, Dzhumabek
Chairman of State Committee for The Supply of Oil Products	Vozzhayev, Yuriy Ivanovich
Chairman of State Committee for The Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry and for Mine Supervision	Karmanov, Ivan Vasilyevich
Chairman of State Committee for Physical Culture, Sport, and Tourism	Kutmanaliyev, Eshim
Chairman of the State Statistics Committee	Akkaziyev, Bulat Akunovich
Charge d'Affaires	Akunov, Beyshebek

The decision is signed by A. Masaliyev, chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet and dated Frunze, 13 April 1990.

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DATE FILMED

25 April 1990